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INTRODUCTION

Digital technologies combined with optical networks make it possible to provide multiple communications services-i.e., voice, video and dataover a single network or platform. This "convergence" holds great promise for the delivery of
cost-effective, innovative new services. At the same
time, it presents daunting challenges to those
charged with administering a regulatory framework premised upon distinct networks, services
and service providers. These integrated digital capabilities rarely fit nicely into existing regulatory
categories.
Vexing "category problems'' arise as providers
already franchised to use public rights-of-way for
specified services begin to deploy additional communications services over existing or upgraded
plant. Some of these issues arise because facilitiesbased cable operators and telecommunications
carriers use the public rights-of-way in a similar
manner, but are regulated under vastly different
regulatory schemes. Existing regulatory regimes
were designed to govern technologically distinct
networks and services that were relatively easy to
recognize-wireline telephone, cable television,
I

See FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 29, DIGITAL TOR(au-

NADO: TiE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

thored by Kevin Werbach), at 26-47 (1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/
oppwp29.pdf (noting difficulties in categorizing Internet services for regulatory purposes and observing that existing regulations "could produce strange results if applied blindly");
Id. at 43; Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining the Future
in Terms of the Past, FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 30 (1998),
republished in 7 COMMLAw CONSPEcrus 37 (1999) [hereinafter

Esbin] (noting that the Internet poses significant challenges
for government policymakers and regulators).

broadcast television, wireless telecommunications
and satellite television services. Correspondingly,
the various "titles" of the Communications Act of
19342 establish regulatory requirements that are,
for the most part, technology, service and network-specific. Technological advances, which enable the provision of familiar services over new
platforms, new services over old platforms and
multiple media services over any platform, are
confounding our ability to intelligently apply
these discrete definitional categories. In our digital age, it is often said that "bits are bits," but government officials must continue to attempt to tell
them apart in order to carry out their statutory
obligations. The exercise must be performed regardless of whether the ultimate goal is to regulate or refrain from regulating a particular com3
munications service.
A vigorous public policy debate has emerged regarding how our regulatory regimes may be rationalized to encourage innovation and market entry
while protecting communications users, the integrity of public rights-of-way and the public interest
generally. This debate has been occurring at every
level of government and has focused on the inter2
Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.

§§ 151-614) [hereinafter Communications Act or Act].

" See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), FinalDecision,77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980). The FCC's seminal Computer Inquiy proceedings were aimed as much at regulating
that which must be regulated on a common carrier basis
under Title II as they were in distinguishing those services
which utilized common carrier communications but which
did not need to be regulated on a common carrier basis because they were subject to vibrant competition.
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twined issues of public rights-of-way management,
regulatory classification and the limits of government regulatory authority over new technologies
and services.
Almost immediately following passage of the
landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the
"1996 Act"), 4 provisions aimed at removing legal
and regulatory barriers to entry into telecommunications markets at the state and local levels 5 became the subject of petitions for preemption
before the Federal Communications Commission
(the "FCC" or the "Commission"). 6 These cases
involved the scope of local franchising of telecommunications carriers, the scope of permissible
rights-of-way management authority, the permissible level of telecommunications franchise fees
and a host of related issues, including the fundamental question of what it means to "use" public
the rights-of-way in a manner that would trigger
local rights-of-way management authority. A substantial body of administrative and judicial case
law has developed, and, as this article will demonstrate, it establishes a very modest role for local
governments in the realm of substantive telecommunications services and advanced services regulation.
4
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1996 Act].
5
See 1996 Act, sec. 101(a), 110 Stat. 70-71, codified at 47
U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
6 See, e.g., In re Classic Telephone, Inc. Petition for Preemption, Declaratory Ruling and Injunctive Relief, Memorandum Opinion and Orde; II FCC Rcd. 13,082, 13,083, para. 1

(1996)

[hereinafter Classic Telephone], enforcement denied, 12

FCC Rcd. 15,619, 15,638, para. 35, (1997); In re Classic Telephone, Inc., Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd. 19,974,

19,975, para. 3 (1999), affgln re Classic Telephone, Inc., Order, 14 FCC Rcd. 960 (1999), vacated as moot, In re Classic

Telephone, Inc., Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 25,101 (2000), motion to
dismiss granted sub nom. City of Bogue v. FCC, Nos. 96-1432

and 99-1521, 2001 U.S. App. LEXis 7562 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15,
2001). In re TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Preemption and Other Relief
Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 544(e), and 253, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 21,396 (1997) [hereinafter
Troy Order], petition for reconsideration denied, 13 FCC Rcd.

16,400, 16,426, para. 83 (1998) [hereinafter Troy Reconsideration Order].
7
Even the terminology of the open access movement is a
matter of dispute. This article will refer to the Internet services provided by cable operators such as AT&T Broadband
as "cable Internet services" and, where appropriate, will refer
to the facilities used to deliver such services as the "cable Internet platform." Others use similar terminology. For example, the FCC has chosen the terms "cable modem service"
and "cable modem platform" to refer to these services and
facilities. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Ac-

By far the most visible and controversial convergence issue has been the question of mandatory
"open access" for unaffiliated Internet service
providers ("ISPs") to the advanced Internet services and platform provided by cable system operators. 7 The push for open access has been driven
by a coalition of online service providers, ISPs, local and long distance telephone companies, and
consumer advocates seeking government-man-

dated open access to the Internet service provided
over franchised cable systems. 8
Initially, efforts to secure open access to cable

were focused on the proceedings before the FCC.
Yet, since early 1999, the FCC, under the leadership of former Chairman William E. Kennard, repeatedly declined to impose mandatory "open access" requirements on cable. The FCC formulated
and implemented this "hands off' policy indirectly in the context of merger review proceedings, in its periodic proceedings to determine the
status of broadband deployment pursuant to section 706 of the 1996 Act 9 and in the course of
other administrative proceedings.' 0 Prior to late
2000, no formal proceeding before the FCC dealt
exclusively or even directly with the question of
the appropriate regulatory status of cable-delivcess to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of
Inquiry, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287, para. I n.1 (2000) [hereinafter
Open Access NOI].

8 See, e.g.,
openNET Coalition, at http://www.opennet
coalition.org (last visited June 2, 2001).
9 See 1996 Act, § 706, 110 Stat. 153, codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 157 note (2000). Section 706 of the 1996 Act was codified
as a note to section 7 of the Communications Act of 1934.
Section 706(a) directs the FCC and each state commission
with regulatory jurisdiction over telecommunications services
to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans" by using, among other things, various "measures that
promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment." Id. Section 706(b) directs the FCC
to regularly initiate a notice of inquiry concerning the availability of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans. Id. If the FCC determines that deployment is not reasonable and timely, section 706(b) mandates that it "shall
take immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment
and by promoting competition in the telecommunications
market." Id. Under section 706(c)(1) "advanced telecommunications capability" is defined "without regard to any transmission media or technology, as high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to
originate and receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technology." Id.
10 See, e.g.,
In reApplications for Consent to the Transfer
of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from
Tele-communications, Inc., Transferor To AT&T Corp.,
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ered Internet services.'' In the wake of their initial defeats at the FCC, open access proponents
launched a three-pronged attack on cable operators that focused primarily on cable local franchising authorities ("LFAs"), federal and state legislators, 12 and later the Federal Trade Commission

("FTC") in the context of the FTC's review of the
merger of America Online ("AOL") and Time
Warner.' At the same time, proponents lost no
opportunity to continue to press the FCC to
change its cable access policy from one of "vigilant restraint,"' 14 to active regulatory intervention.
The effort to force open access upon cable operators at the local level led to a series of conflicting court rulings on the appropriate regulatory
classification for cable Internet services, as well as
the extent of local power with respect to these services. 15 It also caused the FCC to file two amicus
curiae briefs with federal appellate courts reflecting the FCC's views on the twin issues of regulatory categorization and local authority.'" These
lawsuits proved awkward for the FCC because it
had yet to directly address the regulatory classifiTransferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd.
3160 (1999) [hereinafter AT&T/TCI Transfer Order];In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses
and Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc.,
Transferor To AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816 (2000) [hereinafter AT&T/
MediaOne Merger Order]; In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible
Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 FCC
Rcd. 2398 (1999); In re Internet Ventures, Inc., Internet OnRamp, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Internet Service Providers are Entitled to Leased Access to Cable Facilities Under Section 612 of the Communications Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order; 15 FCC Rcd. 3247 (2000) [hereinafter
[VI Leased Access Order].
I I See Esbin, supra note 1, at 113-18.
12
Nearly a dozen bills were proposed at the federal level
between 1999 and 2000. See, e.g., Internet Freedom and
Broadband Deployment Act of 1999, H.R. 2420, 106th Cong.
(1999); Consumer and Community Choice in Access Act of
1999, H.R. 2637, 106th Cong. (1999); Internet Growth and
Development Act of 1999, H.R. 1685, 106th Cong. (1999);
Broadband Internet Regulatory Relief Act of 1999, S. 877,
106th Cong. (1999). None of these bills were enacted, although the Tauzin-Dingell bill, H.R. 2420, which de-regulates
the broadband data offerings of the Bell Operating Companies, was re-introduced in 2001 as H.R. 1542. See H.R. 2420,
106th Cong. (1999); Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001, H.R. 1542, 107th Cong. (2001). Open
access legislation of one form or another was also introduced, but never enacted, in at least seventeen states. Open
Access Legislation, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 23, 2000, at 5.
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cation and related open access issues in the context of an industry-wide administrative proceeding. The resulting lack of interpretive and policy
guidance on the central question of regulatory
classification left the courts free to interpret the
statutory definitions and regulatory directives on
their own.
In June 2000, a defining moment in the push
for open access arrived when the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the City of Portland's open access ordinance was
preempted under a provision of the Communications Act that prohibits local franchising authorities from regulating or interfering with telecommunications services provided by cable
operators. 17 Although the Ninth Circuit determined that cable Internet service is not a Title VI
cable service, 18 it preempted the city's ordinance
on the theory that the cable operator's transport
of Internet services over cable television facilities
is a "telecommunications service," as defined in
the Act.' 9 Immediately thereafter, the FCC announced that it would initiate an inquiry into the
*19 (2000).
See Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission on Industry Monitoring Sessions Convened by Cable Services Bureau, BROADBAND TODAY,
available at http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus/cable/reports/
broadbandtoday.pdf (Oct. 1999); Barbara S. Esbin, Hands Off
Policy Works on Open Access, MULTI-C-ANNEL NEWS, July 26,
1999, at 69.
15 Compare AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp.
2d 1146, 1150, 1156 (D. Or. 1999) [hereinafter Portland I]
(affirming a Portland city ordinance that mandated non-disF.T.C. LEXIS 170,
14

criminatory access for Internet service providers not affiliated
with cable franchisees), rev'd, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)

[hereinafter Portland I]], with MediaOne Group, Inc. v.
County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000)
[hereinafter Henrico County 1] (holding that a local ordinance
mandating open access for any Internet service provider to
cable facilities is pre-empted by state and federal laws), affd,
257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Henrico County I1].
See also Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Gulf Power
Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Gulf
Power II], mandate stayed, cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 879 (2001).
'I

See Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC, at 3, 8, Portland

I1, 216 F.3d 871 (No. 99-35609); see also Amicus Curiae Brief
of the FCC, Henrico County 1, 257 F.3d 356 (Nos. 00-1680, 001709, 00-1719).
17 PortlandII, 216 F.3d at 878. Section 621 (b) (3) (B) of

See America Online, Inc. and Time Warner Inc., Con-

the Act bars any local requirement "that has the purpose or
effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting, or conditioning
the provision of a telecommunications service by a cable operator." 47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (B) (2000).
18 Portland II, 216 F.3d at 877.
19 Id. at 878. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). "The term
'telecommunications service' means the offering of telecom-

sent Order, Decision and Order, Order to Hold Separate, 2000

mtmnications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes

13
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issues raised by the court's action. 20
On September 28, 2000, the FCC initiated its
Inquiry to determine on a national basis the legal
and regulatory framework to govern the provision
of high-speed Internet service over cable. 21 While
the formal pleading cycle in the Inquiry closed on
January 10, 2001, additional action remains within
the discretion of the agency. 22 If the FCC deter-

mines that further action is warranted, this could
come in the form of a report, a declaratory ruling,
the initiation of a notice of proposed rulemaking,
or, depending upon the regulatory category selected, initiation of a proceeding to forbear from
23
regulation under section 10 of the Act.

Meanwhile, the various federal court decisions,
particularly the Ninth Circuit's decision in Portland II, have also engendered speculation that, if
Internet over cable is treated as a telecommunications service rather than a cable service, local governments may regulate it under their telecommunications franchising authority. 2 4 Indeed, as
discussed below, the Fourth Circuit's HenricoIdecision that cable operators offering Internet ser'25
vices maintain "telecommunications facilities"
may be misinterpreted as being consistent with
the need for additional telecommunications facilities authorizations at the local level. Yet, the scope
and extent of such local telecommunications
franchising authority is considerably narrower
than local cable franchising authority. As this article demonstrates, under relevant FCC and judicial
precedent, that authority does not extend to such
substantive service regulation as mandatory open
access.
Thus today, government at every level finds itself involved with these fundamental issues of regof users as to be effectively available directly to the public,
regardless of the facilities used." Id.
20 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission,
FCC Chairman to Launch Proceeding on "Cable Access"Kennard Says Time is Right to Establish Record on Marketplace Developments, available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/Cable/News_Releases/2000/nrcOO17.html (June
30, 2000); FCC Proceeding to Decide Key Cable Open Access Issue,
WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, July 10, 2000, at 1; FCC To
Launch Proceedingson Classification Of Cable Modem Services, Internet Telephony, TELECOMNIM. REP., July 3, 2000, at 5.
21 See Open Access NO1, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287.
22 The 2001 change in administration from Democratic
to Republican is widely believed to portend a less regulatory
approach to the communications industries. However, it remains to be seen how this will affect resolution of the issues
raised in the Open Access NOI. See, e.g., The New Communications Boss, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2001, at A20; Carolyn Hirschman, New Sheriff in Town, TELEPHONY MAG., Jan. 29, 2001, at

ulatory categorization and the limits of its regulatory authority. At each level, government and
judicial bodies have begun to arrive at different
and often conflicting conclusions regarding the
meaning of the 1996 Act's definitions as well as
the scope of its operative market-opening provisions.26 This fragmentation suggests the need for
government decision makers to determine which
policy goal or goals are preeminent and establish
a coherent policy course for achieving them.
A growing body of federal law and policy regarding limits on local government's exercise of
rights-of-way management authority with respect
to cable and telecommunications carriers provides excellent guidance to both the local official
and practitioner in this area. Section 253 rights-ofway management decisions have largely followed
and expanded upon FCC interpretative and policy decisions, which chart a narrow and limited
course for substantive local regulation of telecommunications and advanced services. As demonstrated herein, the consensus view appears to be
that the overriding federal policy to encourage
the rapid deployment of private sector investment
in advanced telecommunications and information
networks requires that local government authority
over such providers should be narrowly construed
and sparingly applied. In contrast, the growing
cable open access jurisprudence has suffered
from the lack of "controlling legal authority" from
the expert administrative agency on this matter.
This vacuum has led to a plethora of confused
and confusing judicial rulings on the regulatory
classification of the cable Internet service and
platform.
This article argues that, regardless of which reg14.
23
See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to
forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of the
Act "to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications
service, or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services" upon a finding that the statutory test
for forbearance has been met).
24 Court Ruling May Trigger Fresh Disputes Over Cities'

Rights, COMM.
25
26

DAiLY,

July 5, 2000, at 2.

Henrico County I1,257 F.3d at 363-64.

See AT&T v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999)
[hereinafter Iowa Utilities]

It would be a gross understatement to say that the [1996
Act] is not a model of clarity. It is in many important

respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the

economy worth tens of billions of dollars.
Id.
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ulatory classification ultimately is attached to Internet over cable, the scope of regulatory authority, particularly local franchising authority, over
these services is and should be limited as a matter
of federal law and policy. Part II reviews the history and policies underlying local franchising authority over cable and telecommunications providers. Part III analyzes FCC and judicial
approaches to rights-of-way management under
section 253 of the Communications Act and argues that overly broad, discriminatory and redundant rights-of-way authorizations should be
avoided. Part IV discusses federal policy regarding
regulation of the Internet and reviews the federal
judicial decisions regarding local authority to impose "open access" conditions on franchised cable
television operators and the regulatory status of
cable Internet service. Part V examines relevant issues raised by the FCC's Open Access NOI. Finally,
Part VI concludes that even if individual municipalities did hold authority over the provision of
cable Internet services, they should exercise their
discretion to refrain from extensive regulation.
Extensive local regulation would: (1) discourage
investment in advanced communications facilities
and thereby delay deployment of advanced services; (2) unnecessarily increase transaction costs
for communications providers and thereby increase consumer prices; and (3) result in an unstable and unpredictable regulatory environment,
which will serve as a barrier to competitive market
entry. Ironically, continued municipal support for
increased regulation of Internet services provided
by cable systems will, if successful, likely retard the
expansion of services provided over these systems,
which expansion in the authors' experience has
long been a local government goal.
These same policy concerns should also guide
the federal regulatory approach to this matter.
27
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 59 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4696 [hereinafter 1984 House Re-

port]; S. REP. No. 9867, at 6-7 (1983) (explaining that the
premise for local regulation of cable was its use of local
streets and rights-of-way).
28
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
636 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]; Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439, 494-95 (1991); Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1437 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of Broad. v. Quincy
Cable TV, Inc., 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Broward County, 124 F.
Supp. 2d at 686.

The statutory definitions are both the beginning
and the end of regulatory decision making, but
they can never be sensibly applied in a policy vacuum. If, as the authors believe, the FCC's preeminent policy goal is facilities-based competition
across all service categories, then the Title VI classification for Internet over cable should provide
an expedient means to that end.
II.

LOCAL CABLE AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FRANCHISING

To franchise a communications service at the
local level, as well to determine the service-specific limitations on such franchising authority, local governments must make an initial determination regarding the service being provided.
Local authority over communications providers
is linked inextricably to the provider's use of the
public rights-of-way to lay conduit, install utility
boxes and hang wire on certain utility poles. 27 Although cable and telecommunications systems
use the public rights-of-way in a similar manner,
these systems differ technologically, and the regulatory and franchising requirements that apply to
each were designed with these differences in
mind.
Further differentiation in regulatory treatment
stems from the historically different nature of the
services provided. Principally, cable operators,
like newspaper publishers, are considered First
Amendment "speakers" and, with limited exceptions, exercise absolute editorial discretion with
28
respect to the content carried on their systems.
Telecommunications carriers, in contrast, must
carry the content or information of the user's
choosing, without alteration in the form or content of the information as sent or received. 29 Arguably, this is the essence of common carriage.
29

"The term 'telecommunications' means the transmis-

sion, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(43) (2000). The term "telecommunications service"
means "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly
to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively
available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). The term "telecommunications carrier" means "any provider of telecommunications
services

... A

telecommunications carrier shall be treated as

a common carrier under this Act only to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services." 47
U.S.C. § 153(44) (2000).
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Telecommunications Service and Its
Regulation

Telephone systems were established to provide
transmission of voice or other subscriber communications without change in form or content of
the information transmitted. 30 They serve as pure
"conduits" for the transmission of information of
the user's choosing. Telecommunications regulation was designed to comport with this basic "carrier" function.
In most states, the state government, acting
through a public service commission, establishes
the market entry qualifications for telecommunications carriers and issues certificates to carriers
that meet minimum financial, legal and technical
requirements. Substantive regulation of-or regulatory forbearance with regard to-the rates,
terms and conditions of service and rules regarding carrier-to-carrier interconnection are established at the state and federal level. Title II of the
Communications Act requires interstate common
carrier wire communications services to be offered under tariff to all who request them on
rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory. 3 ' Sec-

tion 2(b) of the Communications Act preserves
state authority over intrastate common carrier
32
wire communications services.
Thus, in terms of substantive requirements, the
interstate services of local exchange carriers
("LECs") are regulated as common carrier services under Title II of the Communications Act
and corresponding state statutes governing their
intrastate telephone exchange and access services.
30

47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2000).

"Wire communication" or "communication by wire" is
defined in the Act to mean:
the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and
sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the points of origin and reception
of such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the
receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.
47 U.S.C. § 153(52) (2000). Regulation of common carriers'
services and charges, including prohibitions on unreasonable
discrimination and preferences is contained in sections 201
and 202. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2000). Tariff requirements
for common carriers are contained in section 203. 47 U.S.C.
§ 203 (2000). With the 1996 Act's addition of a new section
10 in the Communications Act, Congress authorized the FCC
to eliminate the tariff filing requirement upon the appropriate public interest showing. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
32 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2000).
31

In some areas, local authorities are authorized to
manage LEC use of the public rights-of-way using
a relatively streamlined system for issuing construction permits and overseeing the deployment
of facilities. While exceptions may exist, local governments rarely hold expressly granted substan-

tive regulatory authority over telecommunications
services or service providers.3 3
B.

Cable Service and its Regulation

1.

TraditionalCable Television Service

Unlike telephony, cable services have historically been subject to a dual federal-local regulatory regime. Both Congress and the FCC have repeatedly recognized that local cable franchising
authority historically derived from municipal police power over usage of the public rights-of-way
for facilities placement. 34 In 1984, Congress added Title VI to the Communications Act to "establish a national policy concerning cable communications" and to "minimize unnecessary regulation
that would impose an undue economic burden
on cable systems." 35 Title VI both preserves and
limits the authority that a franchising authority
may exercise through the cable franchise process.
The legislative history of the 1984 Cable Act states
that it was intended to establish a national policy
"clarifying" the then-current system of local, state
and federal regulation of cable television by continuing reliance on the local franchising process
as the primary means of cable regulation, "while
defining and limiting the authority that a
franchising authority may exercise through the
33 See Classic Telephone, 11 FCC Rcd. at 13,107, para. 49
(state commission was authorized to grant state-wide Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to intrastate telecommunications carriers; localities were authorized by state
law to grant local telecommunications franchises).
3M 1984 House Report at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4696; S. REP. No. 98-67, at 6-7 (explaining that the premise for local regulation of cable was its use of local streets
and rights-of-way); In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to an Inquiry on the
Need for Additional Rules in the Area of Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television, Report and Order,
54 F.C.C.2d 855, 861-63, paras. 21-25 (1975) (describing
"reasonable regulation regarding use of the streets and
rights-of-way" as within state jurisdiction); Troy Reconsideration
Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 16,413, paras. 40, 41 n.70.
3Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Cable Act]
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 521(1), (6) (2000)).
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franchise process."3

6

At both the federal and local

level, cable service is treated as an integrated content and conduit service. The First Amendment
rights of cable operators are protected by a series
of Title VI provisions, and even those mandatory
carriage obligations that exist, may not be expanded beyond the limits specifically enacted by
37
Congress.
In the 1984 Cable Act, Congress reaffirmed
cable operators' exemption from common carrier
regulations in section 621(c), 38 and specifically
prohibited "requirements regarding the provision
or content of cable services" in section
624(f)(1).

39

Thus, Title VI preserves local

franchising authority primarily over cable's use of
the public rights-of-way and related aspects of
cable service, particularly consumer protection
and customer service. Localities may, for example,
determine whether a new operator "has the financial, technical or legal qualifications to provide
cable service,"' 4 0 collect franchise fees for the
cable system's use of the public rights-of-way, 4 I establish "construction schedules and other construction-related requirements," 42 and where otherwise consistent with the Act, establish
requirements for facilities and equipment, but
not "for video programming or other information
services." 4 3 Provisions of Title VI enforced solely
by the FCC include program access requirements,
leased access requirements and must carry/re36

1984 House Report at 4

(1984),

reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4656.
37 See Henrico County 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (noting statutory limits regarding access requirements and citing 47
U.S.C. § 531 (2000) (cable channels for public, educational
and government use), 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2000) (cable channels for commercial use), 47 U.S.C. § 534 (2000) (carriage of
local commercial television signals), 47 U.S.C. § 535 (2000)
(carriage of noncommercial educational television), and 47
U.S.C. § 532(b)(2) (2000) ("Any Federal agency, State, or
franchising authority may not require any cable system to
designate channel capacity for commercial use by unaffiliated persons in excess of the capacity specified [herein.]").
38
47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000).
39
47 U.S.C. § 544(0(1) (2000).
40
47 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (4) (C) (2000).
41
47 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
42
47 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (2000).
43 47 U.S.C. § 544(a) & (b) (2000). See In re Entertain-

ment Connections, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13

FCC Rcd. 14,277, 14306-07, para. 62 (1998) [hereinafter
ECI], affd sub nom. City of Chicago v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424,
429-30 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n of
Telecomm. Officers and Advisors v. FCC, 531 U.S. 825
(2000) (quoting In re Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to an Inquiry on the
Need for Additional Rules in the Area of Duplicative and Ex-
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transmission consent. 44
2.

Cable Telephony and Cable Internet Services

Among other things, the 1996 Act repealed the
cable-telecommunications cross-ownership prohibition and opened local telephone markets to
competition. 45 Congress fully expected cable operators to be among the most significant facilitiesbased competitors to enter local markets and took
pains to delineate the appropriate scope of local
franchising authority over cable telephony. Sec46
tion 621 (b) (3) (A) of the Communications Act
now prohibits local attempts to impose Title VI
franchises over cable operators engaged in the
provision of telecommunications services or to impose any Title VI obligations on the cable operator's provision of such services. Section
621(b)(3)(B)47 bars LFAs from imposing any requirement under Title VI "that has the purpose or
effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting or conditioning the provision of a telecommunications
service by a cable operator." In addition, local attempts to "prohibit, condition, or restrict a cable
system's use of any type of subscriber equipment
or any transmission technology," were barred
under amended section 624(e), 48 as were attempts to impose any condition with the "purpose
or effect" of requiring or restricting a cable system's "provision of telecommunications services
cessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television, Report and Order,
54 F.C.C.2d 855, 861, para. 21 (1975))
The ultimate dividing line [between federal and local
regulation], as we see it, rests on the distinction between
reasonable regulations regarding use of the streets and
rights-of-way and the regulation of the operational aspects of cable communications. The former is clearly
within the jurisdiction of the states and their political
subdivisions. The latter, to the degree exercised, is
within the jurisdiction of this Commission.
Id.
44
47 U.S.C. § 532 (2000) (leased access); 47 U.S.C. § 534
(2000) (commercial broadcast must carry); 47 U.S.C. § 535

(2000) (non-commercial broadcast must carry); 47 U.S.C.

§ 548 (2000) (program access).
45 1996 Act, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 118, codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 571 (2000). Although the 1996 Act repealed the former
cross-ownership provision, both telephone companies and
cable television operators remain restricted from entering
joint ventures and from acquiring more than a 10% financial
interest or any management interest in the other within the
same service area; exceptions exist, however, for rural areas
and small systems. See 47 U.S.C. § 572 (2000).
46
47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (3) (A) (2000).
47
47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (3) (B) (2000).
48 47 U.S.C. § 544(e) (2000).
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or facilities" in connection with the grant, renewal
or transfer of a cable franchise under section
621 (b) (3) (D). 4 9
Congress also declared that it is "the policy of
the United States to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 50 Section 230 of the Communications Act now defines
the "Internet" as "the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks." 5 ' It defines
"interactive computer service" as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services of52
fered by libraries or educational institutions."
At the same time, Congress amended the definition of cable services covered under Title VI.
The 1996 Act added the words "or use" to the definition of cable services, so that it now includes
the "one-way transmission to subscribers of (i)
video programming, or (ii) other programming
service, and subscriber interaction, if any, which is
required for the selection or use of such video pro53
gramming or other programming service."
"Other programming service" includes any "information that a cable operator makes available to all
subscribers generally." 54 Addition of this "interac-

tive" feature to cable was accompanied by legislative history indicating that Congress intended
"the amendment to reflect the evolution of cable
to include interactive services such as game channels and information services made available to
subscribers by the cable operator, as well as en-

49 47 U.S.C. § 541(b) (3) (D) (2000). Congress left no
doubt that it intended to preempt inconsistent local regulations by providing that "any provision of any law of any State,
political subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision of any franchise granted by such authority, which is inconsistent with this Act shall be deemed to

service).
57
See generally Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287. Com-

be preempted and superseded." 47 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2) (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (1) (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2) (2000).
53 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
54
47 U.S.C. § 522(14) (2000).
55 S. REP. No. 104-230, at 169 (1996); H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-458, at 169 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10,
50
51
52

182 [hereinafter 1996 Conf. Report].
56 Compare Esbin, supra note 1(amendment may reasona-

bly be interpreted to included cable Internet services as cable
service under the Act), with Earl W. Comstock and John W.
Butler, Access Denied: The FCC's Failureto Implement Open Access
to Cable as Required by the Communications Act, 8 COMML.W
CONSPECrus 5 (2000) [hereinafter Comstock & Butler]
(cable Internet service is a telecommunications service), and
Christopher E. Duffy, Note: The Statutory Classification of CableDelivered Internet Service, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1251 (2000)

[hereinafter Duffy] (cable Internet service is an information

hanced services."

55

The meaning of this amendment has been
much debated, 56 and is integral to the FCC's Open
Access NOI as well as several conflicting decisions
in the federal courts. 5 7 Nevertheless, inasmuch as
Congress explicitly intended to include "enhanced" and "information services" as a component of "cable service" when provided by cable operators,58

and

given

the

FCC's

general

determination that the provision of Internet ac59
cess is an "enhanced" or "information service,"
the conclusion that Congress intended Internet
services provided by cable television operators to
be governed by Title VI of the Act (Cable Communications) rather than by Title II (Common
Carriers) appears inescapable.
Since its enactment, Title VI has defined "cable
service" as including not only "video programming," but also "other programming service,"
which was and is defined broadly as "information
that a cable operator makes available to subscribers generally.""," The 1996 Act expanded the definition of "cable services" to include "interactive
services" like Internet service over cable. 6' The effect of the 1996 amendment is to prevent a cable

pare Portland II, 216 F.3d at 877 (cable modem service includes both a "telecommunications service" and an "information service"), with Gulf Power II, 208 F.3d at 1275-78

(Internet service is neither a cable nor a telecommunications
service), and Henrico County 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (cable
modem service is a cable service).
58

The term 'information service' means the offering of

a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any
such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management

of a telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
59 See, e.g., In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,533,
11,536-40, paras. 66, 73-82 (1998) [hereinafter Universal Service Report to Congress].

60
61

47 U.S.C. § 522(14) (2000).
1996 Conf. Report, supra note 55, at 169.
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operator offering Internet over cable from being
subject, inter alia, to traditional common carrier
obligations. 6"2 The fact that service can also fit easily within the statutory definition of "information
services" is consistent with the amendment. The
categories of both cable and information services
are consistent- with one another and are each
"mutually exclusive" of a telecommunications ser3
vice classification.6
Thus, Title VI may be read to broadly encompass both traditional multichannel video programming distribution ("MVPD") and such
"other programming" and interactive information
services that cable operators provide under its regulatory scheme. 6 4 This reading of the statute is

fully consistent with the statutory goals of advanced infrastructure deployment articulated in

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that the
FCC and the courts were to adopt the approach of
the Ninth Circuit in PortlandII and find that the
transmission of Internet service by a cable operator is the provision of "telecommunications service" as that term is defined by section 3(a) (51) of
the Act,'! this would not mean local franchising
authorities could freely impose either additional
franchising requirements or open access mandates on cable operators. 6 7 As discussed below, existing FCC and judicial precedent establish a far
more limited role for local governments with respect to telecommunications services.
III.

FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY AND LOCAL RIGHTS-OF-WAY
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

A.

Statutory Authority-Telecommunications
Services

section 706 of the 1996 Act." 5 It would achieve

regulatory stability for cable operators, local
franchising authorities and federal regulators by
retaining the familiar local franchising control
over cable's use of the public rights-of-way for its
facilities. At the same time, the classification
leaves the critical programming and spectrum
management decisions involved in the provision
of Internet over cable outside the scope of either
federal or local regulation and firmly within the
editorial discretion of the cable operator. Under
the Title VI regime, cable operators would be free
to continue their substantial investments in network upgrades and advanced infrastructure deployment without unnecessary additional regulatory interference.
See 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000).
See Esbin, supra note I, at 94-98; For an extended discussion of this topic see also Universal Senrice Report to Congress,
13 FCC Rcd. at 11,516-26, paras. 33-48 ("information services" are a separate and mutually exclusive category from
62
63

"telecommunications services").
64 47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (A) (2000); 1996 Conf. Report, supra
note 55, at 169.
65
1996 Act, § 706, 110 Stat. 153 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 157 note (2000)).
66 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000). See supra note 29.
67
An equally pressing question is the scope of local
franchising authority over facilities-based providers of solely
information services. Most state statutes and constitutional
provisions authorizing local franchising speak in terms of
utility services generally or cable and telecommunications
networks and services specifically. It is highly unlikely that localities are authorized to franchise information service providers tinder existing law, and attempts to subject ISPs to the
types of local franchising requirements that apply to cable
operators would likely be met with stiff resistance from the
Internet service community. See, Duffy, supra note 56, at
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 added
section 253 to the Communications Act as a key
ingredient in opening local telephone markets to
competition. In essence, subsection 253(a) eliminates state and local barriers to the provision of
telecommunications services, while subsections
(b) and (c) preserve state and local authority to
protect the public welfare and consumers, preserve universal service and manage local rights-ofway in a non-discriminatory and competitively
neutral manner. Subsection 253(d), in turn, requires the FCC to preempt state and local require1277-79 (classifying Internet over cable as an "information
service" would conform with free market goals of federal
communications law by removing authority from local
franchising authorities). A separate examination of whether
existing state delegations to localities are sufficient to cover
an information service network that does not also function as
a cable system or telecommunications service network is be-

yond the scope of this article. Arguably, however, any communications system that utilizes the public rights-of-way for
its facilities and equipment could be subject to some form of
local authorization and permitting process to the extent permitted by state law. See, e.g., AT&T Communications of the
Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 52 F. Supp. 2d 763, 772-73
(N.D. Tex. 1999)

[hereinafter Dallas III], vacated and re-

manded, 243 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss based upon enactment of subsequent state statute that repealed the Dallas
telecommunications ordinance at issue and preempted any
future similar city ordinances); City of Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d
341 (5th Cir. 1999) (overturning the FCC's decision that
Open Video System ("OVS") operators could not be required
to obtain local franchises).
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ments that are found to violate sections 253(a)
and (b). 68 Litigation of cases under section 253
began immediately following its enactment and,
five years later, has produced a lengthy series of
highly fact-sensitive decisions by the FCC and the
courts. While general themes can be discerned,
local authorities and practitioners are well advised
to tread carefully as to specific requirements when
crafting local telecommunications ordinances.
B.

FCC's Approach to Rights-of-Way
Management Under Section 253

1.

Classic Telephone

In the FCC's first significant section 253 proceeding, Classic Telephone, Inc., filed a request
for preemption alleging that two Kansas municipalities had blocked its entry into local markets in
violation of section 253(a). 69 Kansas authorizes

both its public utility commission and its cities to
grant telecommunications authorizations and
franchises. 70 Classic had received its state authorization, but each city denied Classic a franchise on
the ground that it already had granted a telecom71
munications license to another carrier.
The FCC found that section 253(a) proscribes
state and local legal requirements that prohibit all
but one entity from providing telecommunications services. 72 It also rejected the cities' claims
that their decisions fell within the scope of permitted actions under section 253(b). To be protected by that provision, the cities' actions must
be both "competitively neutral" and "necessary" to
achieve the stated public interest goals. 73 The
FCC concluded that the cities' absolute bar on en74
try failed to meet either requirement.
The FCC also addressed the cities' claim that

7"3

47 U.S.C. § 253(a)-(d) (2000).
Classic Telephone, 11 FCC Rcd. at 13,082, para. 1.
Id. at 13,084, para. 4.
Id. at 13,085, para. 6.
Id. at 13,095, para. 25.
Id. at 13,101-02, paras. 36-38.

74

Id.

68

69
70

71
72

Id. at 13,103, para. 39.
Id. at 13,104, para. 42. Following its order preempting
the cities' decisions that denied Classic's local telephone
franchise applications in Classic Telephone, the Commission
denied Classic's request for action to enforce the order, 12
FCC Rcd. 15,619, and subsequently granted Classic's request
to dismiss the proceeding as moot when Classic asserted that
it no longer planned to provide telephone service in the cities. 14 FCC Rcd. 19,974, afj'g 14 FCC Rcd. 960. The Commis75

76

their actions were valid exercises of their authority
to, manage the public rights-of-way under section
253(c). Drawing on the section's legislative history, the FCC found that permissible management functions include: (i) regulating the time
and location of excavation to preserve effective
traffic flow, prevent hazardous road conditions
and minimize notice impacts; (ii) requiring a
company to place its facilities underground rather
than overhead, where consistent with the requirements imposed on other utility companies; (iii)
requiring a company to pay fees to recover an appropriate share of the increased street repair and
paving costs resulting from repeated excavation;
(iv) enforcing local zoning regulations; and (v)
requiring a company to provide indemnification
against claims of injury resulting from the company's excavation. 75 Because the cities' conclusory
statements regarding their denials of Classic's
franchise applications were "inadequate to establish that the Cities' actions reflect an exercise of
public rights-of-way management authority or the
imposition of compensation requirements for the
use of such rights-of-way," the FCC concluded that
the cities' actions did not "trigger section
253(c).

'

76

2. Huntington Park
In Huntington Park,77 the FCC interpreted the

section 253(a) proscription against requirements
that "prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide" telecommunications services. The California Payphone Association had challenged an ordinance prohibiting
outdoor payphones on private property in the
City of Huntington Park's central business dission later vacated its order preempting the cities' denial of
Classic's franchise applications and its order denying Classic's request for enforcement in an effort to prevent unintended legal consequences for the parties. Classic Telephone, Inc., Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 25,101 (2000). Although the
Commission's Classic Telephone decision is no longer binding
precedent in FCC proceedings, its reasoning was subsequently adopted and endorsed by the FCC in other decisions
as well as by several federal courts, as described in detail below.
77
In re California Payphone Association Petition for Preemption of Ordinance No. 576 NS of the City of Huntington
Park, California Pursuant to Section 253(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 14,191 (1997) [hereinafter Huntington Park].
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trict. The ordinance did not flatly prohibit
payphone service within the city, but rather restricted the locations where payphones could be
placed. 78 The FCC stated that, to determine

whether an ordinance has "the effect of prohibiting" the ability of service providers to offer
payphone services, the FCC would consider
whether the ordinance "materially inhibits or limits the ability of any competitor or potential competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal
and regulatory environment." 79 This broad read-

ing of the statutory language significantly limits
the range of permissible local regulation.
3.

TCI Cablevision of Oakland County

In the Troy case," TCI alleged that the City of
Troy, Michigan, had precluded it from upgrading
its cable system by attempting to condition approval of cable construction permits on TCI's
agreement to subject itself to the city's telecommunications franchise ordinance. 8 ' TCI asserted
that it was not offering and did not intend to offer
telecommunications services within the city.8 2

The FCC concluded that the city's requirement
that TCI agree to obtain a telecommunications
franchise as a condition of receiving cable system
construction permits violated section
621 (b) (3) (B) of the Communications Act.8 3 The

FCC observed that "administration of the public
rights-of-way should not be used to undermine
the efforts of either cable or telecommunications
providers to either upgrade or build new facilities
to provide a broad array of new communications
services."8 4 It therefore encouraged all levels of

government to join in streamlining and hastening
administrative processes in order to accelerate the
completion of cable upgrades, rather than to im85
pede those efforts by erecting new roadblocks.
The FCC also decided that, under the circumstances, it need not have reached TCI's claim that
the Troy telecommunications ordinance violated
section 253.86 Nonetheless, the FCC followed its
See Huntington Park, 12 FCC Rcd. at 14,192-93, para. 5.
Id. at 14,206, para. 31.
80
Troy Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 21,396, recon. denied, Troy ReconsiderationOrder, 13 FCC Rcd. 16,400.
81 Troy Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 21,398, para. 5.
82
Id. at 21,399, para. 7.
78

79

83
Id. at 21,399, para. 6. Section 621 (b) (3) (B) prohibits
local franchising authorities from imposing requirements
under Title VI that have the effect of restricting or condition-
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Classic Telephone precedent and reiterated that the
appropriate scope of local rights-of-way management authority is limited to activities that directly
involve physical usage of the public rights-of-way.
We recognize that section 253(c) preserves the authority of state and local governments to manage public
rights-of-way. Local governments must be allowed to
perform the range of vital tasks necessary to preserve
the physical integrity of streets and highways, to control
the orderly flow of vehicles and pedestrians, to manage
gas, water, cable (both electric and cable television),
and telephone facilities that crisscross the streets and
public rights-of-way... [T] he types of activities that fall
within the sphere of appropriate rights-of-way management ... include coordination of construction schedules, determination of insurance, bonding and indemnity requirements, establishment and enforcement of
building codes, and keeping track of the various systems using the
rights-of-way to prevent interference be87
tween them.

The FCC also addressed TCI's allegations that
the City had applied its telecommunications ordinance in a discriminatory manner. The FCC characterized as an "especially troubling issue" allegations regarding the discriminatory application of
telecommunications regulation, whether at the
88
state or local level.

One clear message from section 253 is that when a local
government chooses to exercise its authority to manage
the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers,
it must do so on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis. Local requirements imposed only on
the operations of new entrants and not on existing operations of incumbents are quite likely to be
neither
89
competitively neutral nor nondiscriminatory.

Thus, the FCC declared that localities may not single out new entrants to telecommunications markets for special and more burdensome treatment,
nor may they unreasonably and/or inexplicably
delay processing new entrants' construction and
system upgrade permits.9 0
In the concluding paragraphs of the Troy Order,
the FCC outlined its vision of the appropriate
roles of local, state and federal authorities in carrying out the mandates of the 1996 Act. The FCC
began by observing that:
Section 253 is a critical component of Congress' proing cable operators' provision of telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (B) (2000).
84
Troy Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 21,429, para. 78.
85
Id.
86 Id. at 21,399, 21,439, paras. 7, 99.
87
Id. at 21,441, para. 103.
88

Id. at 21,442, para. 107.

89

Id. at 21,433, para. 108 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 21,441-42, para 105.

90
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competitive deregulatory national policy framework
that it put into place by enacting the 1996 Act. As we
have noted, 'Congress intended primarily for competitive markets to determine which entrants shall provide
telecommunications services demanded by consumers,
and by preempting under section 253 sought to ensure
that State and local governments implement 91the 1996
Act in a manner consistent with these goals.'

The FCC cautioned local governments about
creating an unnecessary "third tier" of regulation
that extends far beyond the statutorily protected
interest of managing the public rights-of-way.

derstood when enacting section 253. According to
the FCC, the section 253(b) reservation of state
authority "over issues such as universal service,
safety and consumer protection appears to reflect
Congress' view that an array of local telecommunications regulations that vary from community to
community is likely to discourage or delay the development of telecommunications competition."

As a result, where relations among telecommunications
providers would be affected, or where the rates, terms,
and conditions under which telecommunications service is offered to the public are dictated by an local ordinance, is of considerable concern to this Commission. This concern is exacerbated by the potential for
multiple, inconsistent obligations imposed on a community-bycommunity basis. Such a patchwork quilt of differing local regulations may well discourage regional or national strategies by
telecommunications providers, and thus8 adversely affect the economics of their competitive strategies.

Our concern is that some localities appear to be reaching beyond traditional rights-of-way matters and seeking to impose a redundant 'third tier' of telecommunications regulation which aspires to govern the
relationships among telecommunications providers, or
telecomthe rates, terms and conditions under which
92
munication service is offered to the public.

The Troy Telecommunications Ordinance contained provisions that, among other things, required franchisees to interconnect with other telecommunications systems in the city for the
purpose of facilitating universal service, provided
for regulation of the fees charged for interconnection and mandated "most favored nation"
treatment' for the city. 93
Such Ordinance provisions will be difficult to justify
under section 253(c) on the grounds that they are
within the scope of permissible local rights-of-way management authority or other traditional municipal concerns such as police, fire, building code enforcement or
other public safety concerns. In addition, several of
these provisions seem redundant of comprehensive federal and state regulatory programs governing intercarand universal service obligations
rier interconnection
94
and support.

Citing the likelihood of such local requirements impeding competition and imposing unnecessary delays on new entrants, the FCC vowed
close scrutiny of challenged local ordinances in
95
the future.
Finally, the FCC cautioned that while each local
government may believe that it is simply protecting the interests of its constituents, the "telecommunications interests of constituents . . . are not
only local[-] [t] hey are statewide, national and
international as well,"9 6 a fact that Congress un91 Id. at 21,440, para. 102 (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Classic Telephone, 11 FCC Rcd. at 13,096, para. 25).
92
Id. at 21,441, para. 105.
93

Id.

94

96

Id. at 21,441-42, para. 105.
Id.
Id. at 21,442, para. 106.

97

Id.

98

Id. (emphasis added).

95

97

The prescription? The FCC appealed to state
governments to delegate their section 253(b)
powers to local authorities sparingly, and therefore avoid "an intricate intrastate patchwork of

telecommunications regulation at the local level
that will frustrate the prospects for full and effective competition. '9 9 Similarly, the FCC implored

local governments that have "historically refrained from engaging in substantive telecommunications regulation" to refrain from viewing "new
entrants as being more susceptible to regulation
than incumbents."1 011 Such restraint, according
the FCC; would "go a long way in hastening the
arrival of local telephone competition of many varieties, and in particular, of facilities-based local
competition."1 '

4.

Public Utility Commission of Texas

In the Texas proceeding, the FCC preempted
portions of a Texas statute that imposed onerous
02
build-out requirements on competitive LECs.'
Rejecting the state of Texas's claim that the statutory provisions were "saved" by section 253 (b), the
FCC held that a state or local requirement must
9' Id. at 21,433, para. 109.
100 Id.
101

Id.

In re Public Utility Commission of Texas, Petition for
Declaratory Ruling and/or Preemption of Certain Provisions
of the Texas Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1995, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 3460, 3466, 3496-506,
paras. 13, 73-95 (1997) [hereinafter Texas].
102
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be "competitively neutral," "consistent with section 254," and "necessary" that is, indispensable
for the achievement of the goals set forth in sec1 3
tion 253(b) in order to enjoy its safe harbor. 0
The FCC observed that, although it had earlier interpreted the term "necessary" in the context of
sections 251 (c) (6) and 251 (d) (2) (A) as not indispensable, but rather to mean "something more
than just.

.

. 'used' . . . 'useful' . .. or 'a prerequi-

site for competition.'" " 4 Lax interpretation of the
phrase "necessary" in the context of section
253(b) would permit a state or local government
to choose the most restrictive means available,
and thereby thwart the pro-competitive intent of
the 1996 Act. 1 5 Instead, the FCC chose a stringent interpretation of "necessary" in the context
of a section 253 challenge. This choice confirms
that, to qualify for the section 253(b) safe harbor,
a state or local requirement must bear a rational
relationship to the policy goal it purports to further and must stand as a prerequisite to achieving
that goal.
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though it declined both to issue the requested ruling or to preempt the agreement, the FCC found
that the agreement could adversely affect the provision of telecommunications services in Minnesota by facilities-based providers and therefore
would violate section 253(a).10 7 The FCC further

found that the agreement was not saved by section 253(b) because it was neither "competitively
neutral" nor "necessary" to protect the public
safety and welfare, as Minnesota had claimed.""0
In addition, the FCC concluded that the state was
not entitled to the protection of section 253(c).
Even assuming that the agreement constituted
protected rights-of-way management (a point on
which the FCC expressed considerable doubt),
Minnesota had not shown that its management
was competitively neutral and/or nondiscriminatory. I - Of particular concern to the FCC was the
possibility that the agreement would substantially
raise the cost of providing service for new entrants
by restricting them to an entry strategy based
upon resale of the developer's capacity, rather
than reliance upon their own facilities.11 0

5. Petition of the State of Minnesota
In a more recent section 253 proceeding, the
state of Minnesota asked the FCC to find that its
agreement with a developer granting the developer exclusive physical access to certain state
rights-of-way was consistent with section 253. '16 A lId. at 3480, para. 41.
Id. at 3501-02, para. 85 (footnotes omitted) (citing In
re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order,
11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 15,641-42, 15,794, paras. 282, 579
[hereinafter Local Competition Order] (subsequent history
omitted); In re New England Public Commtnications Council, Petition for Preemption Pursuant to Section 253, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,713, 19,723-24,
para. 24 (1996), recon. denied, 12 FCC Rcd. 5215 (1997) [hereinafter New England Payphone]. "[T]he term 'necessary' as
11)
"'4

used in .. .section 253(b) means something more than just

'used,' 'useful,' or 'a prerequisite for competition.'" 12 FCC
Rcd. at 5218, para. 7.
105
In both the 7exas and New England Payphone decisions, the Commission explicitly distinguished its less stringent interpretation of the term "necessary" as meaning "used
or useful" in the context of § 251 's obligation that incumbent
LECs provide for physical collocation of equipment "necessary" for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements. The Commission's less rigorous interpretation of the
§ 251 "necessary" limitation was struck down as "unduly
broad" by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416,
423 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On remand from the D.C. Circuit, the
FCC concluded that equipment "necessary" for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements under section

6. City Signal Petitions
On December 22, 2000, the FCC released three
public notices seeking comment on petitions for
declaratory ruling filed by City Signal Communi-.
cations, Inc. ' I" City Signal, a competitive LEC cer251 (c) (6) was equipment absent which requesting carriers
would be precluded "as a practical, economic, or operational
matter" from obtaining "'equal in quality' interconnection
or 'nondiscriminatory access' to unbundled network elements." In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 2001 FCC LEXIS 4303 (2001), para. 2.
106
In re Petition of the State of Minnesota for a Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Effect of Section 253 on an Agreement to Install Fiber Optic Wholesale Transport Capacity in
State Freeway Rights-of-Way, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
14 FCC Rcd. 21,697, 21,699 (1999).
107
Id. at 21,700, paras. 3-4.
10" Id. at 21,724, para. 50.
'".'
'

i

Id.'at 21,729, para. 61.
d. at 21,717, para. 38.

I
See Comments Sought on City Signal Communications, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Use of
Public Rights of Way for Access to Poles in Cleveland
Heights, Ohio Pursuant to Section 253, Public Notice, 2000
FCC LEXIS 6802 (Dec. 22, 2000); Comments Sought on City
Signal Communications, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning Use of Public Rights of Way for Access to Poles
in Wickliffe, Ohio Pursuant to Section 253, Public Notice, 2000
FCC LEXIS 6803 (Dec. 22, 2000); Comments Sought on City
Signal Comnunications, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling
Concerning Use of Public Rights of Way for Access to Poles
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tified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,
sought FCC preemption of the effective denial by
three municipal governments of City Signal's applications to use public rights-of-way for the placement of aerial fiber-optic cables on existing utility
poles for telecommunications purposes and asked
for an FCC order requiring that such permits be
granted." 2 According to City Signal's three identical petitions,"" the cities of Cleveland Heights,

posed only upon new entrants and not on incumbents constitute a competitively neutral, nondiscriminatory exercise of rights-of-way management
authority." 8 With the exception of City Signal's
Wickliff petition,' 'o these matters remain pending
before the FCC.

Wickliffe, and Pepper Pike, Ohio, ignored City

In July 1999, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry
regarding, among other things, access to public
rights-of-way and the imposition of franchise
fees, 120 in which it reiterated that "local governments and, to a lesser extent, state govern-

Signal's construction applications for the placement of aerial facilities, despite relevant state law
requiring action on such applications within thirty
days, 14 and stated that right-of-way authorizations
would not be granted unless City Signal agreed to

7.

Competitive Networks Notice of Inquiry

ments . . .are responsible for . . .ensuring that

place its fiber underground, despite the fact that

the rights-of-way are used in a manner that bene-

other telecommunications providers maintained

fits the public and . . . [that] neither threatens

aerial facilities throughout the cities.' ' 5 City Signal claimed the municipalities' tactics constituted
a denial of its applications and amounted to a
prohibition on its provision of interstate or intrastate telecommunications service'"" in violation of
section 253 of the Act and the FCC's "mandate to
introduce competition into the local telecommunications markets," as expressed in the FCC's Troy
Order.117 Comments filed by a variety of competitive entrants and franchising authorities covered a
broad spectrum of section 253 issues, including
fundamental questions regarding the FCC's jurisdiction to grant relief for alleged violations of section 253(c), whether municipal delay in processing applications constitutes an unlawful barrier to
entry, and whether construction requirements im-

public safety, unnecessarily inconveniences the

in Pepper Pike, Ohio Pursuant to Section 253, Public Notice,
2000 FCC LEXIS 6804 (Dec. 22, 2000). City Signal withdrew
its petition with regard to the City of Wickliff after the city
granted City Signal access to the public rights-of-way. See City
Signal Communications, Inc. v. City of Wickliff, DA 01-1499,
2001 FCC LEXIS 3401 (June 26, 2001).
112
Id.
11-3 In re City Signal Communications, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland Heights, Petitionfor Declaratory Ruling, CS Docket

No. 00-253 (filed Oct. 18, 2000); In. re City Signal Communications, Inc. v. City of Wickliffe, Petitionfor DeclaratoryRuling,

CS Docket No. 00-254 (filed Nov. 27, 2000); In. re City Signal
Communications, Inc. v. City of Pepper Pike, Petitionfor Declaratoy Ruling, CS Docket No. 00-255, (filed Nov. 29, 2000)
[collectively hereinafter City Signal Petitions].
114
115
1 1,

City Signal Petitions at 2, para. 8.
Id. at 2, paras. 5-6.
Id. at 3, para. 12.

Id. at 4, para. 17.
118 Compare Reply Comments of the Association for Local
Telecommunications Services CS Docket Nos. 00-253, 00-254,
00-255 (filed Feb. 14, 2001), with Reply Comments of the National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advi117

public, nor imposes uncompensated

costs." 1 2 '

The FCC also observed that while incumbent
LECs have long been granted authority to use
public rights-of-way for the placement of wireline
communications facilities, competing providers of
both wireline and wireless communications services seeking such permission for the first time
present special challenges for state and local governments. 122
One challenge for State and local governments in the
era of competitive telecommunications service is to administer the public rights-of-way in a manner that serves
these ends and at the same time does not unfairly favor
incumbent carriers or obstruct other providers' ability
23
to compete effectively in the provision of service. 1

The FCC asserted that:
sors, CS Docket Nos. 00-253, 00-254, 00-255 (filed Feb. 14,
2001).
119 See City Signal v. Wickliff, 2001 FCC LEXIS 3401.
1211
In re Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local
Telecommunications Markets; Wireless Communications Association International, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking to
Amend Section 1.4000 of the Commission's Rules to Preempt
Restrictions on Subscriber Premises Reception or Transmission Antennas Designed to Provide Fixed Wireless Services;
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Petition
for Rule Making and Amendment of the Commission's Rules
to Preempt State and Local Imposition of Discriminatory
and/or Excessive Taxes and Assessments; Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
Inquiry in WI'Docket No. 99-217, and Third FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd. 12,673,

12,675, 12,712-17, paras. 1, 70-80 (1999) [hereinafter Competitive Networks Inquiry].
121
Competitive Networks Inquiry, 14 FCC Rcd. at 12,712,

para. 72.
122

Id. at 12,712, paras. 70-72.

12"

Id. at 12,712, para. 72.
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Full and fair competition in the provision of local telecommunications service requires that competing providers have comparable access to the means of transporting signals... [which] may involve the ability to utilize
public rights-of-way in a manner, on a scale, and under
terms and conditions similar to those applicable to the
incumbent LECs' use of public rights-of-way. 24

The FCC noted that, while many carriers and
communities are able to work out their differences, a significant number of "carriers and their
[trade] associations have alleged that many state
and local governments continue to engage in
rights-of-way management and compensation
practices that the carriers believe are unreasonable, anticompetitive, and contrary to federal
law."' 125 This 1999 proceeding remains pending

before the FCC.
Regardless of its ultimate disposition, the Competitive Networks Inquiry provides insight into the
FCC's view of preemption jurisprudence. In establishing the issues to be addressed, the FCC first
reviewed the statutory requirement as well as its
own section 253 precedents

26

and emphasized its

abiding concern about requirements unrelated to
rights-of-way usage that local governments have
27
imposed on carriers using public rights-of-way.'
The FCC also cited with apparent approval several
federal district court cases in which the courts
took a limited, rather than expansive, view of local
telecommunications franchising authority and relied upon the FCC's Classic Telephone and Troy Orders in doing So. 12 8 These cases, and several
others, are discussed in the following section.
C. Judicial Decisions Under Section 253
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the FCC's section 253 policies in resolving disputes concerning the scope and applicability of
that provision. These decisions 2 9 firmly establish
that local governments may not condition a telecommunications franchise on anything other
than the carrier's agreement to comply with those
regulations and fees minimally necessary to manage and recover the costs of administering usage
of the public rights-of-way for the provision of
telecommunications services.
The federal courts' statutory analysis in these
decisions is straightforward: section 253(a)
broadly prohibits any state or local action that
"prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting" the
provision of telecommunications services.' 30 Sections 253(b) and 253(c) create two narrow exceptions to this broad federal preemption of state
and local regulation of telecommunications. Section 253(b) reserves to states the authority to regulate universal service, protect consumers, ensure
quality, and protect the public safety and welfare
"on a competitively neutral basis and consistent
with section 254 [universal service]."'' Section
253(c) preserves the authority of state and local
governments to manage and seek compensation for
use of the public rights-of-way.' 32 Absent a specific
state delegation of broader telecommunications
regulatory authority to local governments, therefore, section 253(c) defines the full scope of local
authority over telecommunications providers. -1
Section 253(c) limits this authority to
"manag[ing] the public rights-of-way" and "requir[ing] fair and reasonable compensation from
telecommunications providers, on a competitively
neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of

The majority of federal courts have followed
Id. at 12,712, para. 71.
Id. at 12,716, para. 79.
126
Id. at 12,713-16, paras. 73-80.
127
Id. at 12,714-15, para. 76.
128
Id. at 12,714-17, paras. 75-80.
129
See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 247 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2001) amended by, reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
15519; N.J. Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of West New York,
130 F. Supp. 2d 631 (D.N.J. 2001); Dallas III, 52 F. Supp. 2d
at 769-75; AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 52 F. Stpp. 2d 756, 760-63 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
[hereinafter Dallas I/]; AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590-94 (N.D.
Tex. 1998) [hereinafter Dallas I]; Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc. v.
Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Md. 1999),
vacated and remanded, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000) on remand,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10645 (D.Md.July 23, 2001) (preempting county ordinance under state law and permanently enjoining enforcement); AT&T Communications of the South124
125

west, Inc. v. City of Austin, 975 F. Supp. 928, 939-43 (W.D.
Tex. 1997), vacated and remanded, 235 F.3d 241 (5th Cir.
2000) (vacating and remanding with instructions to dismiss
based upon enactment of subsequent state statute that repealed the Austin telecommunications ordinance at issue
and preempted any future similar city ordinances).
130 47 U.S.C. § 253(a). In section 253(a), the phrase "effect of prohibiting" extends to even relatively minor state or
local regulatory requirements that could, in the aggregate,
prohibit new telecommunications providers from entering
the market. See, e.g., Texas, supra note 102, 13 FCC Rcd. at
3480, para. 41 ("We further conclude that this mandate requires ts to preempt not only express restrictions on entry,
but also restrictions that indirectly produce that result.").
11 47 U.S.C. § 253(b).
132
47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
1-"-3 Such delegations are not the norm, and many states,
including Florida, Delaware, Mississippi, Texas, Wyoming
and Michigan, have affirmatively limited the authority of lo-

2001]

Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access

public rights-of-way." 134 Of course, because sections 253(b) and 253(c) shelter certain state and
local regulations otherwise prohibited by section
253(a), courts must always first determine
whether the challenged state or local action "prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting" the provision of a telecommunications service before considering whether the action nonetheless is saved
by either section 253(b) or 253(c). As demonstrated below, courts have narrowly construed the
scope of authority reserved to state and local governments under sections 253(b) and 253(c) and
have taken a fairly expansive view of whether local
requirements prohibit or have the effect of
prohibiting the provision of telecommunications
35
service.1
The Scope of Public Rights-of-Way Management
Authority is Narrow

1.

In the Dallas I decision, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
found that AT&T had demonstrated the rigorous
showing required to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of a local telecommunications
franchise application and fee regime.' 36 The Dallas I court found that section 253 means what it
says. Section 253 "limits the scope of ... [local]
authority to regulate telecommunications to two
narrow areas [under sections 253(b) and 253 (c)]:
the 'management' of city rights-of-way, and the requirement of fees for use of rights-of-way."' 13 7 By
limiting local jurisdictions to rules minimally necessary to manage the public rights-of-way, the
court held that section 253 prohibited the city
from: granting or denying a franchise based solely
on its own discretion; requiring a comprehensive
cal governments to impose substantive telecommunications
regulations. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.01(2) (West 1999)
(granting PSC exclusive jurisdiction over regulating telecommunications companies and preempting all local, special or
municipal acts that conflict with PSC authority); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 26, § 201 (1998) (granting public service commis-

sion exclusive supervision and regulation of all public utilities); Miss. CODE ANN. § 77-3-5 (1999) (granting public service commission exclusive jurisdiction over public utilities);
UTIL. CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon 1997) (granting
public service commission exclusive jurisdiction over public
utilities); Wvo. STAr. ANN. § 37-2-112 (Michie 1999) (granting public service commission exclusive jurisdiction over
TEX.

public utilities);
134
135

MICH. COMp. LAWS

§ 484.2201 (2000).

47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
Apparently, only certain incumbent local phone com-

panies have encountered significant difficulties in demon-

franchise application that considers a company's
technical and organizational qualifications; imposing conditions unrelated to the use of the
right-of-way, such as the submission of financial
information, the maintenance of detailed records
or the provision of free services to the city; and
imposing fees on gross revenue that are unrelated
to the carrier's actual physical use of the rights-ofway.' 3 8
Lower federal courts in Florida, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, New York and California have
reached similar conclusions. In BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Coral Springs,1 39 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida held that both the 1996 Act and Florida
law prohibit local municipalities from conditioning telecommunications franchises on more than
the service provider's agreement to comply with
the municipality's reasonable regulation of its
rights-of-way and the fees for use of those rightsof-way.1 40 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit af-

firmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for
further proceedings based upon a subsequent
change in Florida law. As grounds for the remand, the appellate court cited the district court's
failure to first address whether the cities' ordinances violated section 253(a) before considering
whether they constituted permissible rights-of41
way management under section 253(c).1

In Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's
County, Maryland, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland preempted under federal law the county's telecommunications ordinance, which established a comprehensive
"franchise" scheme regulating telecommunications companies seeking to do business in the
county. 1 4 2 While the court held that telecommustrating that state and local regulations have prohibited or
had the effect of prohibiting their provision of telecommunications service. See BellSouth Telecomms. Inc. v. City of Mobile, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4244 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2001);
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Orangeburg, 522
S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1999).
136
137
138

Dallas 1, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
Id. at 591.
Id.

42 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 1999), affd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded sub nom. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v.
Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169 (lth Cir. 2001).
140 Coral Springs, 42 F.Supp.2d at 1307-08.
141
Palm Beach, 252 F.3d at 1191-92. The Eleventh Circuit also invalidated substantial portions of the cities' ordinances as inconsistent with state law. Id. at 1179-85.
139

142

Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 808-11,
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nications companies interested in using the
county's public rights-of-way could be required to
obtain a local franchise, it also found that section
253 limited "the terms of any such franchise... to
the types of activities described by the FCC in TCI
Cablevision [the Troy Order] and Classic Telephone."'14 " By regulating providers of telecommunications services in "the most comprehensive and
utterly discretionary fashion,"'144 the county ordinance at issue in Prince George's County went "well
beyond the bounds of legitimate local governmental regulation discussed in TCI Cablevision and
5

Classic Telephone." 14

The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit overturned the Prince George's
County decision for failure to consider state law
claims before addressing preemption under federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution."

6

In addi-

tion to its federal preemption claims, Bell Atlantic
alleged that, in passing the ordinance, the
"County had breached a 1904 County franchise
agreement and an 1884 state franchise with Bell
Atlantic, violated Articles 2 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violated public
utilities companies §§ 2-113, et seq. . of the Maryland Code."' 147 The case was remanded to the dis-

trict court for consideration of the state law claims
so the court could determine if it could be resolved without reaching the constitutional issue of
federal preemption. 14

On remand, the district
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dorsed by other federal district and circuit courts,
including, among others, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in City of Auburn
v. Qwest Corp. 1511On April 24, 2001, the Ninth Circuit held that section 253 preempted local telecommunications ordinances requiring wired and
wireless telecommunications providers to obtain
local franchises and pay franchise fees.' 5' The

Ninth Circuitjoined the majority of federal courts
by ruling that "Congress has narrowly circumscribed the role of state and local governments

'5 2
in . . . the regulation of telecommunications."'
Citing the FCC's Classic Telephone and Troy Orders,

the Ninth Circuit held that, under federal law, local rights-of-way management was limited to "control over the right-of-way itself, not control over
' 53
companies with facilities in the right-of-way."'
In Auburn, local telecommunications ordinances enacted by the cities of Auburn, Des
Moines, Olympia and Tacoma, among others, included several features that the Ninth Circuit
found would have the effect of prohibiting entry
in violation of section 253(a). These violations included: (1) lengthy and detailed application
forms, including maps, corporate policies, documentations of licenses, and any other information
requested by the local government; (2) application fees ranging from an undetermined amount
to $5,000; (3) the consideration of "discretionary
factors that have nothing to do with the manage-

court preempted the county's ordinance under
the state law and permanently enjoined its enforcement while respectfully disagreeing with the
Fourth Circuit that federal law initially required
consideration of state law claims in the circumstances presented.' 4 Thus, neither the Fourth
Circuit nor the district court on remand disturbed
the district court's original interpretation of section 253.
The reasoning behind the district court's Prince
George's County decision already has been en-

ment or use of the right-of-way"; 1 54 (4) regula-

813-17; see also CoralSprings, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-11 (pre-

150 247 F.3d 966, amended by, reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15519.
151
Id. Following release of the decision, the city of Portland, Oregon, annotunced that it would abandon efforts to
impose franchise fees on the provision of cable modem ser-

empting under federal and state law significant portions of a
broad local telecommunications ordinance).
14"
Prince George's County, 49 F. Snpp. 2d at 816 (footnote
omitted).
1"14 Id. at 817 (internal quotations omitted).
1"5
Id.
146 Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 212 F.3d 865-66.
147
Id. at 864-65.
148
149

id. at 865-66.

Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc. v. Prince George's County, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10645, n.19 (D. Md. July 23, 2001).

tions concerning the transferability of ownership
and the reporting of stock sales; (5) the imposition of "non-tax fees charged under the franchise
agreements [that] are not based on the costs of
maintaining the right of way, as required under
the Telecom Act"; 155 and (6) the cities' reservation of "discretion to grant, deny, or revoke the
franchises ... even allowing the Cities to remove
the company's facilities."' 1 " The Ninth Circuit

held that each of these requirements would have

vices. COMM. DAILY, May 15, 2001 at 8.
152 Auburn, 247 F.3d at 980 (internal quotation omitted)
(quoting Dallas 1, 8 F. Supp. 2(1 at 591).
153 Id. at 982.
154
Id. at 983.
155
Id. (footnote omitted).
156

id.
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the effect of prohibiting Qwest and other companies from providing telecommunications services,
and that "[t]aken together, they create a substantial and unlawful barrier to entry into and partici157
pation in the ... telecommunications markets."'
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the cities' ordinances fell outside of the safe harbor provisions of section 253(c).1 58 The court applied the

guidelines noted in the FCC's Classic Telephone
and Troy Orders and the legislative history of the
1996 Act to conclude that "the ordinances regulated the telecommunications companies themselves, not merely the rights-of-way."1 59 Therefore,
the court held that the local ordinances failed to
manage the public rights-of-way or require fair
and reasonable compensation for the use of those
rights-of-way, as section 253(c) would permit. The
court focused on four features of the ordinances
that violated section 253(c). First, the ordinances
required an extensive application process that was
not directly related to management of the public
rights-of-way. 160 Second, the ordinances imposed
reporting requirements or other controls concerning matters not directly related to management of the public rights-of-way.

16 1

Third, the or-

dinances required, either through the application
process or by other means, that the franchise
agreements contain conditions unrelated to management of the public rights-of-way, including, for
example, requiring that the franchisees offer
"most favored community" status to the cities in
connection with telecommunications rates and
terms. 1 62 Fourth and finally, like most other

courts, the Ninth Circuit found especially problematic the cities' "unfettered discretion to insist
on unspecified franchise terms and to grant,
deny, or revoke a franchise based on unnamed
157
Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that other federal courts
also had found nearly identical franchise requirements to be
prohibited under section 253. Id. (citing Prince George's
County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 816; Dallas II1, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 770;
Coral Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1304).
158
Auburn, 247 F.3d at 982.
159 Id.
160

Id.

Id.at 983.
Id.
163 Id. at 984 (citing TCG New York v. City of White
Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d 81, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Coral Springs,
42 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; Prince Georges County, 49 F. Supp. 2d
at 816; Dallas Ii, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 592-93).
164
Civ. No. 994766, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19409 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 20, 1999).
165
Id. at *1.
161

162

factors[,]" which the court held was "too vague
and too broad to comply with § 253(c)."'""
In PECO Energy Co. v. Township of Haverford, 6'I
the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania framed the issue as one of
"balancing the authority of a local government to
regulate within its borders against the right of a
telecommunications provider to install its fiber
optic cables in a community without undue interference from the community's officials."'"1 5 PECO
Energy sought to attach fiber optic cables to
Township-owned utility poles that the utility managed for the primary purpose of providing a communications link to various Delaware County
school districts, but which also had the capacity to
serve other customers.'l The Township ordered
PECO Energy to "cease and desist" its construction activities until it had obtained the requisite
permits under the Township's telecommunications franchise ordinance. ' 7 PECO Energy
sought a declaration from the federal district
court that the ordinance was invalid and unenforceable under federal and state law.'" 8
Given the overriding federal policy "to decrease
regulation and increase competition in the telecommunications industry[,]" the court ruled in
PECO Energy's favor on its section 253 challenges. 169 The PECO court found that the ordinance was not entitled to the "safe harbor" protection of section 253(c) because the ordinance was
not limited in several respects to matters involving
the simple regulation of the public rights-ofway.' 17 1 Specifically, the failure of the ordinance to
limit the Township Manager's discretion in granting or denying a franchise placed the ordinance
outside the ambit of the section 253(c) safe harbor. "[N]othing in the ordinance . . . limit[ed]
Id. at *2.
id. at *3.
168 Id. at *4-5.
1'" Id. at *17 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(stating the primary purpose of the 1996 Act was "to reduce
regulation and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies") (internal quotations omitted); Paging, Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 957 F. Supp. 805,
807 (W.D. Va. 1997) (noting that "Congress passed the [1996
Act] in order to provide a procompetitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services for all Americans by
166

167

opening all telecommunications markets to competition.")

(internal quotation omitted).
17' PECO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19409, at *19-20.
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the discretion of the Township Manager to matters involving the physical use and occupation of
the public rights-of-way . . . [or] whether the
Township . . . look[ed] only at matters involving

the public rights-of-way or other factors impermissible under the [1996 Act].'

7

' The court further

found the ordinance violated section 253(a) because it lacked "any guarantee that applications
under this Kafkaesque regime, once submitted,
will be processed expeditiously," and because the
ordinance vested sole discretion in the Township
Manager to "completely prohibit provision of tele-

public rights-of-way [violates 253(a)]
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.'

77

In TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York overturned portions of a city ordinance "setting forth the process by which new
telecommunications carriers could obtain approval to place equipment in the City's rights-ofway."1 78 The city's ordinance required prospective

found a violation of section 253(c) because "[a] ny

carriers to submit a formal application including,
among other things, information regarding the
carrier, its affiliates, the equipment to be placed
in the rights-of-way, the carrier's construction
plans, its legal, financial, technical, and other
qualifications, and the financing for the proposed

fee ...

must be directly related to the company's

construction. 179 Following completion of the ap-

use of the right-of-way" and because the ordinance failed to "state the amount of the fees, how
they are to be calculated, or how they relate to use
of the public rights-of-way."' 7 3 The court therefore found that the ordinance's imposition of
"fees of uncertain amounts" itself might serve as a

plication, new carriers were required to obtain a
"franchise," the terms of which, such as compensation to the city, insurance, performance bonds,
the city's right to inspect the premises, indemnification requirements, non-assignment clauses and
other provisions, were to be negotiated with the
city.8" After the new carrier and the city negotiated the franchise agreement, the application
would be referred to the Common Council, which
was empowered to reject the application or adopt
it by separate ordinance.' 8 ' The ordinance authorized the Common Council to consider,
among other things, the carrier's ability to satisfy
construction requirements, the adequacy of the
terms of the franchise agreement, the adequacy of
the compensation to be paid the city, the legal,
financial, technical and other qualifications of the
carrier, and any other factors the Council deemed

communications services."' 172 Finally, the court

significant barrier to entry.174

The PECO court also rejected Haverford's request that ambiguities in the ordinance be read in
a manner that would not violate the Telecommunications Act of 1996 because such a reading "flies
in the face of the [ 1996 Act], which preserves very
specific authority to local governments."' 75 Once
the court found that the ordinance was not entitled to safe harbor protection, it analyzed whether
the ordinance prohibited or had the effect of
prohibiting PECO Energy's ability to provide telecommunications services under section 253(a).'

7

6

The PECO court followed the Prince George's County
ruling that a similar ordinance had the effect of
prohibiting the provision of telecommunications
services, because "any process for entry [into the
market] that imposes burdensome requirements
on telecommunications companies and vests significant discretion in local governmental decision
makers to grant or deny permission to use the

172

Id. at *20-21.
Id. at *26.

173

Id. at *22.

'7'

Id. at *26.
Id. at *24.
176
Id. at *25. This approach to section 253 analysis conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit's recent determination that
challenged ordinances must first be tested against the section
253(a) prohibitions before considering whether their provisions fall within the section 253(b) or 253(c) "safe harbors."
See Palm Beach, 252 F.3d at 1191-92.
177 PECO, 1999 U.S. DIST. LEXIS 19409 at *26 (quoting
174

175

appropriate and in the city's public interest.1 2 In

contrast, the incumbent LEC, Bell Atlantic, was
not required to obtain a franchise or pay a
franchise fee, and was not subject to the same
general construction permitting requirements or
requirements for insurance, deposits and permit83

ting fees. 1

Although TCG formally applied for franchises
Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 814) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original).
178 TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing White Plains Municipal Code, Telecommunications Franchising and Licensing,
Articles 1-3).
179
Id. at 84.
18o
181

Id.

182

Id. at 90.

18

1l.
1Id. at 85.
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beginning in 1992, as of June 18, 1999, the date
TCG filed suit, it had been unable to finalize any
agreement with the city.' 8 4 Following initiation of

the suit, the city proposed a new franchise agreement, which, among other things, required TCG
to pay an annual franchise fee equal to five percent of gross revenues, required a guarantee of
payment from TCG's corporate parent, required
TCG to construct additional conduit without
charge at the city's request, allowed the city to examine TCG's records, imposed a "most favored
vendee" status on the'city's behalf, and required
TCG to remove its facilities from public property
upon termination of the agreement. 85 TCG's section 253 claims objected to the requirements the
city attempted to impose on grounds that: (1) the
ordinance and proposed franchise effectively prohibited TCG "from providing telecommunications services, and regulate beyond the City's public rights-of-way" in violation of section 253(a),
(b), and (c) of the Communications Act; and
(2) the exemption of Bell Atlantic from terms of
the ordinance and from the requirement of a
franchise was both non-competitive and discriminatory in violation of section 253(c). 186
After analyzing the history and structure of section 253 and related judicial and administrative
decisions, the White Plainscourt held that "the requirements imposed on TCG by the City and the
Ordinance, when viewed as a whole and in context, have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
TCG to provide telecommunications services" in
violation of section 253(a).' 8

7

The court observed

that the city's process of obtaining a franchise became a lengthy and complex negotiation spanning more than seven years and that even if an
agreement had been reached between TCG and
the city, the ordinance gave the Common Council
the right to reject the application based upon unspecified "public interest" factors, which, once
identified, would restart the entire complex pro184
185

Id.
Id.

186

Id.

187

188
189

at 86.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id. (citing RT Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d

1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2000)).
190
191

Id.
Id. at 90.

192
193

Id. at 92.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 89. The court found such provisions to be pre-

194

cess.' 88 "Accordingly, while the City's requirements admittedly do not impose an explicit prohibition on TCG, the regulations coupled with the
City's long delay in moving forward with the approval process have effectively prohibited TCG
from providing telecommunications services in
White Plains .. . [a]s a result, § 253(a) has been
violated." 189
In determining whether the city's regulations
were saved by the safe harbor provisions of section
253(c), the White Plains court addressed three
questions: (1) whether the regulations managed
the public rights-of-way; (2) whether the required
fees for use of the public rights-of-way were fair
and reasonable; and (3) whether the city's exemption of Bell Atlantic from the regulations was competitively neutral and non-discriminatory. 190 The
court cited the FCC's Classic Telephone and Troy Orders in support of its conclusion that "any attempt
to regulate beyond the circumscribed scope of activities related to public rights-of-way is beyond
the scope of § 253(c)."11 The court consequently
invalidated those portions of the city's ordinance
that: (a) required TCG to furnish a description of
the telecommunications services to be provided; 192 (b) required TCG to provide information concerning "proposed financing for the operation and construction of the services ...as well
as a description of the applicant's legal, financial,
technical and other appropriate qualifications to
hold the franchise;"' 193 (c) permitted the city to
include franchise provisions "[it] determines are
necessary or appropriate 'in furtherance of the

public interest;'"1 9 4 (d) required TCG to maintain records other than those necessary for the
city to enforce its rights-of-way regulations and to
ensure that it has received accurate fee information; 9 5 (e) required TCG to offer its services to
the city at rates and terms no less favorable than
those offered to any other governmental or nonprofit agency; 19 6 (f) required TCG to waive its leempted because they gave the city "near total discretion to
approve or reject an application." Id. at 92. For similar reasons, the court invalidated those provisions allowing the
Council to deny an application based upon "the adequacy of
the... franchise agreement ... to protect the public interest ... as well as any other public interest factors or considerations . . . that are deemed pertinent by the City for safe-

guarding the interest of the City and the public." Id. at 93
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
195 Id. at 92.
196 Id. at 93.
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gal right to challenge the terms or conditions of
the franchise agreement;l9 7 (g) required the city's
approval of network construction on private property;' 98 and (h) allowed the city broad rights to
inspect and oversee TCG's business. 99
As the cases discussed above demonstrate, a
sensible and narrow approach to the question of
what it means to "manage" the "use" of public
rights-of-way under section 253 has emerged in
the federal courts. This approach, which confines
local authority to activities of the carrier that are
directly related to its physical occupation and use
of the rights-of-way for communications facilities,
is derived from, and is wholly consistent with, the
FCC's policy guidance contained in the Classic
Telephone and Troy Orders, which the courts have
cited with approval.

ued, "local governments may not set their
franchise fees above a level that is reasonably calculated to compensate them for the costs of administering their franchise programs and of maintaining and improving their public rights-of-way.
Franchise fees thus may not serve as general reve-

2. Fees Should Recover Incremental and Related
Administrative Costs Related to Rights-of-Way
Usage

of-way to provide local phone service. Instead, the
court emphasized, the "proper benchmark is the
cost to the County of maintaining and improving
the public rights-of-way" that the telephone com-

Section 253(c) authorizes municipalities to recover "fair and reasonable compensation" from
telecommunications providers for their use of
public rights-of-way.2 °°
11 Several courts, including
the United States Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, have embraced the view that section 253(c)
permits recovery of only the incremental costs of
using public rights-of-way, and does not authorize
recovery unrelated to the actual physical burden
imposed.20 ' Other courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have taken the more expansive "rent" recov2
ery view. 02
For example, in the initial Prince George's County
decision, the district court found that, under sec-

pany actually uses. 20 " Furthermore, the court held

tion 253(c), the "crucial point . . . is that any

franchise fees that local governments impose on
telecommunications companies must be directly
related to the companies' use of the local rightsof-way, otherwise the fees constitute an unlawful
economic barrier to entry under section

nue-raising measures."' 2 ° 4 These limitations on lo-

cal governmental authority to impose franchise
fees on telecommunications companies are, in
the court's view, "necessary to promote the full
purposes and objectives of Congress" in adopting
the 1996 Act and to prevent local governments
from "effectively thwart[ing] the [1996 Act's] procompetition mandate and mak[ing] a nullity out
of section 253(a)."

2 5
0

Prince George's County erred by basing its telecommunications franchise fee on the estimated
"value" for the "privilege" of using public rights-

that, to be "fair and reasonable," these costs "must
be apportioned [to the carrier] based on its de2' 0 7
gree of use, not its overall level of profitability."
Because the court found nothing in the record to
indicate that the county had based its "right-ofway charge" upon any of these factors, the court
held that the county's franchise fee violated section 253.
The Dallas I court had also concluded that section 253 prevents municipalities from "impos[ing] fees on a telecommunications provider
except as compensation for use of the City's
rights-of-way. ' 20 8 In Dallas I, the city of Dallas had

passed an ordinance that required telecommunications providers to pay four percent of the gross
revenue that resulted from activities conducted in
the city. The city defined "gross revenue" broadly
as twenty-five potential sources of revenue, including long-distance services and resale of unbun-

253(a)."23 For the same reason, the court contin197
198

Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 94.

199 Id. at 94. "The City's limited authority does not give it
the power to micromanage TCG's business through audits
and submission of detailed financial records, unless they are
directly related to the rights-of-way or a proper fee." Id.
200 47 U.S.C. § 253(c).
201
In Auburn, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[s]ome nontax fees charged under the franchise agreements are not
based on the costs of maintaining the right of way, as re-

quired under the Telecom Act." 247 F.3d at 981 (footnote
omitted).
202
See TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d
785 (E.D. Mich. 1998), affd, 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
203,
Prince Ceorge's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
204

1d.

205
206

Id.
id. at 818.

207

Id.

208

Dallas 1, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
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died network elements ("UNEs"). 209 AT&T, which
was offering services in Dallas as a nonfacilitiesbased carrier, objected to the fee and sought a
preliminary injunction in federal court. The court
found that AT&T had already paid for its use of
rights-of-way through the incumbent LEC, from
which it leased UNEs.2 10 Although the court did
not speculate on what a reasonable fee for use of
the public rights-of-way would be, it concluded,
"any fee that is not based on AT&T's use of City
rights-of-way violates § 253(a) of the [1996 Act] as
21
an economic barrier to entry." 1
Similarly, in the PECO decision, the district
court found that the Haverford ordinance violated section 253(c) requirements regarding reasonable compensation, in part because revenuebased fees "cannot, by definition, be based on
pure compensation for use of the rights-ofway." 21 2 The Haverford ordinance was flawed because it imposed at least four different fees of unspecified amounts on telecommunications providers, without any attempt to relate the fees to use
of the public rights-of-way. Moreover, because
other Haverford ordinances imposed fees for the
use of "streets and sidewalks" and "poles and
wires," it appeared that Haverford was already being compensated for use of the public rights-ofway. The court ruled that under the 1996 Act,
"any fees charged must be related to use of the
rights-of-way"; the Haverford ordinance, however,
did "not, on its face, comply with this mandate." 2 13 By vesting complete and limitless discretion in the Township Manager to deny a franchise
and by imposing "fees of uncertain amounts, a
fact which, by itself, may serve as a significant barrier to entry," the PECO court found the barriers
to entry posed by the Haverford ordinance even
greater than those posed by the Prince George's
2 14
County ordinance.
Conversely, in the Dearborncase, the lower court
upheld the imposition of a local telecommunications franchise requirement on TCG, a telecommunications provider licensed by the Michigan
Public Service Commission to provide basic local
209

Id

210

ld.

211

Id.

212

PECO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19409, at *24.
Id. at *23.
Id. at *25-26.
Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d 785.
Id. at 787.

213
214
215
216

telecommunications service in certain areas. 2 15
The telecommunications ordinance required telecommunications providers who wished to utilize
the city's rights-of-way to enter into a franchise
agreement with the city. The proposed agreement
in question required TCG to pay four percent
(4%) of its gross revenues to the city of Dearborn
as a franchise fee, in addition to "a $50,000 one
time payment (in lieu of providing the city with
four fiber optic strands) and up to $2500 of the
costs incurred by [the city] in connection with
granting the franchise.."216 Following passage of
the 1996 Act, TCG rejected the agreement and
filed a suit seeking preemption of the local ordinance under section 253(a) and (c). 2 17 TCG alleged specifically that the city was discriminating
against it by not requiring the incumbent local exchange carrier, Ameritech, at least initially, to
2 1s
enter into a franchise agreement.
The district court rejected TCG's contention
that the percentage-of-revenue franchise fee was
not "fair and reasonable" compensation for use of
the rights-of-way. 2 19 The Dearborn court stated,
"whether compensation is 'fair and reasonable' is
not amenable to a strict test[,]" but rather must
be "determined by examining the totality of the
facts and circumstances."' 22 1 The court endorsed
the view, first established in 1893, that the city
could appropriately charge a "rental" fee to pri22
vate parties occupying the public rights-of-way. '
Given TCG's planned use of public property for
its twenty-seven mile network, the court found the
compensation sought by Dearborn neither unfair
nor unreasonable. Another relevant factor, according to the Dearborn court is "what other telecommunications providers would be willing to
pay." 222 In the court's view, the fact that three
other telecommunications providers were willing
to pay substantially similar amounts also supported a finding that the compensation was fair
223
and reasonable.
The Dearborn court also noted that TCG and the
city had been in negotiations over these fees several years before passage of the 1996 Act and had
Id. at 788.
Id. at 787.
2 19
Id. at 790.
220
Id. at 789.
221
Id. at 789-90 (citing City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel.
Co., 148 U.S. 92, 99 (1893)).
222
Id. at 790.
217
218

223

Id.
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nearly concluded the agreement in its present
form when section 253 was enactedY 24 The court
found TCG's claim that the fees were neither fair
nor reasonable to be "belied by its apparent previous willingness to negotiate, and enter into, the
agreement at issue. In fact, such evidence indicates quite the opposite, that the proposed agreement was reasonable, fair and consistent."2 5 Finally, the court was not convinced by TCG's
argument that the fees were so excessive that they
would likely render doing business unprofitable,
again largely in light of TCG's pre-1996 Act willingness to pay the regulated compensation. The
Dearborn decision was upheld on appeal, where
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's analysis of "fair and reasonable compensation" under
2
section 253(c) . 213
In White Plains, the federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York adopted the
Dearborn court's analysis in upholding the city of
White Plains's imposition, inter alia, of an annual
franchise fee equal to five percent of the gross revenue TCG or its affiliates derived in connection
with the operation of proposed telecommunica-

itself had entered into other agreements in New
York in which it agreed to pay franchise fees based
upon gross revenues); (3) negotiations between
TCG and the city had been fairly constant since
1992; and (4) there was no basis to conclude that
payment of the fees would likely render doing
231
business with the city unprofitable.
The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted
similar reasoning in connection with BellSouth's
claim that the City of Orangeburg's revenuebased franchise fee was neither fair nor reasonable under section 253(c). The Orangeburgcourt
acknowledged a split of authority in the federal
courts regarding "whether municipal franchise
fees must be limited under § 253(c) to the municipality's cost of maintaining the public rights-of-

tions facilities within the city limits.2 2 7 Althoigh

While the courts have split on whether
franchise fees should be designed to recover
"costs" versus "rents," the better view, taking the
pro-competitive policy goals of the 1996 Act into
account, is that section 253's limitation on local
authority to managing the physical use of public
rights-of-way carries with it the concomitant limitation of only collecting fees that are related to
the actual costs incurred in doing so. As several
courts have observed, such a limitation on local
authority regarding compensation for use of the
public rights-of-way is necessary to achieve the facilities-based competition envisioned by Congress,

the court acknowledged judicial decisions holding
that to be "'fair and reasonable,' fees must be directly tied to the carrier's use of and/or the municipality's costs of maintaining the public rightsof-way[,]" 2 28 the White Plainscourt relied upon another case from the Southern District of New
York, which concluded that "this reading of the
word 'compensation' may 'too severely limit the
term' because such a reading would treat § 253(c)
as if it permitted recoupment of 'costs' rather
than gaining of 'compensation."

229

In determining that the city's "rent" for use of
its rights-of-way was "fair and reasonable," the
White Plainscourt applied the factors identified in
the Dearborn case. 2:11 The court found: (1) TCG's
contemplated use of the public rights-of-way to be
extensive; (2) a number of other carriers had
agreed to the same fee provisions (indeed, TCG
Id. at 790-91.
Id. at 791.
226
TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618,
624-25 (6th Cir. 2000).
227
White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 96-98.
228
Id. at 95.
229
Id. at 96 (citing Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v.
Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 99 Civ. 0060 (BJS), 1999 WL
494120, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1999)).
230
Id. at 96-98.

23 2
way used by the telecommunications utility."

The court found that a franchise fee equal to a
percentage of revenue generated is "not inherently unfair or unreasonable as a measure of the
franchise's value as a business asset to the franchisee."W3" Absent evidence that the particular
amount was unfair, the court declined to find that
234
the revenue-based fees violated the 1996 Act.

when it adopted the 1996 Act. 23 5 A similar conclu-

sion has been reached by states such as Colorado
and Florida, which have imposed parallel restrictions on the collection of rights-of-way fees by municipal authorities.

2

-6

96-97.

224

23 1

Id. at

225

2_32

Id. at 808 (comparing the Dearborn and Prince George's

County decisions).
W33' Id.
234 Id.
2_35
See, e.g., Prince Georges County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817;

Dallas 1, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593; PECO, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

19409, at *23-24.
236
See, e.g., COLO.

REv. STAT. § 38-5.5-107 (2001) (limiting "[a] 11fees and charges levied by a political subdivision" to
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Discriminatory Treatment of New Entrants vs. the
Incumbent Should be Avoided

A highly contentious area of section 253 jurisprudence concerns discriminatory treatment of
new entrants, particularly with respect to the imposition of asymmetrical franchise fee obligations.
Although the FCC generally cautioned localities
regarding discriminatory treatment of new entrants in its Troy Order,2 37 it has not directly ruled
upon the question of whether the asymmetrical
imposition of franchise fees on new entrants
would violate federal law. In the Dearborncase, the
city's demand that the incumbent, Ameritech,
enter into a franchise agreement came long after
it sought to require a telecommunications
2 38
franchise from competitive entrant TCG.
Ameritech refused to obtain such a franchise on
the grounds that it had been granted a statewide
franchise to operate due to its incorporation
under an act of the state legislature in 1883.239
The federal district court refused to address
TCG's claim of discrimination, insofar as it pertained to the failure of the city to apply its
franchise requirement to Ameritech, because the
city had initiated that process. However, it ruled
that local governments must be able to distinguish
between different telecommunications providers,
taking into consideration the different burdens
individual carriers place on the rights-of-way in assessing fees.2 40 Thus, the obligations imposed on
incumbents and new entrants need not be identical. According to the court, "it is enough that the
City imposes (or plans to impose) comparable
burdens" to avoid violating section 253(c) .241
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
"fact that Ameritech prevailed before the district
court in its contention that state law prohibits the
City from subjecting it to the franchise fee
charged others does not mean that the City is
242
thereby discriminating in Ameritech's favor."
"the costs directly incurred by the political subdivision in providing services relating to the granting or administration of
permits," restricting local authority to require in-kind services
from telecommunications companies and expressly requiring
that any local taxes, fees or charges "be competitively neutral
among telecommunications providers"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 337.401 (West 1999) (limiting the authority of municipalities to levy taxes or fees on telecommunications companies).
Adoption of such a federal policy under section 253(c), of
course, would not deprive local franchising authorities of any
lawful taxing authority they have been delegated by the states
to impose taxes on all service providers, regardless of their

Although the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the
asymmetrical imposition of local franchising fees
on new entrants might strengthen Ameritech's
competitive position, and thereby enable it to undercut its competition, TCG had not alleged that
this had occurred. 24 -5 According to the Sixth Circuit, "[s] ince the district court found the fee to be
fair and reasonable, and its imposition to be
neither discriminatory in intent nor, in and of itself, anti-competitive in effect, the court also correctly rejected TCG's argument that the fee constituted an impermissible barrier to entry in
violation of § 253(a)."2 4 4
Although an arguably permissible legal interpretation of section 253(c) when examined in a
vacuum, the Dearbornoutcome is squarely at odds
with congressional intent to promote the rapid
development of facilities-based telecommunications competition. A city's plan to impose comparable burdens on the incumbent at some undetermined future time does not result in competitively
neutral and non-discriminatory treatment of new
entrants who must labor under those burdens in
the present. Moreover, these burdens fall particularly hard on a new entrant attempting to build
infrastructure because, without the municipality's
permission, that entity cannot install its facilities
and begin to compete. For an incumbent that already is providing service, a city's request that it
obtain a local telecommunications franchise "after-the-fact" will have little practical or competitive impact. The incumbent has the time to contest such a request at its leisure. For the new
entrant, time-to-market can make the difference
between successful competitive entry and no entry
at all.
Nevertheless, as noted above, some courts have
adopted the Dearborn reasoning to find that
franchising requirements and fee payments imposed on new entrants but not on incumbents sat-

use of the public rights-of-way.
237
Troy Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 21,433, para. 108 (local
requirements imposed only on new entrants will likely violate
47 U.S.C § 253).
238
Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 787, 791.
239
Id. at 791, 793.
240
Id. at 792-93.
241
Id. at 792.
242
Dearborn, 206 F.3d at 625.
243 Id.
244

Id.
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isfy the competitive neutrality and non-discrimination prongs of section 253(c).2 45 The While Plains
court, for example, relied upon Dearborn, other
federal cases, and the legislative history of the
1996 Act for the proposition that "[t]he City need
not treat [the incumbent LEC] and [the new entrant] identically in order to satisfy § 253(c). '24 '
The court rejected TCG's contentions that exemption of the incumbent LECs from city
franchising and franchise fee requirements was
anti-competitive and discriminatory. Instead, the
court reasoned, "[a]s long as the City makes distinctions based on valid considerations, it cannot
be said to have discriminated against [the entrant] in favor of [the incumbent carrier] ."247 The

court characterized as "powerful" the city's reasons for treating the incumbent (Bell Atlantic)
differently, including the fact that Bell Atlantic
had been paying a fee in exchange for use of the
city's rights-of-way in the form of free municipal
use of conduit and through the provision of free
additional conduit for the city's use in building its
own communications network.2

48

In addition, the

court was persuaded that Bell Atlantic's obligation
to offer universal service at affordable rates to the
city's residents, when compared to TCG's ability
to limit its service to the most profitable areas,
constituted a valid consideration supporting the
city's differential treatment of the incumbent and
4
the new entrant." 9

With regard to the non-fee related franchise requirements that the White Plains court had not
preempted for example, submission of construction plans, performance bonds, indemnification
for property damage and regulations designed to
minimize street disruptions-the court found
TCG had not presented sufficient evidence that
Bell Atlantic had engaged in activities impacting
the rights-of-way since enactment of the city's ordinance. According to the court, therefore, "it
cannot be said that exempting Bell Atlantic from
those particular regulations has had a discrimina245
While Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (finding, among
other things, that the incumbent's obligation to offer universal service justified differences in franchising and fee payment requirements).

246

Id. (citing Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. In-

provement Comm'n of the City of Boston, 184 F.3d 88, 103
(1st Cir. 1999)); Dearborn, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 792; Dallas I, 8 F.
Supp. 2d at 598; 141 CON(;. Ric. H8427 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (noting that Congress considered and ultimately re-

jected a "parity" provision prohibiting local governments
from imposing tees that distinguished among different prov-
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tory or non-competitive effect." 250 The court spe-

cifically declined to reach the question of whether
Bell Atlantic would be subject to the city's ordinance, including the franchising requirement, if
in the future Bell Atlantic decided to "build more
conduit or construct other telecommunications
facilities in the City's rights-of-way." 25' And, the

court observed that because the:
fees that the City wishes to impose . . . are not based
upon the construction of new facilities, but rather on
the existence of revenue and the provision of services
from networks running in the City's right-of-way ... the
imposition of a disparate fee could, indeed,
have a dis252
criminatory or non-competitive effect.

Nevertheless, because the city offered evidence of
what it considered to be Bell Atlantic's in-kind
compensation to the city, namely, the provision of
"an extensive underground conduit network"
among other things, and because TCG "offer[ed]
no proof that the fee 'charged' to Bell Atlantic, as
opposed to that which would be imposed on
TCG, would have a non-competitive or discriminatory effect[,]" the court found the city's evidence "sufficient to sustain [its] burden that the
fees charged to TCG and the fees paid by Bell Atlantic [were] competitively neutral and nondis2 53

criminatory.""

These conclusions are troubling for several reasons. First, even maintenance of existing telecommunications structures in the rights-of-way by the
incumbent should be considered a use of the
rights-of-way within the franchising authority and
responsibility of the locality. Existing roadways
can be damaged by maintenance activities, and
the imposition of such costs on the locality is arguably the reason why some level of telecommunications franchise fees is warranted. Therefore, the
court's assumption that Bell Atlantic's activities
would not impact the rights-of-way is dubious.
Moreover, given the heavy recent investment by
incumbent LECs, including Bell Atlantic, to upgrade their plants for the provision of Digital Subscriber Lines ("DSL") ,254 which necessarily entails
iders).
247
White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 98 (quoting Cablevision, 184 F.3d at 103) (alteration in original).
248
249)
250
251
252
253

Id.

Id. at 98-99.
ld. at 99 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 99 n.16.
Id. at 99.
Id.
254 See, e.g., Mike Farrell, Bell South Bags Wireless Cable,
DTH Plans, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 1, 2001, at 1; Doug
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the installation of fiber-optic cables, remote terminals and similar equipment in the public rights-ofway, such an assumption is unjustifiable. In addition, the universal service obligations relied upon
by the court 255 have nothing to do with compensating local governments for direct costs imposed
by carriers' uses of the public rights-of-way and
should not even figure into the equation regarding the discriminatory application of franchise fee
requirements.
Second, the court's discrimination argument
rests upon the untested assumption that the balance of benefits to the city and burdens on the
incumbent LEC represent compensation for use
of the rights-of-way such that the incumbent may
be exempted from payment of franchise fees without running afoul of the nondiscrimination language of section 253(c). In contrast, the FCC specifically addressed discriminatory application of
local telecommunications franchise and fee requirements on new entrants in the Troy Orderand
cautioned that such situations were very likely to
be considered discriminatory and in violation of
2 5, 6
the Act.
4.

Courts Will Uphold Narrowly Tailored
Requirements Regarding Uses of the Public Rightsof-Way

In contrast to the many cases in which the
courts have invalidated local ordinances that unduly burdened the provision of telecommunications services, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Alabama upheld the City
of Mobile's enforcement of a narrowly tailored
and balanced right-of-way management ordinance. In BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City
of Mobile,257 the district court reviewed a local ordinance requiring:
any party who seeks to perform excavation or construction work on public streets or rights-of-way... [to] first
obtain a permit from the City Engineer. In order to obtain such a permit, the party must submit a permit ap-

with
plication, pay a permit fee, and file detailed plans
2 58
the City Engineer before beginning the project.
Olenick, DSL to Surpass Cable in 2004: In-Stat, TwiCE, Dec. 18,
2000, at 1.
See White Plains, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
255
Troy Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 21,443, para. 108 ("Local
256
requirements imposed only on the operations of new entrants and not on existing operations of incumbents are
quite likely to be neither competitively neutral nor nondiscriminatory.").

Prior to enactment of the ordinance, BellSouth
could perform repair, construction or maintenance activities in the City's rights-of-way without
obtaining advance authorization. 259 Significantly,
the City's permit fees were designed "to enable
the City to recover its costs of administration and
enforcement and not for the purpose of raising
revenue." 2611The court held that:
[n]othing in the Mobile Ordinance exceeds the reservation of authority contained in section 253(c).... The
compensation imposed by the Ordinance is reasonable
and is directly related to the actual use of the City's
rights-of-way ....

These fees are publicly disclosed and

are administered in a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis. ... Accordingly, the court finds that
Mobile's Rights of Way Construction and Administration Ordinance 57-022 is not preempted by the [1996
Telecommunications Act]. 261

Moreover, in light of BellSouth's failure to identify any instance in which the city's ordinance had
the effect of prohibiting the company from providing a telecommunications service, the court
found that "BellSouth cannot plausibly make a
claim that the Ordinance" violates section
253(a) .262

The Mobile case is important because it confirms that where local authorities resist the temptation to overreach their authority and enrich the
city coffers at the expense of telecommunications
providers (and indirectly, their customers), the
courts will uphold narrowly tailored regulations to
manage the public rights-of-way in an competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory manner.
The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed
similar issues in a preemption case filed by BellSouth Telecommunications against the city of
Orangeburg, and found for the city by upholding
the application of a local telecommunications fee
ordinance.2"6 3 The Orangeburg court distinguished several federal district courts (including
Dallas and Prince George's County) that interpreted
section 253(c) to strictly limit a local government's power to managing the public rights-ofway. The court observed that South Carolina had
delegated to municipalities "the power to enact

257

BellSouth v. Mobile, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4244.

258

Id., slip op. at 3.

25

Id.

Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting Mobile Ordinance 57-022
section 1.2.7).
261
Id., slip op. at 19 (citations omitted).
Id., slip op. at 47-48.
262
2c3 BellSouth v. Orangeburg, 522 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. 1999).
260
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ordinances 'necessary and proper for the security,
general welfare, and convenience of the municipality or for preserving health, peace, order, and
good government in it.'"264 The court concluded
that this delegation includes the ability to ensure
that the grant of franchise privileges operates to
the public's benefit, and that the Orangeburg ordinance "merely requires BellSouth, as its franchisee, to make reasonable effort to provide the
service that is the subject of its franchise. 26 5

5.

Redundant Rights-of-Way Authorizations Should
be Avoided

The majority view in the case law discussed
above supports the conclusion that local authority
to impose telecommunications franchises is limited in scope to regulation of the provider's physical occupation of the rights-of-way for the installation and maintenance of telecommunications
facilities. Accordingly, a franchised cable operator
should not be required to obtain additional local
authorization to provide telecommunications ser-

vice because the locality's legitimate interests in
managing the use of the public rights-of-way have
already been fully protected under its cable
franchising authority. This policy result may be
achieved by following the reasoning set forth in
the Auburn, Austin, Dallas, Coral Springs, Prince
2
George's County, White Plains, and PECO cases.

264

Id. at 807 (quoting S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 5-7-30 (Supp.

Id.
The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Austin and Dallasdistrict court decisions
based upon a subsequently enacted Texas state statute, which
repealed the Dallas and Austin city ordinances and which
preempted any future similar city ordinances. See AT&T
Communications of the Southwest, Inc. v. City of Austin, 235
F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2000); AT&T Communications of the
Southwest, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 243 F.3d 928 (5th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiffs in the Austin and Dallas cases therefore prevailed in both judicial and state legislative forums. Although
the cases have lost their authority as binding precedent due
to the Fifth Circuit's actions, their persuasive authority is, if
anything, heightened by the Texas legislature's codification
of their reasoning and results. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings the district court's Coral Springs decision, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1304. The Eleventh Circuit based its decision upon
a subsequent change in Florida law and the district court's
consideration of whether the city's ordinance constituted
permissible rights-of-way management under section 253(c)
without the court's first addressing whether the ordinance
266

To Be Subject to Local Franchising,an Entity's
"Use" of the Public Rights-of-Way Must Involve
A Permanent Physical Impact

Federal court decisions have made abundantly
clear that no "use" of the rights-of-way occurs unless signals physically impact the public rights-ofway. According to these decisions, the mere passage of additional electrons through a previously
authorized wire that lies in a public right-of-way
does not "use" the right-of-way and therefore does
not vest the local authority with jurisdiction over a
service provider that is simply using the existing
wire. 26 7 Similarly, the mere passage of light waves

and particles through the air does not affect the
public rights-of-way and therefore does not imbue
municipalities with regulatory authority over the
services of wireless telecommunications provid268
ers.
In Dallas III, for example, the court granted
summary judgment against a municipality that
had sought to claim "rights-of-way" jurisdiction
over a non-facilities-based competitive LEC and a
wireless provider because neither provider ever
physically intruded into the public rights-of269
way.
For the non-facilities-based competitive
LEC, the court held that leasing network elements from an entity that used the public rightsof-way did not mean that the lessee also "used"
the rights-of-way. The court found, "[a]lthough a

66

2000)).
265

a.
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prohibited or had the effect of prohibiting a telecommunications service in violation of section 253(a); the Eleventh Circuit also invalidated substantial portions of the city's ordinance as inconsistent with state law. See Palm Beach, 252 F.3d
1169.
267
Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 943 (describing the city's "unsupported assertion that a non-facilities-based provider is 'using' the City's public rights-of-way" as "wholly unpersuasive");
Dallas 1, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 593
Many of Dallas's franchise requirements-such as the
submission of a wide range of financial information on
the company, the maintenance of detailed records subject to the City's approval, the provision of ubiquitous
services, and the dedication of ducts and fiber optic
strands to the City's exclusive use- . . . are totally unrelated to use of the city's rights-of-way, and are thus beyond the scope of the City's authority.
Id.; Dallas III, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (holding that a non-facilities-based competitive LEC does not "use" the public right-ofway).
268
Dallas I, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 762; DallasIII, 52 F. Supp.
2d at 773.
269 Dallas I1, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
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CLEC's purchase of access to a UNE from an
[ILEC] gives the CLEC exclusive control over the
functionality [of] the UNE, the ILEC still retains
ownership of the UNE and will continue to repair,
maintain, and operate it even when the CLEC
purchases exclusive access." 2 7°1 The DallasIII court

also rejected the city's argument that a wireless
telecommunications provider's transmissions
across and through the city somehow resulted in a
"use" of the public rights-of-way. The court held
that under section 253(c), the term "use" means a
"physical occupation" of the rights-of-way, and
that because the wireless carrier's telecommunications facilities did not do so, it therefore could not
27
be said to be "using" the rights-of-way. '
Definitions of "use" that extend beyond physical intrusions into property strain the term beyond all recognition.2 72 Indeed, as the Austin
court held, definitions of "use" that do not involve
actual physical intrusions simply represent "metaphysical interpretation [s] of the term . . . that

def[y] logic and common sense." 273 To retain any
meaning, the phrase "use of the public rights-ofway" must be limited to actual physical intrusions
into property, not to every beam and particle of
light that happens to pass over or through a pub2 74
lic right-of-way.
b.

Cable FranchisingAdequately Regulates the
Cable Operator's Use of Public Rights-of-Way;
Additional FranchisingIs Unnecessary and
Counterproductive

Cable operators seeking to use, upgrade or install additional facilities in the rights-of-way to provide advanced services present a unique set of issues for local governments. In the case of
franchised cable operators, the physical "use" and
occupation of the public rights-of-way is regulated
by local franchising authorities consistent with the
271

Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.

272

See BLACK' LAW DICIONARY 1541 (7th ed. 1999) (de-

270

fining "use" as "the enjoyment of property which consists of
its employment, occupation, exercise or practice"); 2 NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 459 (Lesley Brown
ed., 1993) (defining "use" as "the holding of land or other
property by one person for the profit or benefit of another").
273
Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 943.
274
See ECI, 13 FCC Rcd. at 14,306, para. 62 (holding that
ECI's SMATV system did not constitute a cable system because ECI purchased capacity from Ameritech's supertrunking system and ECI therefore did not "use" the public rightof-way in a manner that triggers the need for an additional

limitations contained in Title VI of the Communications Act. 275 Title VI authorizes local governments to require that, among other things, cable
operators upgrade their plant to provide more reliable and more advanced cable services. 2 76 These
same upgrades, of course, also enable the cable
operator to begin deploying additional services
such as telecommunications and information services over its cable infrastructure.
Providing additional communications services
over upgraded cable systems, however, does not
place any additional burden on the public rightsof-way. An incumbent cable operator should
therefore not be obligated to obtain additional
authority from local governments before it may
provide telecommunications services over its
cable system. The reasons supporting this position
are simple: (1) local governments already regulate the cable operator's use of public rights-ofway through the cable franchise; and (2) apart
from overseeing the physical use of the rights-ofway, federal law restricts local government ability
to regulate the provision of services classified as
"telecommunications services" under the Act.
Indeed, amendments to section 621 (b) (3) contained in the 1996 Act prohibit a local government from invoking Title VI to impose any
franchising or regulatory requirements on a cable
operator's provision of telecommunications service. 277 The residual, non-Title VI authority that
local governments retain with respect to the regulation of telecommunications services is restricted
to managing the rights-of-way.2 78 "Managing" public rights-of-way does not mean imposing requirements and obligations unrelated to use of public
rights-of-way. 279 Nor does it mean regulating the
types of service that are provided over such rightsof-way. Rather, the term means overseeing "the
physical manner in which [public] rights-of-way
are encumbered by the construction, maintecable franchise); In re Definition of a Cable Television System, 5 FCC Rcd. 7638, 7642, para. 28 (1990) ("[flt is well
established that radio transmissions, including line of sight
transmissions, such as the point-to-multipoint transmission ... do not use public rights-of-way.").
275
47 U.S.C. §§ 521-573 (2000).
276
47 U.S.C. § 546(b)(2) (2000) (local governments
may require that cable franchise renewal proposals include
"proposals for an upgrade of the cable system"); 47 U.S.C.
§ 544(b)(1) (2000) (franchising authorities "may establish
requirements for facilities and equipment").
277
47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (A)-(B) (2000).
278
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000).
279
See Auburn, 247 F.3d at 978.
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nance and continuing use of facilities that provide
telecommunications services."

2

0

A policy aimed at removing barriers to facilitiesbased competition, therefore, would ensure that,
where the provision of telecommunications service will not place a new or additional burden on
the public rights-of-way, local authorities are prohibited from requiring a franchised cable operator to secure a separate telecommunications
franchise. 28 ' If a cable operator offers competitive
telecommunications services over its upgraded
cable facilities-either directly or through a state
certificated affiliate-the public rights-of-way are
no more affected than they are when the operator
offers advanced cable services over the same
plant. 2

2

The mere passage of additional light

waves and electrons through the cable operator's
network does not newly implicate the locality's interest in managing the public rights-of-way to preserve public safety and order. Because that management interest already is fully addressed by the
cable operator's Title VI franchise, no other interests remain to be addressed through a separate lo2 3
cal telecommunications service franchise.
For similar reasons, local authorities should refrain from restraining or precluding cable operators from making their facilities available to third
parties for the provision of telecommunications
or other communications services. The use of the
cable operator's physical plant by affiliated or unaffiliated entities to provide telecommunications
service does not constitute a "use" of the public
rights-of-way that triggers an additional franchise
28(1

See Troy Order, supra note 80, 12 FCC Rcd. at 21,441,

para. 103.
281

See Dallas II, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (authority for

franchising is limited to physical occupation of the public
rights-of-way).
282
See Prince Georges County, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 819-20
(carriers using facilities owned, installed, and maintained by
others); Dallas 111, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (lease of facilities);
Dallas II, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62 (wireless service provider);
Austin, 975 F. Supp. at 942-43 (carrier that provided service
only by means of resale and use of unbundled network elements).
28-3
In principle, this result should extend to any entity
that is authorized to be in the public rights-of-way pursuant
to a local telecommunications franchise. For example, the
provision of additional services, such as Internet access, over
franchised telecommunications plant should not trigger the
need to obtain an additional local rights-of-way authorization. In contrast, a cable franchise would be required under
the existing terms of Title VI to the extent a telecommunications carrier chose to provide cable services, 47 U.S.C. § 541,
and could be required by localities to the extent the carrier
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obligation on the part of the cable operator. 284
Therefore, local governments may not use the
franchising and related permitting processes to
prevent cable operators from making capacity
available to other providers of telecommunications services without the "approval" of the
franchising authority.
This limitation on local regulatory authority
should apply with equal force to any additional
communications service provided over the
franchised cable operator's facilities, including
high-speed Internet access and related data-communications services. The local interest in managing the cable operator's use of the public rightsof-way should be satisfied through a single exercise of state-delegated local franchising authority,
and the collection of a single franchise fee.
Neither local governments nor the public interest
requires any further local authorization before
the provider can offer such advanced services to
the public. This is particularly true for services
that the FCC has already classified as "enhanced"
and/or "information" services, such as data retrieval and processing and Internet access services. 28 5 The local government's authority to manage the rights-of-way is not affected by the
provision of such additional services, and Internet
and interactive computer services are, by Congressional directive, to remain "unfettered" by regulation.

28 6

Moreover, the exercise of expansive local regulatory authority over such additional communications services in varying degrees and jurisdictions
provides "open video services." 47 U.S.C. §§ 571, 573. See Dallas v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999). Although the rightsof-way authorization itself would be redundant, local cable
franchising authority under Title VI is far broader than the
local telecommunications franchising authority permitted
under section 253, and extends to, among other things, cable

franchise transfer approval, enforcement of technical and
customer service standards, as well as the statutory right to
collect a franchise fee of up to five percent of gross revenues
derived from the provision of cable services. 47 U.S.C.
§ 542(a) & (b).
284 See, e.g., ECI, 13 FCC Rcd. at 14,306-07, para. 62
(cable franchise not required where service provider is using
facilities already authorized to be in the rights-of-way); Dallas
111, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 772-73.
285 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2) (2000) ("It is the policy of
the United States ...to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet and other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.").
286

Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (2000).
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would undermine goals local governments have
traditionally championed. 28

7

Increased and incon-

sistent regulation would likely retard or eliminate
the expansion of services offered over cable television systems, discourage investment in advanced
communications facilities, increase transaction
costs for communications providers (and, therefore, consumer prices), and result in an unstable
and unpredictable regulatory environment. Slowing cable entry into new service markets will likely
have a ripple effect as other providers experience
decreased competitive pressure to develop innovative services. Inasmuch as local franchising authorities have traditionally sought expanded services, infrastructure investment and competition,
along with reduced prices for consumers, expanding regulation would actually undercut these
local government interests. Similar policy considerations should also inform the federal regulatory
approach to cable Internet services.
The following section examines how the push
for open access drove the question of mandated
access for unaffiliated ISPs from the federal to the
local franchising level, and then back again. Court
challenges growing out of local franchising authority efforts to force multiple-ISP access to cable
facilities have left a legacy of confusion and uncertainty regarding the appropriate classification of
cable Internet service and the scope regulatory jurisdiction over it. This situation, in turn, has led
back to action at the federal level with the FCC's
initiation of an inquiry into cable open access. 2s8
The final section of this article suggests some
287
See In re Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., Final
Resolution of Cable Programming Service Rate Complaints,
Order, 11FCC Rcd. 4029 (1995); In re Social Contract for
Continental Cablevision, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 299 (1995); In re Social Contract for Time
Warner, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 2788

(1995).

Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (1) (2000) ("The term 'Internet' means the international computer network of both
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data
networks.").
290
See, e.g., Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685;
MediaOne of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen of
the Town of North Andover, Docket No. CTV 99-2, 99-3, 994, 99-5, _ Mass. Reg.
(Mass. Dep't of Telecomm. and Energy, Cable Television Div. May 1, 2000) (available at http://
www.state.ma.us/dpu/catv/Appeals/sumdecfnl.pdf).
291
Reacting to the district court's decision in PortlandI,
former FCC Chairman Kennard described the prospect of
30,000 local franchising authorities arriving at differing formulations of cable open access regulation as one of "chaos,"
288
289

and warned of deleterious effects on the services available to

guideposts for a rational policy solution to the
convergence issues that threaten to leave a legacy
of regulatory roadblocks to the further development of the national and international information superhighway known as the "Internet."
IV.

LOCAL ROADBLOCKS ON THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

The Internet is the widely recognized global
communications "network of networks." 2 9 With
respect to cable open access, the central legal
question before the courts has been the scope of
local authority under the Communications Act to
impose access requirements on cable-delivered Internet services. The handful of local open access
requirements that have been enacted would effectively require cable operators to interconnect
their cable Internet platforms with third-party
ISPs, to permit such ISPs to collocate equipment
for direct connections in the cable head-end, or
to resell broadband transport from the head-end
to the subscriber's premises. 29° That is, they
sought to regulate at the local level of government the "on-ramp" to an interoperable, global
29
communications superhighway. '

Resolution of the legality of local open access
efforts entails a determination of whether the
Communications Act or the U.S. Constitution
preempts locally imposed third-party ISP access
requirements. A conclusion that Internet over
cable is not a Title VI cable service does not necessarily end the matter if, as was true of the Portland
consumers and on the ability of cable operators to raise capital for system upgrades. William E. Kennard, The Road Not
Taken: Building a Broadband Future for America, Remarks
before the National Cable Television Association, Chicago,
Illinois, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
(June 15, 1999) ("IT]he Information Superhighway will not
work if there are 30,000 different technical standards or
30,000 different regulatory structures for broadband. The
market would be rocked with uncertainty; investment would
be stymied. Consumers would be hurt."). Current FCC Chairman Powell echoed these concerns as a Commissioner in his
contemporaneous speech to the Chicago chapter of the Federal Communications Bar Association. Michael K. Powell, Remarks before the Federal Communications Bar Association,
Chicago chapter, Chicago, Illinois, available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/ (June 15, 1999) ("[Government] intervention could stifle the development of alternative paths to the home that are currently under development
and which are attracting investment. Ironically pronouncing
cable an essential asset and declaring regulation of that asset
may risk condemning customers to regulated monopoly control of access.").
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Idecision, a determination also is made that the
service is a "telecommunications service" or an
"information service," or some combination of
the two. If it is a "telecommunications service"even assuming a delegation of authority from the
state to local governments that would permit their
franchising of local telecommunications providers' use of the public rights-of-way-the scope of
local franchising authority to mandate open access (interconnection/furnishing of service) for
ISPs would be tested under section 253. Under
the analysis suggested in the preceding discussion, locally imposed mandatory open access
would not likely withstand preemption.
On the other hand, if the determination is
made that Internet over cable is an "information
service," the likelihood of an express state delegation of regulatory or franchising authority to local
governments over information services is practically non-existent. 2 2 Preemption of local requirements might not be available under section 253,
as its protections are limited to an entity's provision of "any" telecommunications service, but preemption would become a near certainty under
the section 230 mandate that Internet services remain free from regulation by any level of government. Again, as demonstrated in Part III above, a
cable operator's provision of additional wire communications services ,over an already franchised
plant should not give rise to an additional
franchise obligation because the local govern-

ment's interest in managing the operator's underlying use of the public rights-of-way is already protected through the cable franchise. Nor should it
give rise to new common carrier obligations for
cable operators in light of competition in the

See discussion supra note 67; Duffy, supra note 56, at
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1277-79.
293
See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a
Reasonable And Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 FCC Rcd.
20,913, 20,917-19, 20,983-91, paras. 8, 185-202 (2000)
[hereinafter 2000 Section 706 Report]; In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable And Timely Fashion,
and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant
to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, 2402, 2422-32, paras. 6, 45-62
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 Section 706 Report]; Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) [hereinafter NARUC
I]; Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d
601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter NARUC II]; In.
reCable and
Wireless, PLC Application for a License to Land and Operate
in the United States a Private Submarine Fiber Optic Cable
Extending Between the United States and the United Kingdom, Cable Landing License, 12 FCC Rcd. 8516, 8530, para. 39
(1997).
294
See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (2000) ("Any cable system shall

not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by
reason of providing any cable service.").
295
Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. at 19,299, para. 29
("[C]able operators currently are not legally prohibited from
having an exclusive relationship with one particular ISP.")
(footnote omitted).
296
See, e.g., FCC's AOL-TW Deal Approval Stokes Open Access, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 16, 2001 at 2-3. John Raposa, Verizon's vice president and associate general counsel, "whose
company backs that effort," indicated an intent to lobby the
new Administration and Congress to enact a proposed Title 7
regulatory plan that would impose similar high-speed data
rules on phone companies, cable operators and other broadband players, claiming that the "crazy patchwork quilt of regulation" governing cable and telephone companies
"threatened the future of the Internet." Id. at 2-3.
297
The day following the release of the FCC's First Section 706 Report to Congress, the unsuccessful proponents of
regulating cable Internet services, including AOL, MCI
WorldCom, US WEST and other telecommunications carriers and ISPs, announced formation of the "openNET Coalition," with the stated goal "to promot[e] the rights of all consumers to obtain affordable, high-speed access to the
Internet from the provider of their choice." See openNET Coalition, at http://www.opennetcoalition.org/who (last visited

292

93
provision of broadband "last mile" networks.2

A.

The Push for Open Access

The push for mandatory open access came
against a regulatory backdrop that permits cable
operators to structure their Internet offerings free
of the types of resale and access obligations imposed on incumbent local exchange carrier services, so long as everyone agrees that they are
some form of cable service. 29 4 Under the Title VI
"umbrella," cable operators are permitted to establish exclusive arrangements with affiliated ISPs
29 5
for use of their broadband distribution systems.
The historic disparities in regulatory treatment
between cable television and telephone companies have led the latter to call for the imposition
of common carrier regulatory requirements for
cable's Internet services under the banner of "reg29
ulatory parity." 1

From the outset, the lobbying campaign for
open access aimed at "socializing" the concept of
creating a common carrier-like obligation for
cable operators with respect to their budding
high-speed interactive Internet services. Stripped
of its rhetoric, 29-7 mandated open access likely
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would require, at a minimum, that cable operators offer wholesale access and interconnection to
ISPs and other carriers, who in turn would sell the
high-speed Internet connection and ultimately
other services over the broadband cable platform. 298 Under current law, however, if the ser-

vice is a Title VI cable service, it may not be subjected to such common carrier regulation or
subjected to local requirements regarding, for
example, technical standards. 299 From the legal

perspective of cable franchising and open access,
therefore, categorization of the service determines the jurisdiction and scope of possible regulation.
At the federal level, open access proponents initially failed to secure regulatory intervention by
the FCC. Indeed, within the various contexts of
the AT&T/TCI merger, 30 0 the AT&T/MediaOne
merger, 30 1 the Internet Ventures, Inc. Petition for
Leased Access 30 2 and the Section 706 Broadband
Inquiry proceedings, 31° 3 the FCC resisted strident
claims that mandated open access was necessary
to preserve the open nature of the Internet. Instead, the FCC affirmatively chose a policy of waiting and watching (the so-called "hands off' polJune 2, 2001). The naming of the movement, "open access"
and its coalition "openNET" was nothing short of brilliant. It
immediately put cable on the defensive-if cable is arguing
against open access, it must be arguing for "closed access."
The terms of the engagement were set early, and they were
set by cable's competitors.
298 See Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. at 19,299-300, para.
30.
299 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000) ("Any cable system shall
not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by
reason of providing any cable service."); 47 U.S.C. § 544(e)
(2000) ("No State or franchising authority may prohibit, condition, or restrict a cable system's use of any type of subscriber equipment or any transmission technology.").

AT&T/TCI Transfer Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 3206-07,
paras. 95-96 (concluding that the merger of AT&T and TCI
would pose no additional competitive threats to the last-mile
broadband market and that open access mandates were not
necessary in light of the fact AT&T did not block access to
300

any site on the Internet through its Internet platform and
nothing about the merger was adversely affecting consumers'

choice of ISP or their manner of Internet access).

301
AT&T/MediaOne Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at
9867-70, paras. 117-20 (finding that in addition to significant growth in competition from alternative broadband access providers, AT&T voluntarily committed to various principles of "openness" that would enable customer options,
including: choice of ISPs, connection speeds, direct access to

all content available on the World Wide Web without added
charges and the ability to customize a subscriber's "start

page").

302
1VI Leased Access Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 3253, para. 12
(rejecting request by ISP for "leased access" carriage on cable

icy) to see how the nascent broadband markets
developed. The FCC feared that initiating a formal action would result in market uncertainty and
a decrease in investment. 3°14 In other words, the

FCC concluded that regulatory action would not
advance its policy goals, the most important of
which appeared to be the facilities-based deployment of advanced communications infrastructure
and services.30 5 Ironically, had the FCC chosen to
implement its "hands off' policy through formal
regulatory action, rather than through oblique
pronouncements, it might have avoided the series
of conflicting judicial open access decisions that
eventually threatened the agency's ability to set
broadband policy on a national basis.
With few exceptions, localities considering the
imposition of open access conditions have done
so through their cable franchise transfer review
authority. 30 6 One notable exception was 'Broward
County, Florida, whose open access ordinanceprior to its invalidation by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
to all
First Amendment grounds- 7 -applied
cable operators under the county's general cable

system on the ground that ISP's Internet access service did
not constitute "video programming" as that term is defined
in Title VI).
303

1999 Section 706 Report, 14 FCC Rcd. at 2423, 2449,

paras. 48, 101. "We believe it is premature to conclude that
there will not be competition in the consumer market for
broadband. The preconditions for monopoly appear absent."
Id. at 2423, para. 48. "[T]he record, while sparse, suggests
that multiple methods of increasing bandwidth are or soon
will be made available to a broad range of customers. On this
basis, we see no reason to [impose cable open access] at this
time." Id. at 2449, para. 101. See also 2000 Section 706 Report,
15 FCC Rcd. at 20,917-19, para. 8 (finding that deployment

of last-mile facilities to support advanced services is expanding rapidly throughout the country, and rather than
mandating open access, the FCC recommended considering
"whether to allow access by multiple Internet service providers to cable companies' infrastructure for the delivery of advanced services" under its statutory mandate to take action to
accelerate deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans).
304
See, e.g., FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER No. 31, THE FCC
AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET (authored by Jason
Oxman), at 21 (1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l.pdf.
305
See Barbara Esbin, Hands Off Policy Works on Open Access, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 26, 1999, at 69, available at
http://www.tvinsite.com/multichannelnews.
306
47 U.S.C. §§ 533(d), 537 (2000). See PortlandI, 43 F.
Supp. 2d 1146; PortlandII, 216 F.3d 871; Henrico County I, 97
F. Supp. 2d 712; Henrico County II, 257 F.3d 356(4th Cir.
2001).
307
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685.
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franchising authority.3

8

0

On June 4, 1999, open access proponents received their first significant, if short-lived, legal
victory when U.S. District Court Judge Owen Panner upheld Portland, Oregon's, open access
1 - In general, Judge
franchise transfer condition.
Panner accepted the parties' claims that Internet
over cable was a Title VI cable service, but rejected AT&T's challenge to municipal authority to
impose open access as a franchise condition.3 1"
The court held that Title VI permits the local
franchising authority to review the impact on local cable competition of a franchise transfer, and
to order open access to preserve that competition. 311 The court also accepted the city's arguments that cable is an "essential facility," and that
cable operators may be required to open their
plant to competing ISPs to preserve "cable competition" in the locality.

3 12

The 106th Congress also played a role in the
open access debate from spring through summer
1999. More than a dozen bills were introduced in
the House and Senate, either imposing open access on cable, or relieving the Bell Companies of
13
their interLATA data restrictions, or both.1
"(18 These ordinances and the legal challenges to their
validity are discussed below.
309 PortlandI, 43 F. Stipp. 2d at 1149.
31(o Id. at 1151, 1155.
-'i

Id.at 1152.

In cable television franchise transfer proceedings,
LFAs are permitted to consider the technical, legal and financial qualifications of the proposed franchisee, as well as
the impact of a proposed franchise transfer (or transfer of
control) on cable competition in the locality. See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 533(d), 537 (2000); 47 C.F.R. § 76.502 (2000); In re Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Horizontal
and Vertical Ownership Limits, Cross-Ownership Limitations
and Anti-Trafficking Provisions, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsiderationof the First Report and Order, 10 FCC Rcd.
4654, 4676-77, para. 52 (1995). The court's specific rulings
on AT&T's claims of statutory and constitutional preemption
are discussed below.
313 See, e.g., Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 1999, H.R. 2420, 106th Cong. (1999); Consumer
and Community Choice of Access Act of 1999, H.R. 2637,
106th Cong. (1999); Internet Growth and Development Act
of 1999, H.R. 1685, 106th Cong. (1999); Broadband Internet
Regulatory Relief Act of 1999, S. 877, 106th Cong. (1999).
314 The sole broadband access bill that garnered significant support during the 106th Congress was H.R. 2420 (224
sponsors). Representatives Tauzin and Dingell reintroduced
the legislation in the 107th Congress as H.R. 1542. See Internet Freedom and Broadband Deployment Act of 2001,
H.R. 1542, 107th Cong. (2001). The main thrust of H.R.
1542 is to de-regulate the broadband data offerings of the
Bell Operating Companies, particularly relieving them of the
312

None of the bills passed either the House or the
Senate, however, and their future prospects in the
107th Congress remain uncertain. 1

4

More re-

cently, movement in the marketplace, the withdrawal of AOL's public support for government
intervention, as well as entrenched opposition in
the U.S. Senate to re-opening the Telecommunications Act of 1996 all point in the direction of
continued heat and light from Capitol Hill rather
than the likelihood of new regulatory or deregulatory mandates.
By early 2000, state level attempts to impose
open access on cable through legislation had
failed in nearly 17 states.3 15 Nevertheless, at least
two open access proponents, GTE and Bell Atlantic, now "Verizon," vowed to continue to push for
cable open access, and have delivered on this
promise. 3 16 For example, in addition to lobbying,

Verizon sued cable operator Cox Communications, Inc., in federal district court in California.- 7 Verizon's lawsuit seeks both interconnection and unbundled broadband transport services
from Cox based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
PortlandII.
"I

Cable open access emerged as a central issue in
interLATA restrictions contained in sections 271 and 272 of
the Act and certain unbundling obligations imposed by the
FCC pursuant to section 251 of the Act See Ted Hearn, Data
Dereg Rises With Sponsor, MULTICIIANNEL NEWS, Jan. 22, 2001,
at 1.
3 15

Regulatory Interest in Open Access on Wane, COMM.

DAILY, Mar. 23, 2000, at 5.; See also, e.g., Minnesota PUC Closes
Docket to Probe 'Open-Access' Issue, TELECOMMS. REPS., Feb. 28,
2000, at 29; 3 More States Abandon Open Access Legislation,WARREN'S CABLE

REG.

MONITOR,

Feb. 21, 2000, at 2.

16 FCC Asked to Allow Cities to Regulate Cable Internet Service, WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, Dec. 4, 2000, at 3; CableModem Inquiry Yields No Consensus on 'Open Access,'
TELECOMMS. REPS., Dec. 4, 2000, at 26-27; Cable TV Operators
List Legal, Technical Hurdles To 'Open Access;, ILECs Want Regulatory Parity,' TELECOMMS. REPS., Dec. 11, 2000, at 26-29;
COMM. DAILY, May 25, 2000, at 10 (reporting GTE's intention
to file a motion for expedited appeal of the Henrico County I

decision).
317 GTE.NET v. Cox Communications, Inc., No. 00-CV2289-J (CGA) (S.D. Calif. filed Nov. 29, 2000) (hereinafter
GTE.NET v. Cox).
318

Id. In a similar vein, Qwest Communications Interna-

tional, Inc. has threatened both regulatory and judicial action against AT&T's cable television operations in Qwest's
fourteen state service area in an attempt to force AT&T to
provide "'access to the underlying network that provides
transport to the end user's home.'" Steve Caulk, Qwest Ends
Talks with AT&T, Seeks F"orced Access to Cable, DEN. RocKY MTN.
NEWS, availableat http://www.rockymountainnews.com (Feb.
23, 2001) (quoting Steve Davis, Qwest senior vice president
for policy and law).
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the Federal Trade Commission's investigation of
the merger of AOL and Time Warner, which concluded on December 14, 2000, when AOL Time
Warner agreed to enter into a Consent Order requiring that the merged entity make a choice of
ISPs available to its subscribers. 3 1- The FCC's order approving the merging parties' license transfer applications largely echoed, rather than expanded upon, the FTC's open access mandate for
AOL Time Warner. 320 Whether the FCC will impose similar requirements on the rest of the cable
industry will be determined in the course of its
Open Access Inquiry.
By late 2000, most of the largest cable MSOs
had committed to open their networks to thirdparty ISPs.321 In the wake of these developments,
the policy debate over open access has largely
been resolved in favor of some form of access for
third party ISPs and online service providers, with
remaining disputes seemingly confined to the
means of achieving this goal. 3 2 2 Cable operators
prefer market-based negotiations, whereas proponents of open access continue to press for govern32 3
ment mandates.
Nonetheless, open access proponents waged a
fierce campaign to obtain government intervention, particularly at the local franchising level. As
a result of their efforts, several court actions concerning the extent of local authority to order
open access, and remnants of open access activity
before local franchising authorities, a handful of
state legislative committees and public utility commissions, the FCC, and the U.S. Congress re-

mained through mid-2001. These legal efforts,
predictably, took on a life of their own and moved
on a parallel (and far more leisurely) schedule,
which was separate and apart from both the policy
debate and marketplace developments.

319 America Online, Inc. and Time Warner Inc., Consent
Order, Decision and Order, Order to Hold Separate, 2000 F.T.C.
LEXIS 170 (2000) (requiring, inter alia, AOL Time Warner to
allow at least one independent ISP to provide cable modem

Comcast Corporation, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 37-38;

service in a market before it offers broadband service
through affiliated ISP; AOL Time Warner must then reach
access agreements with at least two additional independent
ISPs within 90 days of AOL Time Warner providing broadband service through its affiliated ISP).
320
In reApplications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time
Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc, Transferors, to AOL
Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 Communications Reg. (P & F) 157, FCC 01-12-2001
FCC Lexis 432 (Jan. 22, 2001).
321
See, e.g., Implementing Cable Open Access, CABLE
DATACOM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2001, at 5-6; Comments of the National Cable Television Association, GEN Docket No. 00-185,
at 48-50 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) (describing plans of AT&T,
AOL and Time Warner to permit multiple ISPs to access
cable Internet platform); see also Comments of AT&T, GEN
Docket No: 00-185, at 61-66; Comments of Charter Communications, Inc., GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 7-9; Comments of

B. Judicial Decisions Regarding Local Authority
to Impose Cable Open Access and the
Regulatory Classification Question
Several federal district and circuit courts have
ruled upon challenges to local open access ordinances. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Portland, Oregon's municipal "open access" franchise transfer condition in June 2000..324
In a similar case regarding Henrico County, Virginia, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's invalidation of an open
access franchise transfer condition on federal preemption grounds, while avoiding a determination
of the regulatory classification for cable Internet
services. 32 5 In Florida, the federal district court
for the Southern District of Florida invalidated a
Broward County open access ordinance on First
Amendment grounds.3, " In addition, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that cable Internet services are
neither cable services nor telecommunications
services in the context of a dispute regarding the
FCC's pole attachment rules, and the United
States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari of that decision. 327 Resolution of the open
access cases and related proceedings may affect
the ultimate outcome of the campaign for govern-

Comments of Cox Communications, Inc., GEN Docket No.
00-185, at 25-26.
322
AT&T-Mindspring Agreement on Cable Modems Solidifies
Resolve of All Sides in Access Debate, TELECOMMS. REPS., Dec. 13,

1999, at 7 (quoting Robert Pepper, Chief, FCC Office of
Plans and Policy, saying: "Everybody agrees with the goal of
open networks .

.

. The question is whether it should be

achieved with government regulations or whether the market
is going to work it out.").
423
Compare Comments of Cox Communications, Inc.
and Comments of Comcast Corporation, with Comments of
Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center
for Media Education and Media Access Project, GEN Docket
no. 00-185 (filed Dec. 1, 2000) and Comments of WorldCom,
Inc., GEN Docket No. 00-185 (filed Dec. 1, 2000).
324 Portland I, 216 F.3d 871.
325 Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712), affd, 257 F.3d
356.
326 Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685.
27
Gulf Power 11, 208 F.3d at 1277, cert. granted, 121 S.Ct.
879. The Court scheduled oral argument for Oct. 2, 2001.
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ment-mandated ISP access that once again is
pending before the FCC. Although many of the
lower court decisions have been reversed or otherwise superceded on appeal, their persuasive or
unpersuasive value remains of interest, particularly in light of the lack of final resolution as to
the regulatory status of Internet over cable and
the legality of mandated cable open access. If the
FCC may be faulted for its reticence in answering
the regulatory classification question, several of
the federal courts may certainly be faulted in their
over-eagerness to jump into that breach and,
more importantly, to craft federal broadband policy as a matter of first impression from the appellate bench.

of AT&T's preemption argumentsY'3 The court
first observed that "Congress may either explicitly
state its intent to preempt state law in the language of a statute or Congress may imply its intent
to preempt through the structure and purpose of
a statute." 33 2 Despite the explicit language of sec-

1.

AT&T.313 7 Arguably, the provision cited also sup-

Portland, Oregon-Two Views of Consistency of
Local Access Mandates With Title VI

a.

Portland I-Local Open Access Ordinance
Not Preempted Under Title VI Protections
for Cable Services

As noted above, on June 4, 1999, federal District CourtJudge Owen Panner ruled that the city
of Portland had the legal authority to impose an
open access condition on AT&T's provision of the
@Home cable Internet service. 28 The court cited
section 613 of the Act, which reserves to local authorities the right to reject, and therefore condition, cable franchise transfers that threatened

tion 636(c), 333 however, the court determined

that "Congress intended to interfere as little as
possible with existing local government authority
to regulate cable franchises."'3

34

The judge found

that the Cable Act lacks any clear intent to preempt existing local government authority to regulate cable franchisees. 335 Such preemption must

be "unmistakably clear in the statute's wording," 3 1 and the court did not find a clear intent
to preempt in any of the provisions cited by
ports precisely the opposite conclusion.
The principal issue decided in Portland's favor
was the broad determination that Title VI recognizes the power of local authorities to preserve
competition for cable services, particularly with
respect to changes of ownership and control pursuant to section

613.338

The judge ruled that the

power to deny a transfer includes the lesser power
to condition.3 3 9 Judge

Panner

observed

that

courts have recognized a city's power to promote
competition in the local economy, citing a nineteenth century decision regarding a colonial
franchise to construct and operate a bridge over

"cable competition."3 2 9 Portland's view that open

34
the Charles River in Boston. 11

access was needed because AT&T's plant was an
"essential facility" which, unless opened to com-

Judge Panner rejected AT&T's argument that
the city's open access requirement was preempted
under section 621 (c) due to its treatment of the
cable operator as a common carrier. Instead, the
district court found that requiring a business to
allow its competitors access to an "essential facility"-an antitrust doctrine-does not constitute

peting ISPs, would stifle local cable competition,
was upheld as a valid basis for the franchise transfer condition .33
Because the parties did not contest the issue,
Judge Panner accepted without question that
cable Internet service could be treated as a Title
VI cable service. However, the court rejected each
328
329

330
131

Portland I, 43 F. SUpp. 2d 1146.

Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1153-54.

332 Id. at 1151 (citing.lones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977)).
333
47 U.S.C. § 556(c) 2000 ("Except as provided in section 637, any provision of law of any State, political subdivision, or agency thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision of any franchise granted by such authority, which is
inconsistent with this Act shall be deemed to be preempted
and superseded.").
334
Portland1, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52 (citing Dallas v.

34
common carrier regulation. '

AT&T's constitutional challenges were summaFCC, 165 F.3d at 347).
3 5

Id.

:"

Id. at 1152 (internal quotes omitted) (citation omit-

ted).
137

Id.

339

Id.

'140

Id. (citing Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Pro-

prietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 547-48 (1837) (hold-

ing that the grant of an exclusive franchise to build and operate a bridge does not preclude a local government from
constructing another bridge nearby)).
341 Id. at 1153.
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rily dismissed. The open access requirement was
not found to violate the Contract Clause of U.S.
Constitution 342 because local authorities have the
power to "prevent an antitrust violation" under
their authority to review the "legal qualifications"3
34
of the person seeking to hold a franchisee.
AT&T's claim that "forced access" violated its First
Amendment rights was rejected with virtually no
analysis in light of the court's view that the requirement was a content-neutral economic regulation that satisfied the Supreme Court's O'Brien
test.

guments as being based "on a faulty premise."3 47

The FCC suggested that Internet over cable might
be classified as a cable service, a telecommunications service, an information service or as an "advanced telecommunications capability" under section 706, but stated that it had not yet decided
that issue.3 48 The court was asked to rule nar-

rowly, keeping in mind that only the FCC, and not
local governments, had regulatory authority over
all providers of broadband services, including
3
wireless and satellite carriers.

49

34 4

Tellingly, Judge Panner stated that in reaching
his conclusions, he did not need to consider
whether the open access requirement "is good
policy. ' 345 In flatly rejecting AT&T's preemption

claims and instead finding that the "open access
requirement was within the authority of the City
'3

and County to protect competition,"

46

Judge

Panner effectively authorized a local level of communications antitrust enforcement by the Mt.
Hood Cable Regulatory Commission, in addition
to that performed by the United States Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission
and the FCC. The court cited no state law delegation of such sweeping antitrust powers to local
governments. Judge Panner's ruling stretched
very far to place regulation of cable Internet services within the scope of the local franchising authority's cable regulatory jurisdiction.
AT&T appealed the case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the
FCC entered the appeal with an influential amicus
curiae brief that challenged the parties' Title VI ar-

b.

Portland II-Local Open Access Mandate
held Inconsistent with Title VI Protections
for Telecommunications Services Provided
by Cable Operators

Somewhat ironically, although the Ninth Circuit found that the city of Portland was preempted under Title VI from conditioning cable
franchise transfers on the transferee's provision of
open access, it did not reach this conclusion
under any of the cable service theories AT&T had
advocated. Rather, the court determined that the
ordinance was inconsistent with section
621 (b) (3) ,350 which limits the exercise of local
cable franchising authority over telecommunications services provided by cable operators. This
outcome rests upon the Ninth Circuit's finding
that the provision of Internet service over cable
facilities comprises both a "telecommunications
service" and an "information service" under the
35 1
Communications Act.

Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit dis-

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl..
Portland 1, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. The district court
also rejected AT&T's arguments that the open access condi-

gory, because they allow customers to choose the content
and send it to the recipient of choice. Under this view, the
brief suggested that cable Internet may be more appropri-

tion was barred by the company's franchise agreement because the "franchise agreements do not limit the factors that
the City and County may consider in deciding whether to approve a change in control." Id.
344 Id. at 1154 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.

ately characterized as information or telecommunications
rather than cable service. The brief stated that the FCC had

342

343

367, 377 (1968)).
345 Portland , 43 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.
346

Id. at 1152.

347 Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC, PortlandI1,216 F.3d
871 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-35609).
348 The FCC's brief also attempted to answer the "category" problem by dividing communications service networks
into two: "broadcast" or "one-to-many" networks, and
.switched" or "one-to-one" networks. Lumping "cable" into
the broadcast category, the brief describes the broadcast network as one in which the distributor chooses the content and
sends it to all customers. In contrast, telecommunications
and information services would fall into the switched cate-

not yet conclusively resolved the regulatory classification issue, and effectively urged the Court to decide the case "narrowly" and avoiding ruling on the clarification issue. Id. at 19,
26, 29.
3491 Id. at 29.
350 47 U.S.C. § 542(b)(3).
351
Portland11, 216 F.3d at 877-79. Arguably, this portion
of the Portland II is non-binding dicta. The challenged ordinance was enacted under the city's cable franchising authority and required open access only insofar as Internet over
cable was treated as a Title VI cable service. Id. at 873. Once
the court determined that it was not a cable service, the question before the court regarding the validity of the open access requirement in the city's cable franchise transfer ordi-

nance was settled. The remaining portions of the decision
may therefore be considered dicta. See Export Group v. Reef
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claimed that it was ruling on whether "open access" is the correct national policy for cable, rather,

regulation to cable broadband Internet access"

it was making its ruling on how existing law treats

Instead, the Court ruled that the @Home cable
Internet service is comprised of both a "telecommunications service" and an "information service"
component, and that AT&T's provision of the
@Home transmission element constitutes the provision of a "telecommunications service."3 6 0 The
court correctly noted that the FCC treats ISPs as

what the court described as "cable broadband Internet access." 35 2 The court continued by observ-

ing that cable was one of many providers of broadband Internet access, including wireline
telecommunications carriers, fixed wireless and
satellite providers, and that the fight over open access was fundamentally "a struggle for control
' 353

over access to cable broadband technology."

It

noted that the FCC had declined requests to impose open access conditions on AT&T in the context of its acquisition of TCI. According to the
court, the FCC had declined, both in its regulatory capacity and in its capacity as amicus curiae,
to address the regulatory classification of the
cable Internet service.3 5 4 Therefore, the court was
not bound to give deference to the administrative
agency's statutory construction,3

55

and it felt free

to arrive at its own conclusions under what it
356
called the "plain language" of the statute.

The Ninth Circuit found that the statutory definition of cable services simply did not fit what
AT&T's @Home cable Internet service provides
the consumer. According to the Ninth Circuit,
cable services under the statute are "one-way," in
contrast to Internet access service, which is twoway and highly interactive. 35 7 The court gave

short shrift to the argument that the addition of
the phrase "or use" to the pre-existing statutory
definition of cable services was sufficient to
change the "essence of cable service," which is the
"one-way transmission of programming to sub-

'3
because that would lead to "absurd results."

59

36 1
providing "information services" under the Act.

Information services are defined by the Act as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information via
telecommunications."'3

62

As the definition sug-

gests, ISPs generally lease telecommunications
service or lines to transport data to their customers; as to the "public," they are not providing telecommunications services, but rather are providing
"information services." The court correctly recognized that information services, like the FCC's
earlier category of "enhanced services," have
never been subject to regulation under the Act.36 3
Yet, directly contrary to FCC precedent holding
that the elements of an Internet access service
may not be "teased" apart and given separate regulatory treatment,3 6" the court divided the
@Home offering into two elements: a "pipeline"
that is cable broadband (as opposed to telephone
lines), and what it described as "the Internet service transmitted through that pipeline," and
awarded a different legal status to each element.

35
W

it inconceivable that Congress intended to apply
the "carefully tailored scheme of cable television

The Ninth Circuit appears to have been heavily
influenced by the way traditional dial-up service is
provided by means of a separate telecommunications service (provided by a LEC) and an informa-

Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding

§ 64.702(a) (2000).

scribers generally."'3

5

Moreover, the court found

that the court's statements not necessary to the decision
have no binding or precedential effect).
352 Portland 11, 216 F.3d at 876-77.
35;
Id. at 873.
354 Id. at 876.
355
Id. (referring to Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
356

357

Id.

Id. at 876-77.
358 Id. at 876.
359 Id. at 877.
360
Id. at 877-78.
361
Id. at 877.
362
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
363
PortlandII, 216 F.3d at 878 (citing Howard v. America
Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2000)); 47 C.F.R.

'14
See Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at
11,516-26 (1998); IVI Leased Access Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at

3253-54, para. 13.
Internet access service generally consists of numerous
distinct and related elements, such as access to personal,
educational, informational, and commercial web sites;
the ability to send and receive electronic mail; access to

streamed video content; Internet video messaging and
conferencing; and a host of other services both realized
and forthcoming .... In contrast, the leased access pro-

visions of the Communications Act require cable operators to reserve channel capacity for one statutorily prescribed purpose-video programming.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 522(20)).
,5
Portland I1,216 F.3d at 878.
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tion service (provided by an ISP). The court
found, "unlike [all] other ISPs, @Home controls
all of the transmission facilities between its subscribers and the Internet."3 66 The court stated
that "[tlo the extent @Home is a conventional
ISP, its activities are one of an information service. However, to the extent that @Home provides
its subscribers Internet transmission over its cable
broadband facility, it is providing a telecommunications service as defined in the Communications
Act. ' 367 The very next sentence switches focus
from @Home itself to AT&T, and concludes,
"[u] nder this taxonomy, the Communications Act
bars Portland from conditioning the franchise
transfer upon AT&T's provision of the @Home
transmission element that constitutes telecommunications."' 6 The court's understanding of what
the "it" is in the case of the @Home offering, and
"who" is offering "what" is both confused and confusing.
The Ninth Circuit held that Title VI prohibits
local franchising authorities from "regulating
cable broadband Internet access, because the
transmission of Internet service to subscribers
over cable broadband facilities is a telecommunications service under the Communications
Act."3 69 Specifically, the court found that section
621(b) (3) "expresses both an awareness that
cable operators could provide telecommunications services, and an intention that those telecommunications services be regulated as such,
rather than as cable services. '3 7 Accordingly,
under the terms of section 621 (b) (3), a cable operator "need not obtain a franchise to offer cable
broadband. '3 7 1 Therefore, a city may not impose
any requirement that has the "purpose or effect of
prohibiting, limiting, restricting or conditioning"
the provision of cable broadband, nor may it order the operator to discontinue providing cable
broadband or require the operator to provide
cable broadband as a franchise transfer condition.

The court ruled that under several provisions of
section 621(b)(3), the city, in its capacity as a
cable franchising authority, was prohibited from
regulating the cable operator's provision of
@Home; therefore, the open access condition "is
3 72
void.
In an effort to bolster its novel analysis, the
Ninth Circuit noted that even "[b]eyond the domain of cable-specific regulation, the definition of
cable broadband as a telecommunications service
coheres with the overall structure of the Communications Act as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the FCC's existing regulatory regime." 373 In support, the court cited the
definition of "advanced telecommunications capability" under section 706, which the court found
to describe cable broadband.3 74 Under section
706, advanced telecommunications capability consists of the "high-speed, switched, broadband telecommunications capability that enables users to
originate and receive high-quality voice, data,
graphics, and video telecommunications using
any technology."' 375 Here again, the court departed from FCC precedent that had expressly refrained from ruling that cable Internet service
falls within the category of "advanced telecommu376
nications capability" as defined in section 706.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit observed that the FCC
thus far has refrained from subjecting cable
broadband to any regulation, including common
carrier telecommunications regulation, and that
the FCC has broad authority to forbear from enforcing telecommunications provisions if it determines that such action is unnecessary to prevent
discrimination and protect consumers and consistent with the public interest.' 77 The court made a
point of stating that "Congress has reposed the
details of telecommunications policy in the FCC,
and we will not impinge on its authority over
these matters. '378 Coming fast upon its re-classification of cable Internet service based solely on ar-

372

Id. at 878.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 879.

373

Id.

374

Id.

366

370

367

371

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
368
Id. At this point in the analysis, the Ninth Circuit alipears to have missed the crucial distinction under the Act
between "telecommunications service," which is provided on
a common carrier basis, and "telecommunications" which
may be provided on either a common or private carrier basis.
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2000), with 47 U.S.C. § 153(43)
(2000). In other words, the transmission of telecommunications is not always synonymous with the provision of telecommunications service.
369
Portland II, 216 F.3d at 880.

:175 1996 Act, § 706(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 153 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 157 note).
3176
1999 Section 706 Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398, at para. 24.
377 Portland II, 216 F.3d at 879.
378
Id. at 879-80. The Portland I decision was not appealed and is final.
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guments raised for the first time in appellate
briefs, this statement appears somewhat disingenuous. The Ninth Circuit may have left the "details" of telecommunications policy with the FCC,
but its breaking new ground to classify cable Internet as a telecommunications service itself carried profound consequences. This is amply
demonstrated by Verizon's post-PortlandII lawsuit
seeking interconnection and unbundled service
from cable operator Cox pursuant to Title II.3'

As previously noted, largely in response to the
Ninth Circuit's decision, the FCC has initiated a
proceeding to examine the regulatory implications of cable Internet services. 8 "
2. Broward County, Florida-LocalOpen Access
Mandate Violates Cable Operators' First
Amendment Rights
On July 13, 1999, the Board of County Commissioners for Broward County, Florida, approved a
broad cable open access ordinance, Ordinance
No. 1999-41, unrelated to a particular franchise
transfer, that would require all franchisees to
open their cable modem platforms to independent ISPs. Despite repeated recommendations
from county staff that it not be enacted, the
Board's approval came following an offer from
GTE, which drafted and lobbied for the ordinance, to indemnify the county for any attorney's
fees incurred in defending challenges to the lawfulness of the ordinance.3 8'
The ordinance compels franchised cable opera-

tors to provide ISPs access to "Broadband Internet
Access Transport Services" that are "unbundled
from the provision of content," on "rates, terms,
and conditions that are at least as favorable as
those on which it provides such access to itself, to
its affiliate, or to any other person."3

82

Should the

cable franchisee become subject "to more extensive or different nondiscriminatory equal access
requirements" that are imposed or agreed upon
with "any other jurisdiction," any ISP may, at its
option, compel the franchisee to comply with that
379

GTE.NET v. Cox, supra note 317, No. 00-CV-2289-]

(S.D. Calif. filed Nov. 29, 2000).
380
Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287.
381
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 686-87 & n. 1.
.382 Broward County, Fla., Ordinance 1999-41 § 1.02 (July

13, 1999).
383
384

Id. at § 1.04.
See Linda Haugsted, Fla. Access Setback Follows Two
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obligation in lieu of the Broward County ordinance. 3 Cable operators in Broward County immediately challenged the ordinance in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. Two separate lawsuits were filed, the first
by Comcast and Advanced Cable, and the second
by AT&T/TCI and MediaOne. Each generally alleged preemption and related claims similar to
those alleged by AT&T in the Portland litigation.'

84

Although the district court initially denied the
cable operators' summary judgment motions ,385
following submission of an extensive record, District Judge Donald Middlebrooks subsequently
granted the motions and held that the Broward
County ordinance "unconstitutionally abridges
freedom of speech and the press."3 8 6 In contrast

to the open access preemption cases, Judge Middlebrooks actively assessed the policy implications
of the efforts to regulate the Internet's on-ramps
at the local level by reference to both statutory
and regulatory sources as well as documented
competitive conditions. Without delving into the
regulatory classification issue directly, the court
invalidated the local ordinance on the ground
that it imposed a "significant constraint and economic burden directly on a cable operator's
means and methodology of expression.

'38 7

The

court further found that this constraint was not
adequately justified by local officials as likely to
combat any demonstrable, as opposed to entirely
speculative, set of harms. 8 8
The court likened the cable operators' choice
of offering an Internet service through a selected
ISP, such as Excite@Home, to the cable operators' editorial choice of the types of video and
other programming content offered through
their traditional cable service.
Each selection offers distinctive programming and format. According to the Plaintiffs, their choices were

made from an array of opportunities and reflected a
choice based upon content. Their choice required

them to forgo other programming because of physical
limitations of their systems. They plan to market their
Wins, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, available at http://www.tvinsite.
com/multichannelnews (Feb. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Haugsted].
'85 Comcast Cablevision of Broward County v. Broward
County, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
86 Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
387
3188

Id. at 692.
Id. at 697-98.
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Internet provider as an integral part of their overall
programming. Under their business plan, advertising is

sold to create income for their Internet service
in addi389
tion to payments from their subscribers.

The court rejected Broward County's argument
that although cable operators' content may be entitled to First Amendment protection, "the transmission mechanism employed by the cable operator enjoys no First Amendment protection and
may be separated out for regulation."' 390 In contrast to the type of rationale accepted by Judge
Panner in PortlandI, Judge Middlebrooks rejected
the county's defense that its ordinance regulated
"only trade practices and not speech," because it
was not aimed at the cable operators' own content, but at its "unique facility - the transmission
conduit," that the county believed should be
shared among competitors. 3 9 ' Rather, the court
observed, if, to a substantial extent, "the medium
is the message," how "can government regulate
the technology of expression without also changing its meaning?" 39 2 Because the cable Internet
service is provided by an intertwining of content
and technology, the court found that the type of
analytical separability engaged in by the county
"difficult and perhaps unwise." 39 3 Judge Middlebrooks analogized cable Internet service providers to publishers of information, citing a number of Supreme Court cases applying the First
Amendment to means of distribution and concluded, "[i]n arguing that the conduit or transmission capability of speech can be separated
from its content, the County ignores the relationship between the two."' 94 As these cases establish,
the freedom of press articulated in the constitution is not limited to the traditional print media
"but also to delivery of information by means of
fiber optics, microprocessors and cable. 'The
press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
395
information and opinion."'
The district court observed that while the Broward ordinance imposed significant constraints and
economic burdens on the cable operators' means
389

Id. at 691.

390

Id.

391

Id.
Id. at 692.
Id.

392
393

394
Id.; see Ex ParteJackson,96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 768
(1988); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
'395
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 692 (quoting

of expression, it had no application to wireless,
satellite, telephone transmission or other providers of Internet service. The ordinance, therefore,
"invidiously impacts a cable operator's ability to
participate in the information market... [because it] both deprives the cable opera-

tor of editorial discretion over its programming
and harms its ability to market and finance its service, thereby curtailing the flow of information to
the public."39 6 Because the Broward County ordinance would only become applicable after a cable
operator decided to offer an "Internet information channel," the court found the ordinance and
the arguments supporting it:
very similar to the Florida law which led to the Supreme
Court's decision

in

Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.

Tornillo . . . [and found it] ironic that a technology,
which is permitting citizens greater ease of access to
channels of communication than has existed at any
time throughout history, is being subjected to the same
arguments
rejected by the Supreme Court in
39 7
1

Torillo.

Significantly, the court declined to limit its review to intermediate scrutiny, which the Supreme
Court had adopted in Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC-98 to review the FCC's must-carry regulations. The court found that the reasons given by
the Supreme Court for applying intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny to the must carry rules
did not apply to the case before it once the court
made its central finding that cable operators exercise no bottleneck control over Internet access or
content.
Cable operators control no bottleneck monopoly over
access to the Internet. Today, most customers reach the
Internet by telephone. Those who obtain access
through cable can use the Internet to reach any Internet information provider. After inquiry, the FCC has
concluded that it does not foresee monopoly, or even

duopoly in broadband Internet services.... The "bottleneck" theory offers no justification for less than
heightened
scrutiny of the Broward County Ordi99

nance. 3

The court held that strict scrutiny should be applied to the Broward County ordinance. 4°10 Inter-

mediate scrutiny, used by the Supreme Court in
Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452).
Id. at 693.

396

Id. at 694 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254, 258 (1974)).
398
Turner 1, 512 U.S. 622.
399 Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citation omit397

ted)

(citing Advanced Services Report, 14 FCC Rcd. 2398

(1999).
400

Id. at 697.
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Turner I, was held to be inapplicable because:
(1) unlike the must-carry rules, which applied to
all cable operators, the Broward County ordinance applied only to those few providing Internet service; 4 111(2) unlike the must-carry rules,
differential treatment was unjustified by some special characteristic of the medium such as bottleneck control, which cable operators certainly did
not possess over Internet access; 40 2 and (3) unlike

the must-carry rules, which posed no risk of diminishing the free flow of ideas, or of confusing
the ideas or messages of the broadcasters with
those of the cable operator, the Broward County
ordinance would require the adoption of technology to accommodate, in contravention of existing
contracts, the demands of thousands of Internet
service providers, whose sometimes offensive
speech could be mistaken for that of the cable operator. In sum, in the district court's view, the
Broward County ordinance, unlike the must-carry
rules, threatened to diminish the free flow of in4
formation and ideas. 03

The court also found that the ordinance would
fail intermediate scrutiny if that standard were to
be applied. 0t 4 The court reasoned that the open
access ordinance passed none of the O'Brien criteria, relying heavily upon the FCC's own analyses
of the competitiveness of the broadband marketplace and the pace of deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability. The court rejected the county's asserted justification that open
access was necessary to ensure competition and
diversity in cable Internet offerings by providing
ISPs access to the "essential facility" operated by
cable operators as flatly inconsistent with the
FCC's findings in both its Broadband Today Report
411
The district court observed, "[t]his ordinance is
targeted only at the Plaintifft, and it is likely to result in the
elimination of broadband cable Internet service in unincorporated Broward County. The ordinance was adopted at the
behest of a telephone company seeking to eliminate or hamper a competitor." Id. at 696.
402

I&

Id. at 697. Subsequently, the county and the cable operators reached an agreement whereby the county would
withdraw its appeal of this ruling and repeal the open access
ordinance. See Haugsted, supra note 384.
404 Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 697. Under the
40-

now familiar test articulated in United States v. O'Brien, 391

U.S. 367 (1988), a content-neutral regulation will withstand
constitutional scrutiny if: ( I ) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(3) if the incidental restriction on First Amendment free-

doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
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and its Advanced Services Reports.4° 5 In contrast, the
court noted that the county had not conducted its
own inquiry into the competitiveness of the
broadband Internet access market, but had
merely asserted that the markets were dysfunctional. In addition, the county had failed to
demonstrate that the open access ordinance furthered a substantial government interest. Therefore, the court concluded, even applying contentneutral intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance vio4 6
lated the First Amendment. 11
3.

Henrico County, Virginia-Local Open Access
Mandate Is Inconsistent With Title VI Protections
for Cable Services and Operators

In December 1999, several communities imposed open access in connection with the AT&T/
MediaOne acquisition, including Henrico
County, Virginia, Culver City, Madera County and
West Hollywood, California. 4t 7 AT&T and
MediaOne filed suit against Henrico County in
U.S. District Court in Richmond, Virginia, and
against Madera County in U.S. District Court,
Eastern District of California, Fresno Division. 4°t8
a.

Henrico County I: Title VI Preempts Local
Open Access OrdinanceAs Inconsistent With
Federal Cable Service Regulation

On May 10, 2000, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granted AT&T's motion for summary judgment in connection with the company's
challenge to the Henrico County open access ordinance."11 9 In a strongly worded opinion, Senior
interest. Id. at 377.
415 Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 697-98.
406 Id. at 698.
407 See The Open Access Saga: A Blow by Blow Account, Mu.
TiHANN.
NEWS, May 8, 2000.
4018
See Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp.

2d 712, affd, Henrico
County II, 257 F.3d 356; MediaOne Group, Inc. v. Madera

County, Calif., Civ. F.99-6787 (OWW DLB) (E.D. Calif. filed
Dec. 21, 1999). The Madera County suit remains pending. Its
otutcome, however, will be governed by the Ninth Circuit's

ruling in the Portland litigation that the transmission of Internet over cable is not a Title VI cable service. Because the
Madera County complaint was based upon an open access
condition imposed by Madera County on the transfer of

MediaOne's franchise to AT&T, the district court will be
bound by the Ninth Circuit's Portland decision and the Madera County transfer condition will be invalidated.
409

1-ewnrico County 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712.
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Judge Richard L. Williams permanently enjoined
enforcement of the county's ordinance. 4 10 The
district court found the "Road Runner" Internet
service offered by MediaOne to be properly classified as a cable service, and that Title VI as well as
Virginia law prohibited local franchising authorities from imposing an open access obligation.
The district court began its preemption analysis
by citing three key Communications Act policy directives. The first, contained in the Cable Act, declares that the purpose of Title VI is the establishment of a "national policy concerning cable
communications" that would, among other
things, "minimize unnecessary regulation that
would impose an undue economic burden on
cable systems." 41 1 The second, added by the 1996
Act, declares that "it is the policy of the United
States to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation."' 41 2 Finally, the court
cited section 636 regarding the preemptive effect
of the Communications Act: "any provision of law
of any State, political subdivision, or agency
thereof, or franchising authority, or any provision
of any franchise granted by such authority which
is inconsistent with this Act shall be deemed to be
preempted and superseded."' 4 13 Consistent with
these broad policy directives, the district court cogently held the county's ordinance to be preempted by four separate provisions of Title VI.
First, section 621 (b) (3) (D) prohibits a franchising authority from requiring "a cable operator to
provide any telecommunications service or facilities, other than institutional networks, as a condition of the initial grant of a franchise, a franchise
renewal, or a transfer of a franchise.."4 14 The Henrico ordinance violated this provision by requiring
MediaOne to "provide telecommunications facili-

ties," as a condition of franchise transfer approval. 41 5 The court found the requirement that
MediaOne provide "its cable modem platform" to
any requesting ISP "unbundled from the provision of content" (provided by the ISP) would
force MediaOne to operate its cable modem platform "to provide transmission between the points
selected by requesting ISPs and their customers,
without change in content" and thereby would require the provision of a telecommunications facil4 16
ity in violation of the statute.
Second, the ordinance violated section 624(e),
which proscribes state or local franchising authority actions that "may prohibit, condition, or restrict a cable system's use of any type of subscriber

410
The Henrico County Idecision resolved plaintiff's summary judgment motion on federal statutory preemption and
Virginia state law claims. The complaint, however, also included First Amendment and Commerce Clause claims. Id. at
713.
411
Id. at 714 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), (6)).
412
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2)).
413
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 556(c)).
414
47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (D) (2000).
415
Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed primarily on this basis. Henrico County I, 257

416
Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714. The Communications Act contains no specific definition of "telecommunications facility." The district court's reasoning that the ordinance would force MediaOne to operate its cable modem
platform to provision transmission from the points selected
by requesting ISPs and their customers, without change in
content, could also have supported a conclusion that the ordinance ran afoul of the prohibition against the imposition
of telecommunications service requirements contained in section 621(b) (3) (D). 47 U.S.C. § 541 (b) (3) (D) (2000).

' 4 17
equipment or any transmission technology."

Despite the lack of record evidence regarding the
precise technology necessary to provide thirdparty ISP access, the court found the ordinance
preempted by section 624(e) because it required
MediaOne "to use some kind of multiple access
technology and equipment .. .if MediaOne [ ]
itself decides to offer Road Runner[ ,]'4 18 thereby
bringing the ordinance in conflict with section
624(e).
Third, the open access ordinance violated section 621(c), which provides that "[a] ny cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing any
cable

service." 4 19 The

court found

that the

MediaOne Internet service, which triggers application of the open access ordinance, is a "cable
service" under section 602(6), and is therefore
subject to section 621(c).

4 20

Cable service is de-

fined under Title VI as "(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or
(ii) other programming service, and (B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for
the selection or use of such video programming

F.3d at 364, 365 ("Because the open access condition violates

418

47 U.S.C. § 544(e) (2000).
Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715.

§ 541 (b) (3) (D) of the Communications Act, our analysis may
stop at that.").

419

Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 541(c)).

420

Id. at 715.

417
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or other programming service." 42

1

The district

court reasoned that because the cable operator's
Internet service "contains news, commentary,
games, and other proprietary content with which
subscribers interact as well as Internet access," it
falls under the statutory definition of "cable service."4 22
In addition, the district court found that
"[w]hile Congress adopted certain narrowly defined requirements that set aside particular numbers of cable system channels for particular kinds
of programming, Congress prohibited regulatory
bodies from adopting access requirements for any
' 4 23
Simiadditional types of video programming."

larly, Congress enacted section 621 (c) to prevent
the imposition of additional access requirements
and "recognized that the provision would prohibit
imposition of 'the traditional common carrier requirement of servicing all customers indifferently
upon request.' "424 According to the district court,
Congress had determined, "the demand of consumers for diverse sources of programming would
be best met if 'a cable company's owners, not government officials, .

.

. decide what sorts of pro-

gramming the company would provide.' "425
Open access would violate these precepts by requiring the cable operator to provide indiscriminate access to its facilities by reason of its offering
a cable service, namely, cable modem service. The
ordinance would therefore render the cable operator "unable to make [an] individualized decision[ regarding] whether to share capacity on its
respective cable systems with any one or more
ISP[s] and on what terms[,]" as well as depriving
the cable operator of editorial control over the
content those other ISPs would offer.

42 6

Accord-

ingly, the district court found the open access ordinance to be "forbidden common carrier regula4 27
tion" under section 621 (c).

Finally, the open access ordinance was found to
47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000).
Henrico County 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 531 (cable
channels for public, educational and government use); 47
U.S.C. § 532 (cable channels for leased commercial use); 47
U.S.C. § 534 (carriage of local commercial television signals);
47 U.S.C. § 535 (carriage of noncommercial educational television); 47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (2) ("Any Federal agency, State, or
franchising authority may not require any cable system to
designate channel capacity for commercial use by unaffiliated persons in excess of the capacity specified [herein].")).
424 Id. at 715 (quoting H.R. REI'. No. 98-934, at 60
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4697).
425 Id. (quoting United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d
421

422
423
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violate the section 624(f)(1) ban on any regulatory requirement regarding the provision or content of cable services, except as expressly provided
in Title VI.428 The district court observed that this
section prohibits any additional governmental interference with the programming and related decisions of cable operators. 429 Because Henrico
County's open access requirement was "triggered"
by the cable operator's provision of its own Internet service, and would require the operator to
transmit the "content" of other ISPs, the court
held that "the Ordinance's imposition of requirements regarding both the 'provision' and the 'content' of cable services" violated section
624 J)(1).430

The district court also agreed with the cable operator that the open access ordinance was ultra
4 31
vires and therefore invalid under Virginia law.

Virginia law limits the powers of local government
to those expressly "granted by statute, and any
other power necessarily implied in or incident to
the power specifically granted or essential for
achieving the purpose of the power delegated"
(Dillon's Rule). 432 Because the Code of Virginia
granted local government specific and limited
powers with regard to cable television systems,
and this authorization did not include the power
to require open access, the court held the open
4 33
access ordinance invalid under state law.
b.

Henrico County II: Title VI Preempts Local
Regulation of Cable Operators' Provision of
"Telecommunications Facilities"

Henrico County and Verizon appealed the Henrico County Idecision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. As it did in the
Portland litigation, the FCC intervened in the appeal and filed an amicus curiae brief.4 3 4 The FCC
argued that the Fourth Circuit should uphold the
1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Id. at 716.
Id.
428
Id. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(f) (1) (2000).
Henrico County 1,97 F. Supp. 2d at 716. (citing Time
429
Warner v. City of New York, 943 F. Supp. 1357, 1367, 1399
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd sub nom. Time Warner Cable v. Bloomberg, 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997)).
430 Id. at 716.
4-31 hi. at 716-17.
432
I.
433 Id. at 717.
434 Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC, Henrico County II,
257 F.3d 356.
426
427
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district court decision based upon the section
621 (b) (3) (D) prohibition on local franchising authority requirements regarding a cable operator's
provision of telecommunications "services or facilities," and urged the court to avoid reaching the
underlying regulatory classification of cable In435

ternet service itself.

The FCC indicated its view

that the regulation or non-regulation of cable Internet would hinge upon that classification, and
that it desired to make such an important deci43 6
sion under its regulatory jurisdiction.
In a decision filedJuly 11, 2001, the Fourth Circuit essentially complied with the FCC's request
and held that Henrico County's open access condition violated section 621(b) (3) (D) 4 37 of the
Communications Act. 43 8 As noted above, section

621 (b) (3) (D) prohibits franchising authorities
from requiring "a cable operator to provide any
telecommunications service or facilities, other
than institutional networks, as a condition of the
initial grant of a franchise, a franchise renewal, or
a transfer of a franchise." 439 In his concurring
opinion, Circuit Judge Widener indicated his
agreement with the result reached by the majority, but differed as to the analysis of whether state
law provided an independent ground for disposi4 40
tion of the matter.

there was no independent state law ground for
disposing of the case "[b]ecause the open access
provision is not prohibited by either the Virginia
cable statute or by other laws of the Commonwealth."

442

This reading of Virginia law is directly contrary
to the district court's analysis that, in a Dillon's
rule state such as Virginia, 443 such statutory authorizations are to be construed narrowly, and in
doubtful cases, construed against the local governing body. 44 4 The district court, finding no express or necessarily implied authorization for local open access ordinances, had little trouble
concluding that such ordinances were ultra vires.
While the Henrico II court is correct that nothing
in the Virginia code provisions expressly prohibits
the local imposition of mandatory open access, it
is equally true that nothing in the code expressly
permits such regulation. 44 5 The majority also determined that the Virginia cable statute did not provide an independent ground for disposition because it contained a provision that prohibits any
cable regulation or ordinance that is "inconsistent ... with federal law," 446 and the question of
whether the county's open access provision was
consistent with federal law under that statute was
identical to the question presented directly under

The Fourth Circuit divided its review of the issues into the constitutional question of whether
the Communications Act preempts any power the
county may have under state law to impose cable
open access and the state law question of whether
the county has the authority under Virginia law to
enact such a requirement. The court stated that
to avoid unnecessary decisions on constitutional
grounds, it must first consider whether state law
provides an independent ground for disposition
of the case. 44 1 The Fourth Circuit concluded that

the Communications Act. 44 7 In his concurring

Id. at 13-15, 18-22.
Id. at 21-22.
437 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3) (D) (2000).
438
Henrico County II, 257 F.3d 356. Shortly after the
Fourth Circuit's decision, the Henrico County Board of Supervisors announced that the county would not appeal it.
Linda Haugsted, Henrico Will Not Appeal Decision, MULTIGCIANNEL NEWS, July 26, 2001.
439 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3) (D) (2000)

the power delegated." See Henrico County I, 97 F. Supp. 2d at
717.
444 Id. (citing Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v.
Horne, 215 S.E.2d 453, 456 (Va. 1975); City of Richmond v.
Confrere Club of Richmond, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (Va. 1990).
445
In a Dillon's Rule state, the lack of an affirmative delegation of authority should end the matter. Inasmuch as local authority to impose open access is not necessarily implied
in, incident to, or essential for achieving the purposes of the
Virginia cable statute, Dillon's Rule would appear to invalidate the Henrico County open access ordinance.
446
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2108(E) (Michie 1997 & Supp.
2001).
447 Henico County 11, 257 F.3d at 362.
448
Id. at 366 (Widener, C.J., concurring).

435

436

440

Henrico County H1, 257 F.3d 356-66.

442

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.

443

"Dillon's Rule" provides that local governments hold

441

only those powers granted by statute, which includes any
other power "necessarily implied in or incident to the power
specifically granted or essential for achieving the purpose of

opinion, Judge Widener noted that in view of this
provision, the Court should have rested its decision solely on the fact that the local ordinance is
contrary to state law, in deference to the state's
obvious attempt to avoid routine constitutional
preemption of its statutes. 448 Thus, despite its protestation to the contrary, the court appears to
have reached out to decide, rather than avoid, the
constitutional question.
Turning to the preemption issue directly, the
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Fourth Circuit engaged in an analysis of the cable
Internet service highly reminiscent of the Ninth
Circuit. The court found:
MediaOne's Road Runner service combines the use of
a cable modem platform with access to the Internet.
Road Runner's cable modem platform, separated from
its Internet service component, is a telecommunications facility because it is a pipeline for telecommunications, that is, for 'the transmission .

.

. of information

of the user's choosing, without change in the form
or content.' The open access provision therefore requires MediaOne to provide 'telecommunications ... facilities . . as a condition of... a44transfer of a
franchise' in violation of § 541 (b) (3) (D). 9

Here, the court followed the lead of the Ninth
Circuit in Portland II by separating, for the purposes of analysis, the physical infrastructure from

the "Internet service component." Yet, in contrast
to the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit deferred
to the FCC and its stated desire to answer the service classification question in its regulatory capacity. Thus, the Fourth Circuit declined to reach any
of the other bases adopted by the district court for
invalidating the County's open access requirement, including the district court's holding that
MediaOne's Road Runner Internet service constituted cable service within the meaning of the
Communications Act. The Fourth Circuit expressly declined to reach a determination regarding the proper regulatory classification of Internet
access service provided over cable systems; i.e.,
whether cable Internet service should be deemed
to be "cable," "telecommunications" or "informa4 1
tion" service under the Communications Act.
Instead, the Court accepted, "for the time being,"
the FCC's invitation to allow the agency to make
such a determination in the first instance. The
court reasoned that "[b]ecause the open access
condition violates § 541 (b) (3) (D) . . . our analysis
45 1
of federal law may stop at that."
With regard to the analysis of section
621(b) (3)(D), the Fourth Circuit's decision appears to differ in a subtle but significant way from
that of the district court. The district court held
that Henrico County's franchise transfer requirement-namely, that the operator provide non-discriminatory access to multiple ISPs upon request-would essentially convert the cable system
Id. at 363. (citations omitted).
Id. at 365. ("[W]e do not have to reach the question
of whether MediaOne's bundled Road Runner service is a
cable service, a telecommunications service, or an information service. For the time being, therefore, we are content to
leave these issues to the expertise of the FCC.").
449
451
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into a telecommunications facility and thereby violate the statute. 45 2 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's analysis quoted above may be interpreted to
find that the "cable modem platform," standing
alone, is a telecommunications facility. 453 The

court's lack of precision in this piece of analysis
further darkens the already murky jurisprudential
waters surrounding the provision of Internet over
cable.
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on the "telecommunications facility" theory does not, in itself, imply any conclusion about whether cable modem
service is a cable service, a telecommunications
service or an information service. To reach the
conclusion that cable modem service uses a "telecommunications facility," the court considered
the transmission element of the cable modem service separately from the content provided to cable
modem customers. It determined that "telecommunications facilities" are "the physical installations or infrastructure necessary for transmission"
of telecommunications. 454 In that context, the

Fourth Circuit concluded that the cable modem
platform is a "telecommunications facility" and,
therefore, is subject to the limitations of section
621 (b) (3) (D).
The decision does not conclude that cable
modem services are "telecommunications services," subject to common carrier obligations, but
also does not require that these services be
treated as either cable services or information services. Nevertheless, the court's statement that the
cable modem platform is a telecommunications
facility could easily be misinterpreted as a finding
that the cable modem service is a telecommunications service. Although the statutory provisions
draw a careful distinction between "telecommunications" and "telecommunications service," and
establish that non-telecommunications services
can be provided via telecommunications, these
distinctions easily are obscured or misunderstood.
Moreover, although the court apparently separated the transmission component of cable
modem service purely for analytic purposes,
rather than deciding that such transmission actu451

Id. at

364.

Henrico County 1, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
453 Henrico County I1, 257 F.3d at 363.
454 Id. ("Telecommunications" is the "transmission ... of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the
form or content.") (citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(43)).
452
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ally constitutes a separable service4 55 the language of the Fourth Circuit opinion is ambiguous
enough to be misunderstood as a determination
that the "cable modem platform" is a telecommunications offering independent of cable Internet
services such as RoadRunner and @Home. Therefore, while purporting to affirm the district
court's section 621 (b) (3) (D) analysis, the court's
confusing references to a "telecommunications facility," may provide open access proponents with
another basis to argue that the provision of cable
modem service is a telecommunications service
456
subject to common carrier obligations.
By declining to rule directly on the regulatory
classification issue, the Henrico County II decision
avoided a direct "split in the circuits" between the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits regarding the appropriate service classification of Internet over cable
and thus decreased the likelihood of direct review
by the United States Supreme Court.4 57 Although
the Portland, Broward County and Henrico County
cases differ in their reasoning and approach to
the question of the appropriate regulatory classification of Internet services provided over cable systems, in every case, local open access ordinances
have been invalidated as contrary to preeminent
federal law.

455 Such an approach would be similar to that of the
Ninth Circuit, which found that cable modem service "consists of two elements: a 'pipeline' . . . and the Internet service
transmitted through that pipeline.... However, to the extent
that @Home provides its subscribers Internet transmission
over its cable broadband facility, it is providing a telecommunications service as defined in the Communications Act."
Portland11, 216 F.3d at 878.
456
Open access proponents wasted no time in exploiting
the ambiguity of the Fourth Circuit's decision. In commenting on the decision, Thomas J. Tauke, Verizon's senior vice
president-public policy and external affairs, stated the Henrico
County II decision was important because it "once again suggested that the cable modem is telecommunications equipment. It didn't say specifically telecommunications ser-

vices . . .but that was the implication." Brian Hammond &

Lynn Stanton, Cable TV System OperatorsMove Forward With Access Deals in Wake of Court Victories, TELECOMMS. REPS.,July 23,
2001, at 8.
457
The Supreme Court'sJanuaiy 22, 2001, grant of certiorari petitions in the Eleventh Circuit pole attachment case,
discussed infra, also has the potential of settling the regulatory classification issue, despite the fact that appellants have
specifically asked the Court to rule more narrowly and affirm
the FCC's approach. Meanwhile, in the absence of a definitive ruling from the FCC or the federal courts, local and state
jurisdictions continued their attempts to sort through the
regulatory classification issues presented by so-called "media

4.

Eleventh Circuit Pole Attachment Order-Internet
Services are Neither Telecommunications Nor
Cable Services, But Rather Are Information

Services
Yet another federal court of appeals decision,
that of the Eleventh Circuit in a pole attachment
case, 4 58 also may have direct bearing on the legal
picture surrounding open access in general, and
particularly on the authority of localities within
the circuit to impose open access as a cable
franchising requirement. In Gulf Power v. FCC, a
group of major electric utilities challenged an
FCC order determining, inter alia, that the lower
"cable only" pole attachment rate pursuant to
section 224(d) (3) of the Communications Act would
apply to pole attachments used for both cable and
Internet services. 459 1 The FCC had rejected use of
the higher "telecommunications" rate for facilities
carrying blended cable and Internet services, as
well as the utilities' claim that they could charge
an unregulated market rate for such attachments. 46 0 The FCC concluded that it possessed a
broad statutory mandate under section 224(b) (1)
to set rates, terms and conditions for "any attachments by a cable television system," regardless of
the particular services provided over such attach-

convergence." For example, the Massachusetts Department
of Telecommunications and Energy accepted the cable service classification and ruled that local cable franchising jurisdictions exceeded their authority by enacting open access ordinances in connection with their review of the AT&T/
MediaOne cable franchise transfers. MediaOne of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen of the Town of North
Andover, Docket No. CTV 99-2, 99-3, 99-4, 99-5 (Mass. Dep't
of Telecomm. and Energy, Cable Television Div. May 1,
2000) (available at http://www.state.ma.us/dpu/catv/
Appeals/sumdecfnl.pdf). In a radically different approach to
the issue of cable open access in the context of a state-level
franchise renewal proceeding, the Vermont Public Service
Board tentatively concluded that Internet services offered by
a cable provider constituted "telecommunications service"
under Vermont law. Petitions for renewal of Certificates of
Public Good; Motion of Vermont Department of Public Service, Docket Nos. 6101, 6223, Opinion and Order (Vt. Pub.
Serv. Bd. Apr. 28, 2000), available at http://www.state.vt.us/
psb/orders/document/61016223finalorder.pdf.
458 Gulf Power I1,208 F.3d 1263, cert. granted,121 S. Ct.
879.
459
See In re Implementation of Section 703(e) of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment of the Commission's Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 6777, 6793-96, paras. 30-35
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 Pole Order].
460
Id.
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ments.

46

'

The Eleventh Circuit overturned the FCC order, in part, and concluded that Internet services
could not be considered either Title VI cable services under the amended definition of cable services or telecommunications services under relevant FCC precedent. 462 According to the majority,
therefore, the FCC was without jurisdiction over
pole attachments for facilities used in providing
cable Internet services. 463 Over a vigorous dissent,
the majority dismissed the FCC's argument that
its broad jurisdiction over "any attachments" permitted it to assess the lower "cable only" rate for
Internet over cable. 4 64 The court read the statute
as requiring regulated rates for attachments used
to provide either cable or telecommunications
services, and nothing more. 465 The court also rejected the argument that addition of the statutory
language "or use" to the preexisting definition of
466
cable services could cover Internet services.
The court noted the FCC's previous finding that
"Internet service providers themselves provide information services." 4 7 The Eleventh Circuit
therefore concluded "the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate the Internet under the 1996
Act based on the theory that Internet service is a
cable service." 468 Finally, the court noted the
FCC's finding that "the Internet is not a telecommunications service" under the 1996 Act. 4 69 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded, "there
is no statutory basis for the FCC to regulate the
Internet as a telecommunications service under
47
the 1996 Act." 0
The Eleventh Circuit's Gulf Power II decision exemplifies how courts can be led astray by a combination of silence from the expert agency charged
with interpreting federal law and an analysis that
reads the relevant statute in a vacuum divorced
from its underlying policies. The court's first error was a factual one; namely, the inaccurate observation that the FCC had interpreted the 1996
Act "to require that utility companies give Internet providers access to their poles because the
461
462
463
464
465

Id. at 6795-96, para. 34.
Gtlf Power II, 208 F.3d at 1276-77.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1273, 1275-76.
Id. at 1276.

Id. at 1276-77.
Id. at 1277 (quoting UniversalService Report to Congress,
13 FCC Rcd. at 11,501, 11,532-33, para. 66).
466

467
468

Id.

469

Id. (citing 1998 Pole Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6795, para.
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Internet was a cable service." 4 7' This factual error

may have led to the court's dubious conclusion
that "the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate
the Internet under the 1996 Act based on the theory that Internet service is a cable service." 472 The

FCC never has adopted such a theory. In fact, the
FCC has studiously avoided determining the regulatory category for "Internet service" and certainly
has never stated that "the Internet was a cable service," as the court asserted. Indeed, in the 1998
Pole Order cited by the court as support for this assertion, the FCC specifically determined that it
"need not decide . . . the precise category into

which Internet services fit. Such a decision is not
necessary in order to determine the pole attachment rate applicable to cable television systems
using pole attachments to provide traditional
473
cable services and Internet services."

Although the FCC avoided making a determination regarding the classification of cable Internet service, it also avoided the Eleventh Circuit's error of analyzing the text of the statute
without considering its purpose. The FCC's analysis in the 1998 Pole Order integrated the congressional purpose underlying the Pole Attachment
Act:
The purpose of the amendments to Section 224 made
by the 1996 Act was similar to the purpose behind Section 224 when it was first enacted in 1978, i.e., to remedy the inequitable position between pole owners and
those seeking pole attachments. The nature of this rela-

tionship is not altered when the cable operator seeks to
provide additional service. Thus, it would make little
sense to conclude that a cable operator should lose its
rights under Section 224 by commingling Internet and
traditional cable services. Indeed, to accept contentions
that cable operators expanding their services to include

Internet access no longer are entitled to the benefits of
Section 224 would penalize cable entities that choose to
expand their services in a way that will contribute 'to
promot[ing] competition in every sector of the communications
industry,' as Congress intended in the 1996
74
4

Act.

In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit based its analysis on what it called "the unambiguous language

33; In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Recommended Decision, 12 FCC Rcd. 87, 123, para. 69 (1996)).
470

Id.

Id. at 1269 (citing 1998 Pole Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at
6795-96).
472
Id. at 1277.
47'
1998 Pole Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6795, para. 34.
474 Id. at 6794, para. 31 (quoting 1996 Act preamble)
(footnotes citing legislative histories of the Pole Attachment
Act and the 1996 Act omitted).
471
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without considering the Act's

purpose.
The 1996 Act calls for the Commission to establish two
rates for pole attachments. One, described in section
224(d) applies to 'any pole attachment by a cable television system solely to provide cable service.' ...The second rate applies to 'charges for pole attachments used
by telecommunications carriers to provide telecommunications services.' For the FCC to be able to regulate
the rent for an attachment that provides Internet service then, Internet service must qualify as4 either
a cable
76
service or a telecommunications service.

In addition to ignoring the congressional policies underlying section 224, the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis fails to give effect to Congress's mandate
that the FCC "shall regulate the rates, terms, and
conditions for pole attachments," 4 77 which Congress defined as "any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
services." 47 8 As Judge Carnes observed in dissent,
"the adjective 'any' is not ambiguous; it has a wellestablished meaning.... that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.' ... Applying that

definition to sections 224(a) (4) and (b) (1), the
FCC has the authority to regulate all attachments ....[including] those attachments used to
provide ... Internet services." 4 79 The directive in
subsection 224(d) (3) to apply certain rates to
"any pole attachment used by a cable television
system solely to provide cable service,"' 4

0

there-

fore does not preclude the FCC from regulating
other pole attachments as the Eleventh Circuit
concluded. 48 1 In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit's
4 2
focus on the nature of the services provided
rather than the nature of the attaching entity and
the nature of the existing pole use specified in
section 224(a), the FCC observed that:

Rather, a 'pole attachment' is defined to include any
attachment by a 'cable television system.' Thus, the
rates, terms and conditions for all pole attachments by
a cable television
system are subject to the Pole Attach48 3
ment Act.

Having made the questionable finding that the
nature of the service provided-rather than the
service provider-determined whether a pole attachment was subject to the statute, the Eleventh
Circuit majority also rejected the argument that
Congress's addition of the words "or use" to the
statutory definition of cable services under section
602 (6)484 was intended to encompass Internet services when those services were provided over
cable television system facilities. 48 5 Although the
court acknowledged the FCC's determination that
"Internet service providers themselves provide information services [,]"486 it selectively quoted from
the legislative history of the 1996 Act to support
the conclusion "that Congress expanded the definition to include services that cable television
companies offer to their customers to allow them
to interact with traditional video programming
services." 48 7 As noted earlier, the 1996 Conference Report actually stated that:
[t]he conferees intend the amendment to reflect the
evolution of cable to include interactive services such as
game channels and information services made available to
subscribers by the cable operator, as well as enhanced services. This amendment is not intended ...to cause dialup access to information services over
telephone lines
88
to be classified as a cable service."

[t]he definition of 'pole attachment' does not turn on
what type of service the attachment is used to provide.

Based upon congressional intent as expressed in
the legislative history of the 1996 Act, if Internet
service is an information service, as the court appeared to acknowledge, its conclusion that Congress did not intend such services to constitute
cable service when provided by a cable operator
over a cable television system is erroneous.

Gulf Power 11, 208 F.3d at 1276.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting 47
U.S.C. §§ 224(d) (3), 224(e) (1)).
477 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2000).
478
47 U.S.C. § 224(a) (4) (2000) (emphasis added).
479
GulfPower II, 208 F.3d at 1280 (Carnes,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
480
47 U.S.C. § 224(d) (3) (2000).
481 To the extent that section 224(d) (3) could reasonably be interpreted as narrowing the scope of sections
224(b) (1) and 224(a) (4), the statute is susceptible to two different meanings and is ambiguous by definition. Pursuant to
the now familiar Chevron analysis, therefore, the Eleventh
Circuit should have deferred to the FCC's interpretation of
the statute. "Congress is well aware that the ambiguities it
chooses to produce in a statute will be resolved by the implementing agency." Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397 (citing Chev-

ron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)).
482
Gulf Power II, 208 F.3d at 1274 (stating that the statute
"by negative implication does not give the FCC authority over
attachments to poles for wireless communications." (footnote
omitted) (emphasis in original)); "The 1996 Act allows the
Commission to regulate the rates for cable service and telecommunications service, Internet service in neither." Id. at
1276 (emphasis added).
48-3
1998 Pole Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6793-94, para. 30.
484
47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2000).
485
Gulf Power II, 208 F.3d at 1276-77.
486
Id. at 1277 (quoting Universal Service Report to Congress,
13 FCC Rcd. at 11,532-33, para. 66).
487
Id. (footnote omitted).
488
1996 Conf. Report at 169, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 182.

475
476
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If upheld on appeal, the practical effect of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision would be the removal
from federal regulation of any pole attachment
used to provide Internet services in addition to
traditional cable television or telecommunications
services. If applied in the context of open access,
the court's conclusion that Internet service is not
a cable service also would prohibit local franchising authorities within the states comprising the
Eleventh Circuit from requiring open access as a
cable franchise condition. On May 26, 2000, the
FCC and others petitioned the Eleventh Circuit
for rehearing, arguing that the ruling "attributes
to Congress an inexplicable intent to penalize
cable companies for providing high-speed In4 11

5.
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Summary
One practical consequence of the FCC's "hands

off' approach to cable open access has been the
resulting lack of "controlling legal authority" on
the question of the appropriate regulatory classification for the cable Internet service. The FCC, of
course, cannot expect to benefit from the important doctrine of Chevron deference without first

providing the courts a statutory interpretation to
which they may comfortably defer. 4 94 The FCC

repeatedly declined to address the classification
question, citing the lack of need to answer the
question in the context of particular proceedings
49 5
before it.
Courts that have been asked to ad-

the Supreme Court supplying "controlling legal
authority" on the question of the appropriate regulatory classification of Internet over cable, despite the requests of the appellants that the pole
attachment rate issue be decided in accordance
with the FCC's original decision.

dress this question either directly or indirectly
have found the cable Internet issue to be somewhat of an "attractive nuisance." The Ninth Circuit used silence from the expert administrative
agency as a springboard to reach its conclusions
about the nature of the service and how it ought
to be regulated. As discussed above, the deternination that AT&T's @Home service was not a
cable service within the meaning of the Communications Act was sufficient to resolve the controversy before the court; therefore, its conclusions
regarding other regulatory classifications of cable
Internet service were wholly unnecessary to the
decision and may be considered dicta. 4 1'1Nonetheless, the court's ruling on the regulatory classification question has had far reaching consequences specifically for cable operators and local
governments within the Ninth Circuit, and for national regulatory policy generally. The Eleventh
Circuit simply proceeded to make its own determination on the question, in the context of nationwide rules establishing the rates for cable and
telecommunications pole attachments. If the Elev-

489 Petition by Respondents for Panel Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, GulfPower 11,208 F.3d

communications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order in CC
Docket No. 98-14 7, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-

at 1263 (No. 98-6222) (emphasis in original).

98, 14 FCC Rcd. 20,912, 20,941-42, para. 59 (1999)).
492
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 226 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir.
2000).
493- Gulf Power 1l, 121 S.Ct. 879.
494 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (both courts and administrative agencies "must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress"; however, where a statute is silent or ambiguous, courts will defer to an agency's reasonable construction of the statute).

ternet access."

The FCC asserted, inter alia, that

the court need not have reached out to address a
"controversial issue with enormous implications
beyond this case: whether a cable company's provision of Internet access is properly characterized
as a 'cable service,' a telecommunications service,"
or an 'information service.' 4' 1 1 Although it is
"central to the 'open access' debate," the FCC
stated that it has taken no position on that issue to
date. 49' The Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing, 4 9 2 but stayed the issuance of its mandate
pending resolution of petitions for certiorari to
the Supreme Court. On January 22, 2001, the
United States Supreme Court granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the FCC and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association
("NCTA"). 493 This action raises the prospect of

490

The FCC argued that the panel erroneously con-

cluded that a cable attachment receives statutory protection
only if it is used to provide services falling within one of the
two "rate boxes" described in sections 224(d) and 224(e) of
the Act. According to the FCC, the Pole Attachment Act cov-

ers all attachments of cable television systems, regardless of
the services provided over those attachments, and grants the

FCC discretion to extend the lower "cable only" pole rate to
cable attachments used for mixed cable and Internet services. Id. at 7-11 & n.1.
491
Id. (citing In. re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Tele-

495 See, e.g.,
AT&T/MediaOne Merger Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at
9872, para. 126; AT&T/TCI Transfer Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at

3191, para. 60.
4911 See supra note 351; Reef Indus. Inc., 54 F.3d at 1472.
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enth Circuit's ruling is left standing, cable operators deploying advanced Internet services will face
unregulated rates for their pole attachments, and
the FCC's regulatory authority will be diminished.
The Fourth Circuit recognized the absence of guidance to date from the expert agency as a reason
not to decide the service classification issue, but
even here appears to have reached out to decide
more than it needed to resolve the dispute. Similarly, the issue continues to be examined by several state utility commissions with varying results.
Moreover, the consequences of statutory service
classification are not confined to the area of substantive service regulation alone. Significant
franchise fee and tax consequences may flow from
categorization of plant as either "telecommunications" or "cable." 49 7 Resolution of difficult regulatory policy questions such as the appropriate regulatory status of cable Internet services should be
left to the agency created by Congress to make
such decisions as a matter of its primary jurisdiction. But in order to expect deference from the
courts in such matters, the FCC must carefully
protect its jurisdiction in the first instance by fully
explaining the bases for its policy choices and,
where necessary, supplying timely, authoritative
interpretative guidance for the statute it is
charged to administer. The ambiguities of the
Communications Act and particularly the Telecommunications Act of 1996, are legion 498 and
the need for administrative policy and interpretative guidance has been nowhere more clearly
demonstrated than by the cable open access litigation.

As stated above, in view of its recognition of the
widespread confusion regarding the regulatory

status of Internet services provided over cable, as
well as the controversial issues raised regarding
the need to establish a national policy with respect to "open" or "forced" access to the cable Internet platform, the FCC initiated a Notice of Inqui.ry on September 28, 2000.4 .'9 The stated
purpose of the Open Access NOI was to gather information regarding, among other things, the appropriate regulatory classification for Internet services provided over facilities originally
constructed for the delivery of cable television signals. 50 0 The Open Access NOI remains a "Pandora's
Box" of possible regulatory consequences for an
array of communications service providers, including broadcasters, competitive local exchange
carriers, wireless service providers and entities using unlicensed spectrum technologies. Although
the focus is primarily on the issue of third-party
access to the cable Internet platform, the Open Access NOI also sends the unmistakable message that
the FCC could adopt an approach that would fundamentally alter the provision of Internet services
by all industry sectors.
The Open Access NOI acknowledges that the
FCC's approach has been one of regulatory restraint with respect to cable's high-speed Internet
services5 °1' and asks whether it should continue its
2
existing "hands off' policy. 511
Among the many
unanswered questions is whether FCC policy
should encourage facilities-based competition
among a variety of vertically integrated networks,
or impose common carrier-like requirements on
each infrastructure provider, regardless of the media or technology used. 511" The relevant legal and
policy issues are explored through the approximately 180 questions posed regarding the regulatory framework for cable, information, telecommunications and advanced services, the status of
access to cable's infrastructure, whether access

497
See, e.g., Reply Comments of the California Cable Television Association, GEN Docket No. 00-185, 11-16 (filed
Jan. 10, 2001) ("[T] he regulatory classification issues at stake
in the NOI have a real impact on cable operators' taxes and
fees"; Portland H holding may also trigger provision of the
California Internet Tax Freedom Act, which bars imposition
of franchise fees on cable modem services if the services are
considered telecommunications services as well as a "utility
user" tax that applies in the City of Los Angeles to telecommunications but not cable services; California law subjects
regulated telephone companies to assessment by the State
Board of Equalization whereas cable companies are subject
to local assessment under a different set of rules); see also Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. 11, 112
Stat. 2681-719 (1998). In addition, under federal tax law,

cable plant and telecommunications plant are subject to different depreciation schedules and related tax treatment.
49a8 See Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. at 397.
It would be a gross understatement to say that the [1996
Act] is not a model of clarity. It is in many important
respects a model of ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction. That is most unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial segment of the
economy worth tens of billions of dollars.
id.
499' Open Access NO1, 15 FCC Rcd. 19,287.
500
i.at 19,293, para. 14.
501
Id. at 19,288-89, para. 4.
502
ld. at 19,288-89, 19,301, paras. 4, 35.
503 Id. at 19,305, paras. 44-46.
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should be mandated, and what that mandate
5 4
would specifically entail. 11

The FCC's underlying concept appears to be
similar to the Ninth Circuit's approach in Portland
II; namely, that cable Internet service might be
comprised of two distinct elements or components-an unregulated information service element and a telecommunications or transport element-and that these separate components
potentially could be treated differently for regulatory purposes. If the FCC departs from its own
precedent and takes this approach, two key questions will emerge. The first is whether the FCC is
willing to permit the "telecommunications" component of the cable Internet service to be provided on a "private carriage" basis (as it arguably
is today) or will insist on imposing "common carrier" obligations on the cable or other network
operator, including the obligation to serve all ISPs
indiscriminately and on non-discriminatory rates,
terms and conditions of service. The second is
whether this approach will be confined to the
cable Internet service and platform, or will be applied to other facilities-based providers of Internet connectivity or transmissions. 50

5

Applying

open access only to the cable Internet service
would raise issues of fundamental fairness, while
the imposition of common carrier obligations on
every communications distribution technology
would call for a wholesale revamping of the existing regulatory framework, with significant effects on existing businesses.
The first portion of the Open Access NOI sought
comment on the appropriate regulatory classification for Internet over cable, including whether it
should be treated tinder the Communications Act
as a Title VI cable service, a Title II telecommunications service, a Title I (unregulated) information service, a section 706 "advanced telecommunications capability" or as a yet undefined, new
category. 51" The FCC also sought comment on
Id. at 19,293-308, paras. 14-56.
For example, the American Automobile Association
("AAA") filed reply Comments in which AAA seeks the imposition of open access requirements on the Telematics industry so that drivers will have a choice among service providers
in their cars. Telematics integrates conventional wireless
technology, high-speed mobile connections to the Internet,
global positioning systems and other technology to produce
devices capable of providing safety to drivers. Today, automobile manufacturers are entering into exclusive contractual arrangements with wireless and other communications service
providers to provide telematics features in their automobiles.
504
505

how it should treat services that may fall into
more than one category.50 7
The second portion is devoted to issues surrounding the implementation of mandatory open
access, including: (a) how the FCC should define
open access; (b) whether it is a desirable policy
goal and, if so, what would be appropriate means
of achieving that objective (i.e., the present market-based approach or regulatory intervention);
(c) whether a uniform framework should apply to
all providers of high-speed services; and (d) an examination of the technical and operational issues
5 1°
associated with open access. 1

The Open Access NOI observed that most open
access proposals entail two broad elements that
would provide unaffiliated ISPs with the right to
(1) purchase transmission capability and (2) access the customer directly through the incumbent
cable operator's facilities.5 0

9

These obligations ap-

pear to be simply variants of the traditional common carrier requirements of just, reasonable and
non-discriminatory rates, terms and conditions of
service.5 10 Significantly, the FCC sought comment
on how the imposition of any of the foregoing
open access paradigms on cable networks would
affect other providers of high-speed services, such
as those that use wireless, satellite, broadcast and
unlicensed spectrum technologies. 5 1' Like cable

operators, currently none of these providers is
prohibited from having an exclusive relationship
with a particular ISP.512 The adoption of any of

the open access models discussed in the Open Access NOI for cable and other providers of highspeed Internet services would undermine many
existing and planned business models based upon
the exclusive and bundled provision of Internet
content and transmission over any medium.
For the last two years, the FCC has repeatedly
declined calls to regulate cable Internet services
in light of its findings that market conditions have
shown increasing levels of facilities-based competiAAA fears
be forced
providers.
185, at 12
506

22-24.
507

508
509
510
511

512

that, without government intervention, drivers will
to change automobiles in order to change service
Reply Comments of the AAA, GEN Docket No. 00(filed Jan. 10, 2001).

Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. at 19,296-98, paras.
Id. at 19,297, para. 23.
Id. at 19,300-06, paras. 32-49.
d. at 19,298, para. 27.
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2000).
Open Access NO[, 15 FCC Rcd. at 19,305, para. 44.
Id. at 19,299, para. 29.
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tion in "last mile" markets for broadband Internet
access. The final section of the Open Access NOI addressed the FCC's options: continuation of its current "hands off' approach, initiation of a rulemaking proceeding, and/or exercise of its
forbearance authority under the Act with respect
5 13
to telecommunications carriers or services.
Specifically, the FCC questioned whether market conditions warrant forbearance from regulating Internet over cable. 5 14 In recognition of tele-

phone company calls for "regulatory parity"
between the high-speed cable Internet service and
their DSL offerings, the FCC asked whether those
same market conditions should result in forbearance under section 10 of the Communications Act
from current regulatory requirements imposed
on telecommunications carriers' provision of
high-speed access services. 51 5 Section 10 permits
the FCC to forbear from applying any regulation
or provision of the Act "to a telecommunications
carrier or telecommunications service, or class of
telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services." 5 16 There is no comparable broad
statutory forbearance authority for Title VI cable
517
services.
Without endorsing this outcome, the authors
note that an FCC desiring to preserve its regulatory jurisdiction has much to gain from classifying
the Internet transmission services of any facilitiesbased carrier as telecommunications services, including:
0 The ability of the FCC to exert jurisdiction
over a vast array of providers that it does not
now regulate for this purpose, while at the
513

Id. at 19,306-08, paras. 50-56.

514

Id. at 19,307-08, paras. 53-56.
Id. at 19,296-97, para. 22.
47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2000).

515
516

See Esbin, supra note 1, at 117.
To reconcile the conflicting directives of placing cable
Internet services tinder a Title VI regulatory regime, and
yet preserving the unregulated nature of the Internet,
the Commission may need additional, express Title VI
forbearance authority. If it had such authority, the Commission could then fully effectuate congressional intent
with respect to cable Internet services by combining
such targeted regulatory actions as it finds are necessary
to promote infrastructure development and competition, with equally targeted regulatory 'forbearance'
where application of the full panoply of regulation
would slow infrastructure development or competition.
Id.
At the FCC's regularly scheduled February 22, 2001, Open
Agenda meeting, the then Chief of the FCC's Cable Services
517

same time reducing the scope of local government authority;
" The ability to assess universal service fund
contribution requirements, to apply requirements that networks be designed to accommodate access for persons with disabilities,
and to impose the telecommunications service subscriber privacy rules;
* The ability to utilize its Section 10 forbearance authority, should the record reveal a
marketplace solution for open access has
emerged and taken hold;
" A cleaner answer to the question of the appropriate regulated pole attachment rate for
cable lines carrying Internet traffic; and
* A defined set of service and interconnection
obligations under both the Act and FCC
rules that would require only pruning and
fine-tuning if applied to the architecturally
distinct features of the cable modem platform.
Conversely, the FCC appears to have little to
gain from classifying the transmission component
of Internet over cable as a Title VI cable service,
unless it desires to keep its "hands off' posture as a
permanent policy mandate. As the Open Access
NOI acknowledged, cable operators are not legally
prohibited from having an exclusive agreement
with the ISP of their choice. 518 Title VI precludes
the imposition of common carrier regulation on
cable operators insofar as they are providing cable
services. 51 9 And, no other provision of Title VI
readily accommodates mandatory carriage for
third-party ISPs.5 "° If Internet over cable is a cable
Bureau, Deborah Lathen, raised the possibility of a need for
Title VI forbearance authority to provide a "safe harbor" for
providers of new services that do not fit easily within traditional regulatory classifications. Cable Bureau Suggests Regulatory Forbearancefor New Services, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 23, 2001.
518
Open Access NOI, 15 FCC Rcd. at 19,299, para. 29.
519
47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000).
521
Congress required cable operators to set aside lim-

ited channel capacity for particular kinds of programming.
47 U.S.C. § 531 (2000) (public, educational, and governmental channels); 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2000) (leased commercial access); 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (2000) (mandatory carriage of
certain commercial and educational broadcasters). Congress,
however, specifically prohibited "[a] ny Federal agency, State,
or franchising authority [from requiring] any cable system to
designate channel capacity for commercial use by unaffiliated persons in excess of the capacity specified in [title VI]."
47 U.S.C. § 532(b) (2) (2000). See also Henrico County I, 97 F.

Supp. 2d at 715; IV Leased Access Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 3247.
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service, neither the FCC, states nor cities may impose open access mandates. 52 1 Cable service prov-

iders do not contribute to the universal service
fund on the basis of their cable service revenues,
nor are their networks subject to disabilities access
requirements. These may be among the reasons
why the Kennard FCC did not appear to favor the
"cable service" classification. 522 In addition, the
cable classification leaves the FCC in the difficult
posture of explaining why the transmission of Internet communications over local phone networks is treated differently than cable-provided
transmissions when many, including most incumbent LECs, argue that in a digital world, "bits are
bits."
The other category that could easily apply to
the cable Internet service is the information service category. The legislative history accompanying passage of the 1996 Act explicitly states that
the purpose of adding the words "or use" to definition of cable services was to "reflect the evolution of cable to include interactive services such as
game channels and information services made available to subscribers by the cable operator, as well
as enhanced services."52 Thus, Congress intended
to bring information services provided by cable
operators over cable systems under the Title VI
framework. This result is desirable because such a
classification simultaneously secures Title VI treatment for advanced cable Internet services provided on a commingled basis with traditional
cable television offerings, while leaving the manner in which cable operators provide their Internet services free from unnecessary common
carrier regulation. Indeed, all cable services can
be considered a specialized form of "information
service"-there is no conflict because both cate521
Compare Henrico County 1,97 F. Supp. 2d 712, with Portland!, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146. See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (2000).
522 Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC at 19-20, PortlandHI,
216 F.3d 871 (No. 99-35609); Amicus Curiae Brief of the FCC
at 14, 16-18, Henrico County 11, 257 F.3d 356 (Nos. 001680 (L), 00-1709, 00-1719).
523
1996 Conf Report, at 169, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.
C.A.N. 10, 182 (emphasis added). Esbin, supra note 1,at
94-99 (analyzing intent of this change). But see Comstock &
Butler, supra note 56; Duffy, supra note 56 (disputing the-

ory).
524 Esbin, supra note I, at 51-52 (information service
and cable service share common origin in that neither may
be regulated as a common carrier offering); see also FCC,
OPP WORKING PAPER No. 24, TI-ROUGH TIHE LOOKING GLAss:
INTEGRATED BROADBANI) NETWORKS, REG.ui.rORY' POLICY AND
INsriTUTIONAL CHANGE

(authored by Robert M. Pepper), at

gories were created to wall-off from common carrier regulation these specialized forms of "pro524
gramming" or content services.
Moreover, cable Internet service fits the statutory definition of information services very well.
Like other Internet services, cable Internet service
offers end users "[the] capability for generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications."'

525

The FCC already

has ruled that Internet service providers provide
Internet access, e-mail, web-hosting and a variety
of related applications that fall under the information service category of Title

1.526

One open question is whether the FCC will
make explicit that this classification applies to facilities-based information service providers as well
as non-facilities-based value-added networks.
Some parties filing comments in response to the
Open Access NOI argued that the FCC's prior rulings on this issue extend only to non-facilitiesbased ISPs who purchase or lease use of the underlying telecommunications facilities from tele52 7
communications providers.
Another open question relates back to the telecommunications category: whether the FCC
would treat the "via telecommunications" component of the cable-provided information service as
a form of private (as opposed to common) carriage. Finally, it remains to be seen how the FCC
will respond to the arguments of incumbent LECs
who maintain that extending the information service classification to Internet over cable raise serious questions regarding an alleged "lack of regulatory parity" between the local telephone
company-provided and cable-provided Internet
services, in much the same way the Title VI classi25 (1998) ("[P]t seems reasonable to assume that cable television is an 'information service' Under terms of the decree."
[i.e., the antitrust consent decree directing the break-up of
the unified Bell system, from which the 1996 Act derived its
definition of 'information services' in 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)]).
525
47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2000).
52C6
Universal Service Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11,50 1;
In re Access Charge Reform, irstReport and Order, 12 FCC

Rcd. 15,982 (1997), affd sub nora. SoLthwestern Bell v. FCC,
153 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 1998); In re Implementation of the
Non-Accotinting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the
Comlnications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, II FCC Rcd.
21,905 (1996).
527
Reply Comments of Earthlink, Inc., GEN Docket No.
00-185, at 50 (filed .Jan. 10, 2001) (quoting Universal Service
Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. at 11,534 n.138).
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fication would. 528
An FCC dedicated to maintaining the "vibrant
and competitive free market that presently exists
for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regula529
tion" as mandated by section 230 of the Act,
might choose the information service classification for all providers of Internet services because
that would ensure a deregulatory outcome for all
industry segments. 530 The FCC would retain its
"ancillary" jurisdiction under Title I to intervene
if future market failure endangered its ability to
carry out specific regulatory mandates arising
5 1
under Title II, III or VI of the Act. '
VI.

CONCLUSION

The sometimes difficult policy issues surrounding communications companies' use of the public
rights-of-way for their equipment and facilities
pale in comparison to the thorny, nearly intractable category and policy issues arising from the
provision of cable Internet service. The plethora
of commentary and administrative and judicial
writing on these issues demonstrates only one
thing with certainty: there are no clear answers
under the law today. Only clear-sighted policy
choices can rescue us from this bewildering morass of finely crafted, but never entirely satisfactory, statutory definitions and consequences intended for the services of the past, not the
532
future.
These policy choices may be guided by the policy principles that Congress has already established through the Communications Act. The
purpose of the Act and the FCC itself, from the
outset, has been to achieve:
a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at
528
Comments of the United States Telecom Association,
GEN Docket No. 00-185, at 9-13 (filed Dec. 1, 2000).
529
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
530
In fact, SBC and BellSouth argue precisely this in
their Open Access NOI Comments and Reply Comments. They
propose that all broadband facilities-based information ser-

vices be given unregulated Title I "information service" classifications, regardless of the identity 'of the provider. Comments of SBC Coinmunications Inc. and BellSouth
Corporation, GEN Docket No. 00-185, at ii (filed Dec. 1,
2000). In other words, regulatory parity would effectively deregulate the Bell Companies' advanced service offerings.
531

See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.

157, 172-78 (1968) (recognizing FCC's authority over cable
television systems to the extent "reasonably ancillary to the

reasonable charges, for the purpose of national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and
property through the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing a more effective
execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate and
foreign3 commerce in wire and radio communication.5

The addition of the Cable Act in 1984 was for
the purpose of achieving similar goals; namely,
among other things, to:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which
encourage the growth and development of cable
systems...;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal,
State, and local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are
encouraged to provide the widest possible diversity
of information sources and services to the public;
and ...
(6) promote competition in cable communications
and minimize unnecessary regulation that would
impose an undue economic burden on cable systems.

53 4

The 1996 Act similarly calls for the provision of
a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private
sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and service to
all Americans by opening all telecommunications
' 53 5
markets to competition."
Section 253 of the Communications Act explicitly mandates the removal of state and local legal
and regulatory barriers to entry, not the erection
of whole new local regulatory regimes for telecommunications carriers. 536 Section 621(c) prohibits the imposition of common carrier regulation on cable services. 53 7 Section 230 explicitly
calls for the continued forbearance from regulation for the Internet and interactive computer sereffective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting").
532
Esbin, supra note 1, at 118 ("It is increasingly likely
that the above-mentioned regulatory categories [cable, telecommunications service, information service, advanced telecommunications capability] painstakingly established over
many years to further particular policy goals must necessarily
collapse of their own weight in the digital communications
world of tomorrow.").
5347 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
534 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
535 1996 Conf Report, at 113, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.
C.A.N. 10, 124.
536 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
537 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2000).
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vices. 538 Section 10 mandates forbearance from
telecommunications regulation where specified
public interest tests are met and, specifically in
the case of sections 251(c) and 27, only when
these provisions are "fully implemented. '5 3 9 Section 706 directs the FCC and the state commissions to encourage the deployment of advanced
telecommunications capabilities through various
de-regulatory means, including forbearance, price
cap regulation, measures that promote competition "or other regulatory methods that remove
54
barriers to infrastructure investment. " 11
Given these overarching, federal de-regulatory
policy mandates, even assuming arguendo that individual municipalities retained regulatory authority over cable Internet services, they should
exercise their discretion to refrain from regulation. Imposing additional regulation on cable Internet services would contravene long-standing
and frequently reiterated policy principles by: (1)
discouraging investment in advanced communications facilities and services, thereby delaying their
deployment; (2) increasing transaction costs for
communications providers, thereby increasing
consumer prices; and (3) causing an unstable and
unpredictable regulatory environment, thereby
impeding competitive entry for new communications providers.
In the case of a single platform providing multiple services, differing and potentially inconsistent
levels of regulation may apply to the various services and to the platform itself. Regulatory regimes may be harmonized by keeping paramount
the overall policy objective of increasing the number of communications "pipes" in the so-called
"last mile" and thereby increasing competition
and consumer choice while restraining prices.
This may mean the imposition of a single
franchise to use the public rights-of-way for a single system, regardless of the number of communications services or capabilities that platform may
provide.
Local policies that require redundant authori538

539
540

54'
542

47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).

47 U.S.C. § 157 note (2000).
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 697.
See Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 622; Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444;

Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986); Century

Communications, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Quincy
Cable TV, 768 F.2d 1434, cel. denied sub nom. 476 U.S. 1169;
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
543 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185-86
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zations to utilize the public rights-of-way will delay
and may undermine facilities-based competition,
and are more likely to be found inconsistent with
federal law than those that attempt creative solutions to rights-of-way management challenges.
Ironically, municipal support for increased regulation of Internet services provided by cable television systems will likely result in retarding the expansion of services provided by cable systems,
which historically has been a long sought-after
goal of local franchising authorities.
Ultimately, mandated carriage on cable networks, no matter how it is labeled, or by whom it
is imposed, would raise First Amendment concerns no less significant than those raised by the
statutory "must-carry" requirements, as the Broward County court recognized. 54 1 Cable operators
are recognized First Amendment speakers. 542 In

the case of analog must-carry, the preservation of
free over-the-air television broadcast stations was
found to be a sufficiently compelling government
interest by a bare majority of the Supreme
Court. 54- At least one court has found that there

is no equally compelling government interest to
be found in ensuring mandatory carriage for ISPs,
many of whom provide nothing more than basic
Internet connectivity without content. 544 To the

extent ISPs compete with cable operators as content providers, it is unclear why their speech
should be accorded preferential carriage rights
over the cable operator's own chosen speech or
545
content.
Additional constitutional concerns arise under
the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.5

46

Cable

operators, like other non-common carriers, attract investments in the capital markets on a set of
expectations about their businesses, many of
which would be defeated by the imposition of after-the-fact common carrier regulation that effectively takes and physically occupies significant portions of the operator's facilities for third-party use
without the consent or permission of the property
owner. 547 Should policymakers conclude that they
(1997)

[hereinafter Turner/!].
Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97.
545
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REv. 87,
125 (2000).
546
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
547 See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (a permanent physical
occupation of property is always a taking); Chicago, R.I. &
P.R. Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 80, 96 (1931) (passage of
544
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must intervene in the vibrant Internet markets
and impose access regulation on a variety of information superhighway technologies, they may find
that unanticipated constitutional roadblocks ulti-

mately bar their way. In the final analysis, constitutional questions may be avoided through the prudent and sparing exercise of regulatory authority
by all levels of government.

title is not necessary to effect a taking); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (occupation can take

the form of an easement; appropriation of navigation right is

a taking).

